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KORTE VOORSTELLING VAN HET PROEFSCHRIFT (in Dutch) 
 
De welbekende bedrijfsschandalen die de ondernemingswereld het afgelopen decennium op 
zijn grondvesten deed daveren, hebben ertoe geleid dat risicobeheersing en interne controle een 
steeds belangrijker onderdeel werden van corporate governance (zogenaamd ‘deugdelijk 
bestuur’).  Diverse nationale en internationale regelgevingen en richtlijnen stimuleren de raad 
van bestuur en het management om op een solide manier ondernemingsrisico’s te beheersen en 
openlijk te tonen dat ze hun onderneming onder controle hebben.  Meer specifiek dient de raad 
van bestuur erop toe te zien dat risicobeheersystemen en interne controles aanwezig zijn in de 
onderneming, een verantwoordelijkheid die vaak gedelegeerd wordt naar het auditcomité.  Het 
management is op zijn beurt verantwoordelijk voor het identificeren en evalueren van de 
ondernemingsrisico’s gevolgd door het opzetten, implementeren en bewaken van een degelijk 
interne controlesysteem.   
 
Door duidelijk te benadrukken dat interne audit dient bij te dragen tot de evaluatie en 
verbetering van de risicobeheersing, de interne controles en het beheer van de ondermening, 
erkent het Instituut voor Interne Auditoren (IIA) de rol van interne audit in corporate 
governance.  Interne audit is dé functie bij uitstek om de raad van bestuur, het auditcomité en 
het management te ondersteunen bij het deugdelijk besturen van de onderneming.  Dit geeft 
interne audit de mogelijkheid om zijn toegevoegde waarde voor de onderneming te tonen 
alsook om zich los te maken van het aloude imago van politieman en waakhond.  Met andere 
woorden, kennis en ervaring met betrekking tot risicobeheersing en interne controle worden 
een belangrijke troef voor interne audit om zijn rol in corporate governance te verstevigen.     
 
Dit proefschrift behandelt twee grote onderzoeksvragen.  In eerste instantie wordt de grootte 
van de interne audit verklaard.  In tweede instantie wordt dieper ingegaan op 
organisatievariabelen die een invloed hebben op de interne auditactiviteiten.  Dit proefschrift 
bestaat uit zes gerelateerde papers die samen een zo volledig mogelijk beeld van het interne 
auditberoep in een niet-Angelsaksische context trachten te schetsen.  Het combineren van 
diverse theoretische invalshoeken leidde tot vernieuwende inzichten die bijdragen tot zowel de 
academische literatuur als de ontwikkeling van het interne auditberoep.  Dit proefschrift is 
gebaseerd op een weloverwogen combinatie van kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve empirische data.   
Agency theorie toont aan dat interne audit een belangrijk toezichtsmechanisme is voor het 
reduceren van zowel interne als externe informatieasymmetrie.  Complementair aan de agency 
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theorie worden in dit proefschrift alternatieve verklaringen, gebaseerd op kenmerken van de 
controleomgeving, ontwikkeld en getest voor de grootte van de interne audit.  Het is dan ook 
een uitdaging voor verder onderzoek in dit domein om deze nieuwe theoretische benadering te 
verfijnen.  Naast het verklaren van de grootte van de interne audit worden in dit proefschrift 
organisatievariabelen bestudeerd die de interne auditactiviteiten beïnvloeden.  Interne 
auditactiviteiten dienen bestudeerd te worden vanuit de interactie tussen interne audit en zijn 
belanghebbenden, zijnde het auditcomité en senior management.  Deze interactie wordt 
gekenmerkt door het zoeken naar comfort door de belanghebbenden en het creëren van 
comfort door interne audit, meer specifiek in het domein van risicobeheersing en interne 
controle.  De nood aan comfort alsook de manier waarop interne audit comfort biedt, wordt in 
belangrijke mate beïnvloed door de corporate governance context en de status van het 
risicobeheersysteem en de interne controles.  Het wordt duidelijk in dit proefschrift dat de 
belanghebbenden van interne audit dit comfort belonen door het geven van de nodige 
ondersteuning die cruciaal is voor de aanvaarding en verdere uitbouw van de interne 
auditfunctie.   
 
Naast de academische bijdrage tracht dit proefschrift ook een bijdrage te leveren tot het interne 
auditberoep.  Het dient benadrukt te worden dat dit proefschrift enkel tot stand kon komen 
door intensieve samenwerking met deze beroepsmensen.  De inzichten uit dit proefschrift 
bieden hen een leidraad om hun positie in de hedendaagse bedrijfswereld te versterken.  
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The Role of Internal Auditing in Corporate Governance: 
Qualitative and Quantitative Insights on the Influence of Organisational Characteristics 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The increased regulatory demands for accountability, following the well-known corporate 
scandals that have shaken the worldwide business environment in the last decade, have 
brought organisations’ risk management and internal control systems into the public policy 
debates on corporate governance.  Many national and international corporate governance 
regulations and guidelines, including recent initiatives taken by the European Commission 
(2003) and the Belgian Corporate Governance Committee (2004), clearly demand that boards 
of directors and executive management adhere to sound risk management, and demonstrate 
publicly that they are in control of their organisations.  More specifically, the board of 
directors is responsible for ensuring that appropriate systems of risk management and internal 
control are in place.  In addition, an audit committee is often established to assist in carrying 
out these growing monitoring responsibilities with respect to control in the broadest sense.  
Subsequently, it is the role of executive management first, to identify and evaluate the risks 
faced by the company, and second, to design, operate and monitor a suitable system of 
internal control which implements the policies adopted by the board.   
 
By stating that internal auditing should evaluate and contribute to the improvement of risk 
management, control and governance, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) formally 
recognises the assurance and consulting role of internal auditing in corporate governance, and 
thereby, reflects existing practice:   
 
“Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to 
add value and improve an organization’s operations.  It helps an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes” (IIA, 2004). 
 
An internal audit function that meets this definition is uniquely positioned to support the 
board, the audit committee, and executive management as an essential component of their 
governance mechanisms (ECIIA, 2005).  Consequently, a significant opportunity for internal 
auditing has emerged to demonstrate its potential to add value and to break away from its 
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historical characterisation as “organizational policeman and watchdog” (Morgan, 1979).  In 
other words, expertise and knowledge of risk management and internal control become a 
source of power for internal auditing to advance and play an important assurance and advisory 
role within the contemporary corporate governance environment.   
 
In this dissertation, I deal with two major research questions.  First, I explain the size of the 
internal audit function from two different theoretical viewpoints.  Second, I go deeper into the 
organisational variables influencing internal audit practices.  Internal auditing has moved 
towards a hybrid and pro-active function that has to meet modern companies’ dual need for 
assurance and value-added suggestions on governance improvement.  Although extensive 
practitioner literature on internal auditing exists, the academic literature in this area remained 
rather limited until a few years ago (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1995; Vinten, 1996).  Since then, 
the number of studies published in international journals has increased significantly, 
illustrating the growing academic interest in this still unexplored research area.         
 
This dissertation consists of six related papers, together aiming to provide a comprehensive 
picture of the internal auditing profession.  This dissertation includes insights on the internal 
audit function (macro level) as well as insights on internal audit practices and interactions 
with organisational parties (micro level).  Throughout this dissertation, several research 
methods are applied.  Four papers are based on qualitative data stemming from theory 
specification case studies, enabling to obtain deeper insights on internal audit practices and 
the interaction with organisational parties.  In other words, existing theories or findings were 
taken into the field to asses whether they capture the heterogeneity and complexity of 
contemporary internal auditing practices.  It was kept in mind that core concepts and 
relationships may need to be re-conceptualised, refined or elaborated in order to come up with 
more specific and structured conclusions (Keating, 1995).  Two papers are based on 
quantitative data resulting from a questionnaire administered to Chief Audit Executives in 
Belgium and the annual reports of their respective companies.  These quantitative data enable 
to validate insights obtained from the qualitative data.  This mixed research method fits within 
the intention to come up with a comprehensive picture of internal auditing and provides a 
basis for sound and well-founded conclusions.  Appendix 1 gives an overview of the subject 
and the research method of all six papers.  Appendix 2 provides background information on 
the 18 case studies, conducted in 2004 and 2005.  
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The first paper explains the size of internal audit functions within Belgian companies using an 
agency model.  Data to test this model were collected from annual reports and a questionnaire 
sent to Chief Audit Executives.  The results show that the agency model has high explanatory 
power and reveal that the more diffused the ownership structure of the company, the larger 
the company and the more reporting levels within the company, the larger the internal audit 
function.  The results of this study confirm the growing role of internal auditing in monitoring 
corporate governance.   
 
The second paper identifies three organisational characteristics that influence internal audit 
practices and specifies how each of them can exert that influence.  This study is based on a 
literature review, combined with insights from six theory specification case studies.  The 
results indicate that internal audit practices are influenced by the stakeholders of internal 
audit, the organisational support for internal auditing and the risk management and internal 
control system.  
 
The third paper goes into more detail on the role of internal auditing in risk management, 
including internal control.  The paper describes and compares in a qualitative way how 
internal auditors within U.S. and Belgian companies perceive their role in risk management.  
In order to obtain adequate data, ten theory specification case studies were conducted.  The 
findings illustrate that in the Belgian cases, internal auditors’ focus on acute shortcomings in 
the risk management system creates opportunities to demonstrate their value.  Internal 
auditors are pioneering the creation of a higher level of risk and control awareness and a more 
formalised risk management system.  In the U.S. cases, internal auditors’ objective 
evaluations and opinions are a valuable input for the new internal control review and 
disclosure requirements stipulated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
 
The fourth paper, building upon the sociology of professions literature, investigates the extent 
to which audit committees are uncomfortable with risk management and internal control, and 
how internal audit can be the expert in providing comfort in these areas.  Four theory 
specification case studies reveal that audit committees need comfort with respect to the 
control environment and the internal controls in high-risk areas.  Thanks to their internal 
position, their familiarity with the company, and their proximity to people across the 
company, internal audit seems to be the most suitable mean of providing comfort and 
becoming the ‘guard of the corporate culture’.  Besides internal audit’s assurance role, active 
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involvement in the improvement of these internal controls brings a significant level of 
comfort to the audit committee.  Their unique conceptual and company-specific knowledge of 
risk management and internal control, combined with the right inter-personal skills, enables 
internal audit to provide this comfort.  Formal audit reports and presentations, together with 
informal contacts, seem to be important ways of providing this comfort.   
 
The fifth paper, based upon five theory specification case studies, offers a qualitative 
assessment of the relationship between internal audit and senior management, analysing the 
expectations and perceptions of both parties.  It was found that senior management’s 
expectations have a significant influence on internal audit, and that internal audit, generally, is 
able to meet these expectations.  Senior management wants internal audit to compensate for 
the loss of control resulting from organisational complexity.  On the one hand, senior 
management expects internal audit to play a supporting role in the monitoring and 
improvement of risk management and internal control, and wants them to monitor the 
corporate culture.  On the other hand, internal audit expects senior management to take the 
first steps in the formalisation of the risk management system.  They are also looking for 
senior management support, as this benefits their overall acceptance.     
 
The sixth paper contributes to the literature by developing three control environment 
variables, reflecting the contemporary context in which internal auditing is operating, and 
testing how these variables are related to the size of the internal audit function.  Data were 
collected from a questionnaire sent to Chief Audit Executives.  The new control environment 
variables turned out to be relevant when studying the size of the internal audit function.  The 
results show that the degree of formalisation of the risk management system and the risk 
culture are both positively associated with the size of the internal audit function.  
Furthermore, the significance of the control environment variables seems to differ between 
the smallest and largest companies.  The results of this study lead to a conceptual model for 
further research.      
 
Appendix 3 gives an overview of the key constructs discussed in this dissertation. 
 
This dissertation positions the internal audit function within the contemporary corporate 
governance context.  More specifically, each paper illustrates how current corporate 
governance requirements have an impact on the internal audit profession.  Besides, this 
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dissertation complements previous research, mainly conducted in Anglo-Saxon countries, by 
studying internal auditing within a continental European context where corporate governance 
requirements are less stringent and where, for a majority of companies, the establishment of 
an internal audit function still remains voluntary.   
 
In addition to validating the traditional agency model, this dissertation presents other 
organisational variables that have a significant influence on the size of the internal audit 
function and/or the internal audit practices.  After the identification of these organisational 
variables in paper two, the subsequent papers provide a deeper analysis of the influence of 
these variables, thereby enhancing the understanding of contemporary internal auditing 
practices.  Using qualitative data gives us a more profound insight into the specific roles of 
internal auditing in risk management and internal control as well as the influence of particular 
organisational variables.  
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PAPER 1 
THE AGENCY MODEL AS A PREDICTOR OF  
THE SIZE OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION IN BELGIAN COMPANIES 
 
The first paper, explaining the size of the internal audit function (macro level), provides an 
answer to the first research question of this dissertation.  This paper illustrates the growing 
monitoring role of internal auditing in reducing principal/agent problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control of companies, and therefore illustrates the relevance of 
studying the role of internal auditing in contemporary corporate governance.  Furthermore, 
this paper demonstrates the role of internal auditing in reducing internal principal/agent 
problems between top management and lower management, a topic that will be investigated 
in more detail, using theory specification case studies, in paper five of this dissertation.        
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THE AGENCY MODEL AS A PREDICTOR OF THE SIZE OF 
THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION IN BELGIAN COMPANIES1 
 
Gerrit Sarens 
 
Abstract:  This study attempts to contribute to the literature by explaining the size of internal 
audit functions in a non-Anglo-Saxon environment using an agency model.  Data to test this 
model were collected from annual reports and a questionnaire sent to Chief Audit Executives.  
The results show that the agency model has high explanatory power and reveal that the more 
diffused the ownership structure of the company, the larger the company and the more 
reporting levels within the company, the larger the internal audit function.  The results of this 
study confirm the growing monitoring role of internal auditing in contemporary corporate 
governance.       
 
Keywords: internal auditing, Belgium, agency theory, questionnaire, annual report. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite all of the recent attention focused on the internal audit function as one of the crucial 
parties within corporate governance (Carcello et al., 2005b), little is known about the factors 
explaining the size of the internal audit function.  Why do some companies have a large 
internal audit function, while others do not?  This is especially relevant in continental Europe, 
where internal auditing is still a relatively young profession and where corporate governance 
requirements are less stringent than they are in the Anglo-Saxon world (Sarens and De 
Beelde, 2006a).  Therefore, this study attempts to explain the size of the internal audit 
function within Belgian companies.  Following Willekens et al. (2004), it can be argued that 
Belgium is representative of a non-Anglo-Saxon environment.  At the time of this study, 
Belgian companies, with the exception of those listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) as well as banks and insurance companies, were not mandated to install an internal 
auditing function.       
 
The literature is replete with studies that have used agency theory to examine the role of 
external auditing (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981, Watts and Zimmerman, 1983).  The provision of 
audited financial statements has been confirmed to be a cost-effective contractual response to 
agency costs.  Similarly, internal auditing may also serve as a monitoring response to agency 
costs (Anderson et al., 1993; DeFond, 1992).  Relatively few studies have used agency theory 
to explain the importance of internal auditing (Adams, 1994).  Given the insights from the 
studies indicating the relevance of agency variables in explaining monitoring through 
auditing, this study adopts a traditional agency model to explain the size of the internal audit 
function in a continental European environment.  Few studies have investigated voluntary 
demand for internal auditing (Anderson et al., 1993; Carey et al., 2000; Wallace and 
Kreutzfeldt, 1991) and the present study accordingly adds to this literature.  From a practical 
point of view, companies can use the model tested in this study to decide on the size of their 
internal audit function, a question that is highly relevant in today’s business environment 
(Carcello et al., 2005b).  The results of this study confirm the explanatory power of agency 
variables such as diffusion of ownership, company size and the number of reporting levels.   
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The following section of this paper develops hypotheses for the agency model based on a 
review of the relevant literature.  The third section outlines the methodology of this study.  
The fourth section shows the empirical results.  The paper ends with a summary and 
discussion of the conclusions.     
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Agency theory postulates that a company consists of a nexus of contracts between the owners 
of economic resources (the principals) and managers (the agents) who are charged with using 
and controlling those resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Agency theory is based on the 
idea that agents have more information than principals and that this information asymmetry 
adversely affects the principals’ ability to monitor whether or not their interests are being 
properly served by agents.  It also assumes that principals and agents act rationally and that 
they will use the contracting process to maximise their wealth.  This means that because 
agents have self-seeking motives, they are likely to take the opportunity to act against the 
interests of the owners of the company.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to this dilemma as 
the moral hazard problem.  Another type of agency problem is adverse selection.  This occurs 
when the principal does not have access to all available information at the time a decision is 
made by an agent, and is thus unable to determine whether the agent’s actions are in the best 
interests of the firm.  To ensure the so-called pareto-optimality in the contracting process, 
both principals and agents will incur contracting costs.   
 
Sherer and Kent (1983) and Watts (1988) suggest that internal auditing is a bonding cost 
borne by agents to satisfy the principals’ demands for accountability.  The cost of internal 
auditing can also be judged to be a monitoring cost which is incurred by principals to protect 
their economic interests.  Agency theory contends that internal auditing, like other 
intervention mechanisms like financial reporting and external auditing, helps to maintain cost-
efficient contracting between owners and managers.  Adams (1994) illustrates that agency 
theory helps to explain the existence of internal auditing in companies but can also help to 
explain an important characteristic of the internal audit function, namely its size.  It is 
assumed that the more information asymmetry, the greater the need for monitoring to reduce 
this information asymmetry, resulting in a larger internal audit function.  In a larger internal 
audit function, there will be more staff, representing a more diverse range of skills and 
competences, that will be able to reduce a greater range of information asymmetry problems.    
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Furthermore, the scope of the internal audit work covered would be greater in a larger 
function than in a smaller function (Mat Zain et al., 2006).  It is assumed that a larger internal 
audit function has a broader scope of work and is able to cover more areas where (potential) 
information asymmetries exist.  In the following paragraphs, hypotheses will be developed 
based on the principal/agent problem that exists between the owners of resources 
(shareholders and debtholders) and the users of resources (management).   
 
Diffusion of Ownership  
Based on studies done by DeFond (1992) and Francis and Wilson (1988), explaining the 
implications of the separation of ownership and control, it can be argued that the more 
diffused the ownership of the company, the higher the divergence in preferences of the 
owners and managers and the lower the observability and control of management’s actions by 
the owners.  As the diffusion of ownership increases, it is expected that a greater demand for 
monitoring will be exhibited through a larger internal audit function to monitor the owners’ 
interests.  This is reflected in Hypothesis One.       
 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the diffusion of ownership, the larger the internal audit function.  
 
Management Share Ownership  
DeFond (1992) argues that the greater the ownership interest of managers, the more closely 
aligned their preferences are with those of the outside owners.  Since owner-managers have an 
opportunity for entrepreneurial gains, they have incentives to increase the value of the firm 
rather than shirk (Francis and Wilson, 1988).  Although the current popularity of stock-based 
compensation (Bolton et al., 2006), managers typically own only a relatively small portion of 
the organisation’s shares.  They have more incentives to allocate resources in ways that are 
not necessarily consistent with the interests of non-managing shareholders (Chow, 1982).  In 
Hypothesis Two it is expected that the smaller the managers’ ownership of shares, the greater 
the demand for monitoring, resulting in a larger internal audit function.   
 
Hypothesis 2: The smaller management’s share ownership, the larger the internal audit 
function.  
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Leverage  
Similar to the principal/agent problem between shareholders and management, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that the same problem arises out of conflicting incentives of 
debtholders and management (see also DeFond, 1992).  It is argued that as the proportion of 
debt in a company’s capital structure increases, it becomes more likely that the organisation 
will need monitoring through auditing (cf. Chow, 1982; Francis and Wilson, 1988).  Previous 
research (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Blackwell et al., 1998; Chow, 1982) supports a positive 
association between the level of debt and the demand for external auditing.  This result is 
based on the importance of accounting numbers in debt covenants, reducing the information 
asymmetry between debtholders and management, and the monitoring role of external 
auditing with respect to the reliability of these accounting numbers.  Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) indicate that auditor assurance reduces lenders’ monitoring costs.  To the extent that 
debt contracts increase the need for external auditing, Carcello et al. (2005a) recently found 
that this increased need for monitoring also affects a company’s investment in internal 
auditing.  Given the focus of internal audit’s work, reviewing different types of internal 
controls (including financial controls), and the direct or indirect impact this has on the 
reliability of accounting numbers, it is assumed that a positive relationship exists between the 
proportion of debt and the size of the internal audit function, resulting in Hypothesis Three.           
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the proportion of debt, the larger the internal audit function.   
 
Company Size 
Fama (1980) utilised agency theory to examine the hierarchical relationships that exist within 
large, divisionalised companies.  In this context, the company’s top management is viewed as 
the principal who delegates responsibility and authority to subordinate managers (agents) for 
effective utilisation of a portion of the firm’s resources, leading to moral hazard problems 
between both levels.  Top management would attempt to mitigate this moral hazard problem 
through available organisational controls including internal auditing (San Miguel et al., 1977).   
Previous empirical studies have identified a correlation between company size and the 
demand for both external and internal auditing (e.g. Carcello et al., 2005a).  A number of 
explanations have been suggested.  Chow (1982) indicated that as the total amount of 
potential wealth transfers increases with company size, the related benefits from monitoring 
increase.  Abdel-Khalik (1993) suggests that with increased size it becomes more difficult for 
principals, in this case top management, to oversee and be cognizant of the enterprise, which 
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creates a greater demand for internal auditing to compensate for the loss of control.  On the 
cost side, larger companies have opportunities to take advantage of economies of scale when 
investing in the fixed costs of an internal audit function (Anderson et al., 1993).  Once the 
internal audit function has been established, the marginal cost of its operation is likely to 
decrease with company size.  This leads to Hypothesis Four which relates the size of the 
company to the size of the internal audit function.        
 
Hypothesis 4: The larger the company, the larger the internal audit function.   
 
Number of Reporting Levels  
In a small company with only one level of hierarchy, operations are primarily controlled by 
means of direct supervision and personal observation.  As the company grows, multilayered 
hierarchies evolve and authority is often delegated down the chain of command (Abdel-
Khalik, 1993).  The reduced observability in hierarchies can cause loss of control 
(Williamson, 1967; Williamson and Ouchi, 1981).  First, observability of subordinates’ 
actions decreases as the chain of command gets longer.  Second, the longer the chain of 
command, the more likely that communication will become distorted  (Katz and Kahn, 1966).  
Third, communication down the chain of command passes through several filters, which 
subject it to summarisation, misinterpretation, and possible intentional manipulation 
(Williamson and Ouchi, 1981).  Williamson (1967) argues that as the number of hierarchical 
levels in the company increases, the demand for monitoring grows, resulting in a larger 
internal audit function as reflected in Hypothesis Five.    
 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the number of reporting levels within the company, the larger the 
internal audit function.   
 
Geographical Dispersion of the Activities  
Carcello et al. (2005a) suggest that increased organisational complexity resulting from a 
larger number of foreign subsidiaries, is associated with greater decentralisation, which in 
turns leads to a greater demand for monitoring.  Wallace and Kreutzfeldt (1991) found 
evidence that a more decentralised company will have a greater propensity to establish an 
internal audit function.  The number of countries in which the company has subsidiaries or 
operating units is a proxy for the extent of control loss.  Based on these findings, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated:    
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Hypothesis 6: The larger the number of different countries in which the company has a 
subsidiary, the larger the internal audit function.   
 
Figure 1 depicts the assumed relationship between the six agency variables and the size of the 
internal audit function.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Target Population  
Contrary to most research in this area (e.g. Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991) focusing on the 
existence of internal auditing, this model explains the size of the internal audit function within 
Belgian companies.  The target population excludes those Belgian companies that do not have 
an internal audit function, and consists of companies that are known to have an internal audit 
function, based on the membership database of the Belgian Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIABEL).  This results in a target population of 260 companies.  One can argue that we 
excluded those Belgian companies that have an internal audit function, but that are not a 
member of IIABEL.  The Belfirst database (Bureau Van Dijk)2 was used to develop a list of 
all companies, excluding banks and insurance companies, with more than 1,000 employees.  
Given previous research on internal auditing in Belgium (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 
2006b), these companies can reasonably be expected to have an internal audit function.  A list 
of 175 companies resulted that was almost completely represented by the membership 
database of IIABEL.  So, it can concluded that the target population is representative for the 
group of Belgian companies with an internal audit function.     
 
Data Collection 
The data collection for this study consisted of two parts.  First and given the limited amount 
of publicly available data, questions related to agency variables as well as the size of the 
internal audit function were incorporated into a broader questionnaire on internal auditing 
practices in Belgium.  This questionnaire was sent out in November 2005 to the head of the 
internal audit department of all 260 companies from our target population.  By March 2006, 
                                                
2
 The Belfirst database contains the annual accounts of approximately 300,000 Belgian companies.   
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after an intensive follow-up by e-mail and phone3, 85 questionnaires were returned.  This 
represents an overall response rate of 32.69 percent.  A first review revealed 12 questionnaires 
with many missing values.  Consequently, these were excluded from further analysis, yielding 
73 usable questionnaires.  This represents 28.08 percent of the target population, which is 
similar to recent studies in this area (e.g. Carcello et al., 2005a, Mat Zain et al., 2006).        
 
Second, for the 73 companies that returned a usable questionnaire, archival data were 
collected from their 2005 annual report from the Belfirst database (for Belgian companies), 
Amadeus database (for Belgian subsidiaries of a company located in another European 
country), both issued by Bureau Van Dijk, or a manual investigation of the annual report (for 
Belgian subsidiaries of a US-based company).    
 
Non-Response Bias 
To detect a possible non-response bias, Armstrong and Overton (1977) suggest comparing 
key constructs between early and late respondents4.  The analysis reveals no significant 
differences in terms of number of employees (p = .702) and total assets (p = .109) between 
early and late respondents.  Comparison of the dependent and independent variables shows 
only one significant difference between early and late respondents.  More specifically, 
management share ownership (independent agency variable) is significantly higher within the 
group of late respondents (p = .007).  Including a dummy variable for late respondents in the 
regression analysis did not change the results; the dummy variable itself was not significant (p 
> .05) in the agency model.  It can be concluded that the data do not suffer from a non-
response bias.     
 
Variable Measurement 
 
Dependent Variable  
The number of internal auditors within the internal audit function (FTE) is the dependent 
variable in the OLS regression analysis.  A closer investigation of the histogram of this 
variable reveals a strong positively skewed distribution, and an examination of the residuals 
of the regression analysis indicates a problem of heteroscedasticity.  As recommended by Hair 
                                                
3
 We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of IIABEL in this part of the data collection.  
4
 We consider those respondents returning their questionnaire during the last week of the data collection, who 
lasted 18 weeks in total, as ‘late respondents’.  
 43
 
et al. (2005), the dependent variable was transformed by computing the logarithm of the 
number of internal auditors to solve this problem.  We are convinced that this corrective 
action will increase both the predictive accuracy of both models and the validity of the 
estimated coefficients.  The dependent variable should be interpreted as a measure of 
proportional change in the size of the internal audit function.      
 
Control Variables  
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requires all listed companies to have an internal 
audit function, although it does not address the nature or effectiveness of the internal audit 
function (SEC, 2003).  Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that, due to these institutional 
requirements (cf. also Chow, 1982), within NYSE listed companies, the size of the internal 
audit function will be significantly higher.  Those Belgian companies that are directly listed 
on the NYSE or whose parent company is NYSE listed are controlled by including a dummy 
variable.  Some industries face substantial regulatory scrutiny that may increase the 
importance of internal auditing (Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991).  For example, financial 
institutions are highly regulated and have compliance risks that exceed those in many other 
industries (Basel Committee, 2001).  Therefore, those companies operating in the financial 
sector (banks and insurance companies) are controlled by including a dummy variable.  It can 
be reasonably expected that these companies will have a larger internal audit function.  Data 
for both control variables were collected through the questionnaire.   
 
Independent Variables 
Consistent with Francis and Wilson (1988) and given the limited availability of data, the 
diffusion of ownership is measured by the largest individual percentage of stock ownership at 
the end of 2005.  The smaller this percentage, the more diffused the ownership structure.  This 
percentage is obtained from the annual report.  The questionnaire also asks for this 
percentage, which is only used if the annual report did not contain the information.  
Management share ownership is measured by the percentage of shares that was owned by 
managers at the end of 2005 (cf. Chow, 1982).  For non-US companies, we asked the 
respondents for an exact figure or an approximation, as this percentage is rarely disclosed in 
the annual report.  Following Carey et al. (2000) and Chow (1982), leverage is measured as 
the proportion (percent) of total debt compared to total assets.  Following Carcello et al. 
(2005a), DeFond (1992) and Francis and Wilson (1988), replacing total debt by long-term 
debt leads to the same results.  These data were obtained from the 2005 annual report.   
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Consistent with previous research, total assets as reported in the 2005 annual report are used 
to measure company size (cf. Carey et al., 2000; Chow, 1982; Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 
1991).  Given the non-linear relationship between total assets and the number of internal 
auditors, the logarithm of total assets reflects a more reliable measure (see also Blackwell et 
al., 1998; Carcello et al., 2005a).  The respondents were asked to specify the number of 
reporting levels between top management and the lowest operating unit, and the number of 
different countries in which their company has one or more subsidiaries or operating entities.                   
               
Common Methods Variance Bias 
According to Hair et al. (2005), common methods variance bias can emerge when dependent 
and independent variables all come from a single respondent.  In order to avoid this bias, two 
countermeasures were taken.  First, the dependent variable (number of internal auditors) is an 
objective measure rather than a perception.  Second, some of the independent agency 
variables were obtained from a secondary source (annual report).   
 
Model Specification 
An OLS regression analysis will be performed to test the agency model (expected signs are 
between brackets):  
Ln (Number_IA) =  a0 + a1 Finance + a2 NYSE + a3 Dif_Owner + a4 Mgt_Stocks +  
a5 Leverage + a6 Ln (Total_Assets) + a7 Report_Level + a8 Countries  
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln (Number_IA) Size of the internal audit function measured by the logarithm of 
the number of internal auditors (FTE) 
Control variables 
Finance (+) Company operates in the financial industry (bank or insurance 
company): Dummy variable (0/1) 
NYSE (+) Company or parent company is listed on the NYSE: Dummy 
variable (0/1) 
Independent variables 
Dif_Owner (-) Diffusion of ownership measured by the largest individual 
percentage of stock ownership 
Mgt_Stocks (-) Management share ownership measured by the percentage of 
shares owned by managers 
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Leverage (+) Leverage measured by the proportion of total debt compared to 
total assets 
Ln (Total_Assets) (+) Company size measured by the logarithm of total assets 
Report_Level (+) Number of reporting levels between top management and the 
lowest operating unit 
Countries (+) Number of different countries in which the company has one or 
more subsidiaries or operating units 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A of Table 1 shows a breakdown of the respondents by industry.  It is apparent that 
almost one third (32 percent) of the respondents comes from the production, energy an utility 
sector, whereas one fourth (26 percent) of the respondents operates in the financial sector 
(bank or insurance company).  Panel B of Table 1 indicates that 22 percent of the responding 
companies (or their parent company) is listed on the NYSE.  Table 2 gives an overview of the 
descriptive results for the dependent and independent variables and indicates substantial 
variability.  Table 3 shows the correlations and reveals no substantial indication of collinearity 
between the independent variables.  All tolerance values are higher than 0.58, which is above 
the common cut-off threshold.  All variance inflation factor values are lower than 1.74, and 
are below the threshold (Hair et al., 2005).  Hence, multi-collinearity is not a significant 
problem.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
     
OLS Regression Analysis 
The first OLS regression analysis only includes the two control variables and has an F-value 
of 7.788 (p = .001) explaining 16 percent of the variance in the proportional change of the 
size of the internal audit function.  It is clear that the internal audit function is significantly 
larger in companies who are listed (or their parent company) on the NYSE stock exchange.  It 
should be noted that this variable remains significant in the agency model which confirms the 
strong influence of institutional requirements (Chow, 1982).   
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The second OLS regression analysis, testing the agency model, has an F-value of 22.011 (p < 
.001) and explains 70 percent of the variance in the proportional change of the size of the 
internal audit function, which is relatively high compared to previous studies using these 
variables (Anderson et al., 1993; Carcello et al., 2005a; Carey et al., 2000; Chow, 1982).  It 
becomes clear that agency variables explain to a high extent the size of the internal audit 
function in Belgian companies.  This OLS regression analysis supports the following 
hypotheses:  
       
Hypothesis 1: The larger the diffusion of ownership, the larger the internal audit function. 
The OLS regression analysis reveals a highly significant (p < .01) negative coefficient, 
indicating that the smaller the individual stake of the largest shareholder, the larger the 
internal audit function.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The larger the company, the larger the internal audit function.   
The OLS regression analysis shows a highly significant (p = .000) positive coefficient, 
indicating that the larger the company, the larger the internal audit function.   
 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the number of reporting levels within the company, the larger the 
internal audit function.   
The OLS regression analysis indicates a highly significant (p < .01) positive coefficient, 
thereby confirming that the larger the hierarchical distance between top management and the 
lowest operating unit, the larger the internal audit function to compensate for the loss of 
control at top level.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Additional Analysis 
Given the institutional requirements, one could wonder whether the agency variables are 
significantly different between the regulated companies (financial or NYSE-listed) and non-
regulated companies (non-financial or non-NYSE listed).  Some additional univariate 
significance tests (ANOVA) were performed, revealing interesting differences.  Table 5 
shows that financial companies (banks and insurance companies) and NYSE-listed companies 
are significantly larger (p < .05), in terms of total assets, than their non-regulated counterparts.  
Financial companies seem to have significantly less reporting levels (p < .05) than non-
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financial companies and are significantly less geographically dispersed (p = .006).  In 
contrast, NYSE-listed companies have significantly more reporting levels (p < .05) than non-
NYSE listed companies.  Furthermore, financial companies have a significantly higher 
leverage (p = .000) than non-financial companies.   
 
Contrary to what one might expect, the internal audit function is not significantly larger 
within financial companies (p = .192) than in non-financial companies.  When comparing the 
size of the internal audit function between NYSE-listed companies and non-NYSE listed 
companies, it is revealed that the internal audit function is significantly (p < .01) larger in the 
former group.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Complementary to previous studies applying agency theory to explain the existence of 
internal auditing in companies, this study illustrates that agency theory is also a relevant 
framework to explain the size of the internal audit function in those companies who already 
have an internal audit function (Adams, 1994).  It can be argued that a larger internal audit 
function represents a more diverse range of skills and competences and has a broader 
coverage in their audit work, and therefore, is better able to reduce the information 
asymmetries and resulting loss of control that is inherent to modern companies.  In this study, 
a distinction was made between the principal/agent problem between the owners of resources 
(shareholders and debtholders) and the users of resources (management) on the one hand, and 
between those who delegate responsibilities within the company (top management) and those 
who take these responsibilities (lower managers) on the other hand.  With respect to the first 
principal/agent problem, it is confirmed that companies with a more diffused ownership 
structure have a larger internal audit function.  This confirms that internal auditing can be 
considered as a basic monitoring mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry resulting 
from the separation of ownership and control (Francis and Wilson, 1988; DeFrond, 1992).  As 
this separation is considered as the basic principle behind the demand for corporate 
governance, this result confirms the growing importance of internal auditing’s monitoring role 
in contemporary corporate governance (Carcello et al., 2005b).      
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Contrary to the hypothesis, the coefficient in the regression analysis suggests a negative 
relationship between the leverage and the size of the internal audit function.  Contrary to 
Carcello et al. (2005a), it seems that in this sample internal auditing is not playing a major 
monitoring role in the contracting relationship between debtholders and management.  This 
confirms, to some extent, previous research demonstrating the important monitoring role of 
external auditing in this agency conflict (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Blackwell et al., 1998; Chow, 
1982).  It seems reasonable that the external auditor has a more valuable role to play when it 
comes to monitoring the reliability of the accounting numbers.  This is consistent with the 
current scope of internal auditing in a non-Anglo-Saxon environment, focusing more on 
evaluating operations and processes, with a less dominant focus on the reliability of financial 
numbers (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a).  Further research could validate this by investigating 
whether a higher leverage leads to a higher importance of external auditing, reflected by 
higher audit fees, and whether these higher audit fees can be associated with a smaller internal 
audit function (cf. Carey et al., 2000).          
 
Furthermore, the results demonstrate that internal auditing is a relevant monitoring 
mechanism to reduce the internal principal/agent problem (cf. Fama, 1980), thereby 
confirming San Miguel et al. (1977).  Given recent corporate governance requirements, top 
managers are assigned with increased monitoring responsibilities in order to demonstrate that 
they have the company ‘under control’.  In this context, the internal principal/agent problem 
and the resulting need for monitoring become strongly relevant.  Testing the agency model 
reveals that larger companies and companies with more reporting levels, coping with more 
potential moral hazard problems between top management and lower managers, have larger 
internal audit functions.   
 
This result confirms the important relationship between company size and the demand for 
monitoring through internal auditing to compensate for the loss of control (Abdel-Khalik, 
1993).  This also suggests that larger companies are better able to take advantage of the 
economies of scale when investing in the fixed costs of an internal audit function (Anderson 
et al., 1993).  This result also illustrates that the longer the chain of command within the 
company, the more valuable internal auditing becomes to enhance observability of 
subordinates’ actions and avoid distorted communication (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Williamson 
and Ouchi, 1981).  In these companies, it can be argued that top managers are more 
confronted with their own limitations, resulting from information asymmetries, in monitoring 
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the company. The internal audit function seems to be the partner of top management in 
monitoring the company.  The internal audit function, focused on monitoring the internal 
controls and operations at different levels in the company, provides top management with an 
important assurance, which enables them to assume their monitoring responsibilities. 
 
It became clear that NYSE-listed companies have significantly larger internal audit functions.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that institutional requirements in the U.S., stressing the 
importance of internal auditing, clearly contribute to the recognition and development of the 
profession.  One could wonder whether making an internal audit function also mandatory for 
European listed companies would elevate the status of the internal auditing profession in 
continental Europe.  Belgium has recently taken some preliminary initiatives in this direction.   
 
It can be concluded that, apart from company size, the diffusion of ownership and the number 
of reporting levels within the company have the most significant influence on the size of the 
internal audit function.  Additional analysis indicated that some agency variables between 
regulated and non-regulated companies are significantly different.  On the one hand, it was 
suggested that financial companies encounter more external principal/agent problems given 
that they were larger and have a higher leverage than their non-financial counterparts.  On the 
other hand, it can be assumed that they encounter less internal principal/agent problems given 
the lower number of reporting levels and the more limited geographical dispersion of their 
activities.  NYSE-listed companies were larger than their non-NYSE listed counterparts, but 
have more reporting levels and a wider geographical dispersion of their activities, which leads 
to the assumption that internal principal/agent problems are more prevalent in this sub-group.  
Given these interesting differences, further research, building upon a larger number of 
observations, could test the extent to which the influence of these agency variables on the size 
of the internal audit function varies between regulated and non-regulated companies.    
   
Limitations  
Despite the interesting insights revealed by the agency model, this study has some limitations.  
Although yielding a reasonable response rate, the absolute number of respondents remains 
rather low, especially when this group is split into several sub-groups for more detailed 
analysis.  Nevertheless, this is a general disadvantage of survey-based research.  With respect 
to the dependent variable, one could wonder whether other measures like the internal audit 
budget (Carcello et al., 2005a; 2005b) would lead to the same conclusions.  Given the limited 
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availability of data, the largest individual percentage of stock ownership was used as a proxy 
for the diffusion of ownership.  Besides, a self-reported measure was used to measure 
management share ownership.  One could wonder to what extent these measures are 
sufficiently reliable.  A larger disclosure within the annual report of Belgian companies would 
solve this measurement problem.  Given the low significance level, the results suggest that the 
geographical dispersion of the activities, measured by the number of different countries in 
which the company has one or more subsidiaries or operating units, is not capturing the 
information asymmetry resulting from organisational complexity.  New measures, for 
example recent involvement in mergers and/or acquisitions, could lead to more significant 
results.  From a longitudinal perspective, it would be interesting to consider the change in the 
size of the internal audit function, for example over the last three years, as the dependent 
variable, which is probably a better proxy for the importance of internal auditing.  Similarly, 
using the incremental change in each of the independent variables could lead to an even 
higher explanatory power of this agency model.   
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Figure 1:  
Relationship between Agency Variables and the Size of the Internal Audit Function 
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Table 1 : Breakdown of the Respondents 
 Frequency Percentage 
Panel A : Industry   
Production, energy, utilities 23 31,50% 
Telecom, IT, media, entertainment 9 12,33% 
Trade, Transport, logistics 9 12,33% 
Professional services 13 17,81% 
Financial services and insurances 19 26,03% 
 73 100% 
Panel B : NYSE listing   
Company or parent company listed 
on the NYSE  
16 21,92% 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (n = 73) 
 Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Number of internal auditors 1 130 10,71 21,19 
Ln (Number of internal auditors) 0 5 1,42 1,26 
Diffusion of ownership  
(largest individual percentage of 
stock ownership) 
5,16 
 
100 
 
 
63,32 
 
29,16 
 
Management share ownership 0 62,65 4,55 10,67 
Leverage (total debt / total assets) 10,02 96,99 67,51 21,89 
Total assets (in 000 Euro) 9 659 508 761 000 107 000 000 71 834 776,38 
Ln (Total assets) 9 20 14,19 2,07 
Number of reporting levels 
between top management and 
lowest operating unit 
 
1 
 
 
10 
 
 
4,38 
 
 
1,93 
 
Number of countries in which the 
company has one or more 
subsidiaries or operating units 
1 
 
100 
 
14,51 
 
18,40 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
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Finance 1        
NYSE -.088 1       
Dif_Owner .115 .029 1      
Mgt_Stocks .147 -.098 -.173 1     
Leverage .422** -.145 -.090 .047 1    
Ln (Total Assets) .297* .285* -.094 -.184 .238* 1   
Report_Level -.282* .257* -.063 -.072 -.140 .156 1  
Countries -.321** .221 -.236* -.047 -.130 .204 .173 1 
       * : p <.05 ** : p <.01 
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Table 4: OLS Regression Analysis (n = 73) 
Dependent variable: ln (Number_IA) 
 
 Expected Sign Control Variables Agency Model 
 
   Coefficient      T-value Coefficient T-value 
Finance +        .061               .564 .004 .049 
NYSE +        .428             3.940*** .148   2.078** 
     
Dif_Owner -  -.196    -2.823*** 
Mgt_Stocks -  -.106      -1.531 
Leverage +  -.119      -1.612 
Ln (Total Assets) +  .660     8.214*** 
Report_Level +  .198     2.792*** 
Countries +  .062 .838 
     
R²         .182 .733  
Adjusted R²         .159 .700  
F-value       7.788***   22.011***  
* : significant at p =  .10         ** : significant at p < .05   *** : significant at p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58
 
Table 5: Univariate Significance Test (ANOVA) 
 Financial 
Companies 
(n = 19) 
Non-
Financial 
Companies 
(n = 54) 
Significance Test NYSE-
Listed 
Companies 
(n = 16) 
Non NYSE-
Listed 
Companies 
(n = 57) 
Significance Test 
 
         F            p-value           F            p-value 
       
Number of Internal Auditors 16.19 8.78     1.737            .192 25.04 6.68    10.628           .002 
       
Diffusion of Ownership  68.93 61.35       .950            .333 64.93 62.87       .062            .804 
Management Stocks 7.17 3.63     1.566            .215 2.60 5.10       .683            .411 
Leverage 82.98 62.07   15.366            .000 61.55 69.19     1.533            .220 
Company Size 15.22 13.83     6.888            .011 15.30 13.88     6.273            .015 
Number of Reporting Levels 3.47 4.70     6.137            .016 5.31 4.12     5.030            .028 
Number of Countries 4.63 17.98     8.131            .006 22.13 12.37     3.642            .060 
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PAPER 2: 
BUILDING A RESEARCH MODEL FOR INTERNAL AUDITING: 
INSIGHTS FROM LITERATURE AND THEORY SPECIFICATION CASES 
 
Paper two is the first paper dealing with the second research question of this dissertation.  
After explaining the size of the internal audit function (macro level) in paper one, this paper 
comes up with new organisational variables influencing internal audit practices (micro level).  
Each of these organisational variables will be studied in more detail, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, in the following papers.         
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BUILDING A RESEARCH MODEL FOR INTERNAL AUDITING:  
INSIGHTS FROM LITERATURE AND THEORY SPECIFICATION CASES5 
 
Gerrit Sarens  Ignace De Beelde 
 
Abstract:  This study identifies three organisational variables that have an influence on 
internal auditing practices and specifies how each of them can exert its influence.  This study 
is based on a literature review, combined with insights from theory specification cases; and 
contributes to the literature by developing a specific and structured research model.  The 
extent to which internal auditing practices are focused on the provision of assurance, the 
formulation of recommendations, or the performance of separate consulting activities is 
influenced by: (1) the stakeholders of internal audit; (2) the organisational support for internal 
audit; (3) the status of the internal control system.   
 
Keywords: internal auditing, research model, theory specification cases, organisational 
variables.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The area of internal auditing is ripe for a wide variety of research (Rittenberg, 1999; 35)” 
 
In this study, we follow the recommendation made by Rittenberg (1999), who stresses that 
academic research in internal auditing should move beyond treating internal auditing as an 
extension of the work that is performed by the external auditor.  This study encompasses the 
broader nature of internal auditing that is evolving in practice and confirmed by the revised 
definition of internal auditing and by the new Professional Practices Framework (IIA, 2004). 
 
Although extensive practitioner literature on specific internal auditing topics exists, the 
academic literature in this area is rather limited (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1995; Vinten, 1996) 
and suffers from a lack of specific and well-structured research models that facilitate the 
understanding of contemporary internal auditing practices (Ratliff et al., 1988; Boyle, 1993).  
Few studies explained the existence of an internal audit function (Anderson et al., 1993; 
Carey et al., 2000) as well as the size of the internal audit function (Sarens, 2007) relying on 
traditional agency variables.  This study takes these explanations for the existence and the size 
of the internal audit function for granted and goes one step further by investigating internal 
auditing practices in more detail.  The existing literature, as well as the IIA Standards and 
Practice Advisories (IIA, 2004), suggests that internal auditing practices are influenced by 
several organisational variables, like the stakeholders of internal audit, organisational support 
for the internal audit function, and the status of the internal control system.  Based on a 
focused literature review, combined with insights from six theory specification cases within 
Belgian companies, this study contributes to the literature by confirming and further 
specifying the influence of these organisational variables on internal auditing practices.  As 
the profession has changed significantly during the last decade, the final aim of this study is to 
develop a more specific and structured model, adapted to the current state of the profession, in 
order to guide further research in this area.    
 
At the Belgian level, at the time of data collection (Summer 2004), little regulation or 
corporate governance guidelines had a significant influence on internal auditing practices.  
The Belgian Code on Corporate Governance was published in December 2004 and refers only 
very limitedly to internal auditing.  Actually, private companies are only encouraged to install 
an internal auditing function, without any legal obligation.  
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This paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides some necessary background on 
the internal auditing profession, followed by a third section dealing with the research 
questions and methodology of this study.  The fourth section describes three organisational 
variables influencing internal auditing practices, by combining insights from existing 
literature with empirical evidence from six theory specification cases.  Besides describing the 
limitations of this study, the final section summarises major insights into a specific and 
structured research model linked with additional suggestions for further research.  
 
THE INTERNAL AUDITING PROFESSION: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT STATE 
 
The roots of internal auditing lie in the financial control area.  In the early decades of its 
existence, the profession was charged with the task of measuring and evaluating the 
effectiveness of different types of control, evaluating the correctness of financial transactions 
and checking compliance with applicable laws and procedures.  The objective of the function 
was to assist members of the organisation in the effective discharge of their responsibilities 
(Bou-Raad, 2000; Brink and Witt, 1982; Rittenberg and Covaleski, 1997). 
 
When analysing the evolution of internal auditing practices, Gupta and Ray (1992) noticed a 
shift from examining financial records and fraud investigations towards more efficiency and 
economy audits (i.e. management or operational audits) and the provision of 
recommendations for future actions (see also Vinten, 1991).  According to Allott (1996) and 
Thevenin (1997), the contemporary internal auditor must determine whether organisational 
objectives have been achieved.  By incorporating a business perspective into current control 
and compliance processes, the internal auditor is becoming more like an indispensable 
management assistant or internal business partner.  The result is a hybrid and pro-active 
auditing function that meets the organisation’s dual need for assurance and for value-added 
suggestions on business improvement.  When carefully examining the content of these 
contributions from the practitioner literature published during the 1990’s, we already can 
recognise most of the new elements that were incorporated into the revised definition, 
published by the IIA in 1999:   
 
“Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to 
add value and improve an organization’s operations.  It helps an organization accomplish its 
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objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes (IIA, 2004)”. 
 
The incorporation of the added value concept was the underlying principle for the revision of 
the internal auditing definition.  In order to add value, internal auditors must embrace the 
forces of change in their business environment (e.g. higher demand for consulting oriented 
services) and expand their role in organisations.  The incorporation of the consulting concept 
is one of the major adjustments made in order to better reflect contemporary internal auditing 
practices.   
 
As one of the first academics, Nagy and Cenker (2002) addressed the question of whether or 
not the new definition actually reflects the day-to-day activities of internal auditing 
departments.  As expected, their respondents confess that the audit focus shifted several years 
prior to the definitional change and that the new definition simply better reflects existing 
practice.  
 
Based on the new definition, we can make a distinction between two types of internal audit 
activities: assurance activities and consulting activities, both clearly defined in the latest 
revision of the Standards (IIA, 2004).   
 
Assurance activities “involve the internal auditor’s objective assessment of evidence to 
provide an independent opinion or conclusion regarding a process, system or other subject 
matter.  The nature and scope of the assurance engagement are determined by the internal 
auditor.  There are generally three parties involved in assurances services: (1) the person or 
group directly involved with the process, system or subject matter – the process owner, (2) the 
person or group making the assessment – the internal auditor, and (3) the person or group 
using the assessment – the user (IIA, 2004)”.  
 
Based on an early framework developed by San Miguel et al. (1977), we can summarise that 
most assurance activities consist of four dimensions: evaluating, diagnosing, informing and 
recommending.  In other words, based on the evaluation of evidence, the internal auditor 
reports an opinion on the existing processes and internal controls, completed by an overview 
of specific, correctible weaknesses.  In addition, the internal auditor suggests possible 
improvements in these processes and internal controls, and recommends specific steps to 
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improve their functioning.  The proposed improvements and recommendations, that comprise 
most internal audits, should be considered to be a ‘by-product’ of the regular assurance 
activities.  According to Kowalczyk (1987), evaluation and recommendations are both 
constantly in the auditor’s mind throughout the audit.  Courtemanche (1986) emphasises that 
the ability to recommend solutions to problems is based on years of experience and 
organisational wisdom that have been acquired in the performance of ascertainment and 
appraisal tasks.   
 
The concept recognises that there are other ways for internal auditing to provide assurance to 
the organisation besides auditing against predefined or prescribed criteria.  Traditional 
auditing services, such as financial audits, compliance audits and operational audits, as well as 
newer forms of assurance stemming from control and risk management evaluations, are 
incorporated into the definition under a broader umbrella (Krogstad et al., 1999, McNamee, 
2000, Wagner, 2000).  Although companies did not always formally recognise the internal 
audit’s role as a provider of internal consulting, a recent study by Woodward and Selim 
(2004) revealed that a majority of internal auditors in the UK and Ireland carried out 
consulting assignments before the 1999 change in the definition.  
 
Consulting activities are defined by the Standards as “being advisory in nature and generally 
performed at the specific request of an engagement client.  The nature and scope of 
consulting engagements are subject to agreement with the engagement client.  Consulting 
services generally involve two parties: (1) the persons or group offering the advice – the 
internal auditor, and (2) the person or group seeking and receiving the advice – the 
engagement client (IIA, 2004)”. 
 
An internal auditor can expand his or her activities by proactively offering counsel and 
advice, by helping to solve problems and by participating in the reengineering of processes, 
the development of systems and the establishment of new organisations or processes  
(Anderson, 2003).  McCall (2002) asserts that, by providing consulting services, many 
auditors are helping to ensure that management sees the auditing function as essential to 
achieving organisational goals and objectives.  Although earlier studies by Brody and Lowe 
(2000) and Flesher and Zanzig (2000) emphasised that internal auditors should maintain a 
proper balance between acting as a consultant and providing independent evaluations, in order 
to remain independent and objective, more than one third of the internal auditors surveyed in 
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a study by Woodward and Selim (2004) indicates that they allocate more than 20 percent of 
their time to consulting assignments.  Moreover, two thirds agrees that internal audit’s 
involvement in consulting will increase in the future.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Complementary to studies that explained the existence and size of the internal audit function 
(Anderson et al., 1993; Carey et al., 2000; Sarens, 2007; Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991), 
several internal auditing research manuscripts published in the 1980s and 1990s have 
suggested theoretical frameworks to describe, explain and predict the multiple roles of 
internal audit.  For example, Mautz et al. (1984) studied developments impacting internal 
auditing to offer suggestions on how internal auditing can most appropriately respond to such 
developments.  Albrecht et al. (1988) also developed a framework which they offered to 
internal audit groups to evaluate and improve their effectiveness.  Additionally, Boyle’s 
(1993) framework identified four roles / relationships, addressing internal as well as external 
responsibilities, a framework believed to capture the broad nature and scope of internal 
auditing at that time.  Because of the continuous changes with which the internal auditing 
profession has had to cope, we are convinced that research frameworks need to be updated 
and refined on a regular base.  
        
Similar to Boyle (1993), we combined the existing literature with insights from our recent 
case studies within six Belgian companies, in order to develop a more specific and structured 
model to guide further research in internal auditing.  More specifically, we formulated a 
qualitative answer on the following research questions: 
• Which new organisational variables influence internal auditing practices?  
• How do these new organisational variables influence internal auditing practices?  
 
Our cases can be considered theory specification cases.  In other words, we took existing 
theories or findings into the field to asses whether they capture the heterogeneity and 
complexity of contemporary internal auditing practices.  We kept in mind that core concepts 
and relationships may need to be re-conceptualised, refined or elaborated in order to come up 
with a more specific and structured research model (Eckstein, 1975; Keating, 1995).   
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It is important to notice that qualitative samples tend to be purposive, rather than random.  In 
other words, the selection of the companies for this study was partially theoretically driven 
and partially based upon experience with the internal audit profession in Belgium.  We did not 
want to generalise the findings to other settings.  Under these circumstances, we talk about 
analytical generalisation, in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the current case studies (Yin, 1994).  
 
Based on previous empirical research, identifying a correlation between organisation size and 
demand for both external and internal auditing (e.g. Anderson et al., 1993; Chow, 1982; 
Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991), we found it adequate to control for organisation size and 
selected six large (considering the Belgian corporate context) companies (more than 1.000 
employees).  Moreover, we included an equal number of manufacturing and service 
companies.  Additionally, our experience with internal audit in Belgium incited us to include 
a majority of companies (four) with a small internal audit department (less than five internal 
auditors) and only a minority (two) of companies with large internal audit departments (more 
than five internal auditors).  Appendix 2 of this dissertation provides more details on the six 
cases.    
 
We used interview data supplemented by archival data obtained from the interviewees (Chief 
Audit Executives or hierarchically equivalent), like the internal audit charter, the audit 
planning , audit reports and audit committee reports in order to triangulate6 the interview data.  
We used an open-ended interview guide and interviews lasted from 80 to 105 minutes.  Each 
interview was tape recorded and transcribed one or two days after the interview took place.   
 
We used a systematic analytical protocol, suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), to 
enhance the reliability of this qualitative analysis.  After an early analysis of the transcriptions 
and documents, we moved on to the coding process.  First, an initial coding process, one week 
after the interview, was executed by one researcher.  That same researcher executed a second 
coding session about five to seven weeks after the interview.  Subsequently, the coding 
process was redone by a second researcher, independently from the first one.  The level of 
coding reliability in the three sessions averaged 85 percent, which is within the norms of 80 to 
                                                
6
 Triangulation is supposed to support a finding and thereby enhance its validity by showing that independent 
measures of it agree with it or, at least, do not contradict it (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
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90 percent.  Further, we summarised the major findings from each interview and each 
document into a standardised and comparable matrix, which facilitated cross-case analysis.  
Table 1 summarises the main insights of this cross-case analysis. Besides the existing 
literature, this forms the basis for our development of a more specific and structured research 
model.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
ORGANISATIONAL VARIABLES INFLUENCING INTERNAL AUDITING 
PRACTICES 
 
A focused review of the existing literature reveals three organisational variables that can have 
an influence on internal auditing practices.  In this section, we will describe these 
organisational variables and how they can have an influence on internal auditing practices, 
combining existing literature and empirical evidence from our theory specification cases.     
 
Stakeholders of Internal Audit  
Roth (2003) stresses that internal auditors must take into account their specific clients or 
stakeholders when they want to identify the practices that will add the most value.  Moreover, 
internal audit also must raise stakeholders’ expectations by showing them how much value 
they can add.  Additionally, Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003) recognise the need to take into 
account the influence of an internal auditor’s stakeholders on the orientation of the internal 
auditing activities.  This stimulated us to get deeper into the influence of this organisational 
variable, taken into account that serving several masters is a difficult game to play (cf. Paape 
et al., 2003).  
 
Literature Review 
Attribute Standard 1110, on organisational independence (IIA, 2004), stipulates that the chief 
audit executive (CAE) should report to a level within the organisation that allows the internal 
audit activity to accomplish its responsibilities.  More specifically, the IIA believes that, to 
achieve necessary independence, the CAE should report functionally to the audit committee 
or its equivalent (Practice Advisory 1110-2).    
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Article 39 of the proposed directive on Statutory Audit, published by the European 
Commission (2004), stipulates that the audit committee shall monitor the financial reporting 
process, the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls, its internal audit where 
applicable, and its risk management system.  Given the current working scope of internal 
audit, the IIA (2004) recognises that audit committees and internal audits have interlocking 
goals.  A strong working relationship with the audit committee is essential for each to fulfil its 
responsibilities to senior management, board of directors, shareholders, and other outside 
parties (see also Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Turley and Zaman, 2004).  Regular meetings 
between the audit committee and internal auditing make it more likely that the audit 
committee remains informed and knowledgeable about relevant issues related to their own 
monitoring responsibilities (Raghunandan et al., 2001).  Therefore, a recent study by the IIA 
(2003) found that audit committees are more concerned with the evaluation and opinion of 
internal auditors regarding whether internal controls are adequate, the (financial) data 
provided by managers are reliable, laws and regulations are being followed and assets are 
safeguarded.  Thus, assurance-oriented activities regarding risk management and internal 
control are expected to add more value to audit committees.                   
 
For administrative purposes, the IIA (2004) recommends that the CAE report directly to the 
chief executive officer of the organisation (Practice Advisory 1110-2).  Although this 
potentially can lead to a limitation in scope or in reporting of results, the IIA recognises that 
some CAEs report administratively to the chief financial officer.  Besides, Performance 
Standards 2010, 2020 and 2060 (IIA, 2004) mention that the CAE should consider the input 
of senior management (including CEO and/or CFO) in the internal audit planning.  The CAE 
also should report periodically to senior management on the internal audit activity’s purpose, 
authority, responsibility, and performance relative to its plan.  Due to this strong interaction 
with the CEO and/or CFO, it can be expected that these last ones are in a position to exert 
significant influence on the internal audit function.   
 
Given senior management’s own executive and monitoring responsibilities over operations, 
processes and internal controls, the IIA (2003) suggests that, besides the independent and 
objective evaluation and opinions contained within an internal audit (assurance), management 
should be highly interested in recommendations to improve the efficiency of operations and 
processes and the adequacy of internal controls.  Moreover, Griffith’s study (1999) found that 
providing a more constructive contribution, by means of active involvement in the assessment 
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and management of business risk, should enhance a financial director’s perception of the 
internal audit function.  More specifically, managing the control and risk self assessment 
process, or having significant involvement in its delivery, provides the opportunity to directly 
support the financial directors’ requirements and responsibilities in this regard.  In other 
words, providing recommendations and more active involvement in consulting activities 
regarding risk management and internal control would be expected to add more value for 
senior management.      
 
Empirical Evidence from Theory Specification Cases 
In four of the six companies, internal audit has a functional reporting relationship with the 
audit committee.  Although the audit committees spend sufficient time on internal audit topics 
during their meetings, it becomes clear that the interaction between internal audit and the 
audit committees is rather limited: “quite often my presentation is followed by silence… I do 
not receive any question from the audit committee members, they just move on with their 
agenda”.  The interviewees as well as a detailed analysis of audit committee reports reveal 
that the role of the audit committee vis-à-vis internal audit often is limited to the formal 
approval and follow-up of the audit mission, audit planning, and occasionally an evaluation of 
some important audit conclusions.  In these cases, the absence of important topics, suggested 
by the audit committee, in the internal audit planning, reflects the limited influence of the 
audit committee on internal auditing practices.   
 
Two companies (case one and three) do not even have an audit committee.  In these two 
companies, internal audit practices are to a large extent influenced by senior management, 
their main stakeholder, and clearly more focused on providing recommendations for the 
(immediate) improvement of processes and internal controls based on the knowledge and 
expertise of internal audit.  Moreover, in these two companies, internal audit is more engaged 
in consulting activities.  Respectively, 42 percent and 69 percent of the audit planning is 
dedicated to activities like procedure development and modification, training of key 
personnel, facilitation of risk assessment workshops,...  The Chief Audit Executive in one of 
these two companies even admits that his function “was clearly promoted within the 
organisation as a consulting function and his agenda was mainly directed by the CEO”.   
 
Another company (case four), where the audit committee is clearly the main stakeholder of 
internal audit, represents the opposite extreme.  By providing a lot of input for the internal 
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audit planning, based on its own responsibilities and need for information, the audit 
committee has a strong influence on internal auditing practices.  In this company, audit 
reports clearly reflect a greater focus on assurance aspects (e.g. a detailed description of audit 
findings in order to explain thoroughly how the internal auditor came to certain conclusions or 
opinions).  The Chief Audit Executive stresses: “actually, the audit committee determines my 
agenda, it suggests which cycles to audit as well as specific ad hoc priorities.  In fact, it wants 
assurance on processes and controls in order to avoid surprises”.  
 
In all companies, internal audit has an administrative reporting relationship with senior 
management (CEO or CFO).  In most cases, the scope of internal auditing practices was, to a 
large extent, influenced by senior management and, therefore, more focused on formulating 
recommendations for the further improvement of the processes and internal controls and even 
providing separate (ad hoc) consulting activities like assistance with the integration after a 
merger, and assistance with new software implementations,…  As one of the interviewees 
clearly states: “OK, we are still focused on providing an opinion on internal controls, but as 
management asks us to think together with them about the improvement of the internal control 
system, we are becoming more and more involved in control reengineering”.  In general, it 
becomes clear that the assurance role internal auditing mainly is playing for the audit 
committee sometimes conflicts with the management demands for consulting activities.       
 
In other words, our empirical insights provide support for the expected influence of internal 
audit stakeholders like the audit committee and senior management (CEO and/or CFO) on 
internal auditing practices.  The influence of these internal audit stakeholders should be taken 
into account, when studying internal audit practices (see Figure 1).         
 
Organisational Support for the Internal Auditing Function  
Although previous studies found evidence on the effect of performing certain types of internal 
audit activities on organisational support for internal audit (e.g. Woodward and Selim, 2004), 
until now, no explicit literature exists on the opposite relationship, namely the influence of 
organisational support on internal auditing practices.  Therefore, we had  to use existing 
theories in other research areas, like applied psychology (Eisenberger and Huntington, 1986), 
to obtain a better understanding of the concept ‘organisational support’.   
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Literature Review 
A review of the Standards and Practice Advisories (IIA, 2004) clearly shows that a sufficient 
level of organisational support is necessary for the existence as well as the day-to-day 
functioning of internal auditing.  More specifically, Practice Advisory 1000-1 indicates that 
the purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal audit activity should be defined in a 
charter.  The CAE should seek approval of the charter by senior management as well as 
acceptance by the board.  Besides internal audit’s position within the organisation and the 
scope of its activities, this charter also should authorise access to records, personnel, and 
physical properties relevant to the performance of engagements. Moreover, Practice Advisory 
1110-1 clearly suggest that internal auditors should have the support of senior management 
and the board, so that they can gain the cooperation of engagement clients and perform their 
work free from interference.  It should be clear that both aspects are needed to adequately 
perform internal audits.  As mentioned before, the CAE should report administratively to the 
CEO (Practice Advisory 1110-2).  Administrative reporting typically includes the approval of 
the audit budget by the CEO (see also Performance Standard 2020), a necessary condition to 
run the internal audit function.              
 
According to Eisenberger and Huntington (1986), organisational support can be described as 
the extent to which the organisation values employees’ contributions and cares about their 
well-being.  In this context, we focus on the first aspect, namely the extent to which the 
organisation values the contributions of the internal audit function and the direct and indirect 
effects of this valuation on internal auditing practices.  We changed the formulation of the 36 
statements developed by Eisenberger and Huntington (1986) to measure organisational 
support towards a focus on the internal auditing function as a whole, instead of on individual 
internal auditors, and then summarised these statements into five constructs7: 
• Opinion of the organisation on whether or not the internal auditing function is    
replaceable by an external service provider.   
• Support received from management and collaboration with management. 
• Consideration of internal auditing as an important strategic function. 
• Acceptance and appreciation of internal auditing opinions and recommendations. 
• Distribution of resources to the internal auditing department.  
                                                
7
 It should be clear to the reader that constructs one to four represent subjective elements (perceptions, beliefs).  
Conversely, construct five refers to an objective fact (figures).   
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Note that the second and the fifth construct reflect what we found in the Standards and 
Practice Advisories of the IIA (2004).  Given the fact that consultative or advisory activities 
are mostly performed at specific client request and often support them in strategically 
important projects (cf. Practice Advisory 1000.C1-2), we expect that a higher level of 
organisational support will stimulate management to ask internal audit support through the 
performance of value-adding consulting or advisory activities.  Two previous empirical 
studies found indications for this relationship.   
 
Case studies done by Rittenberg and Covaleski8 (1997) suggest a direct relationship between 
specific aspects of organisational support (as defined above) and the proportion of consulting 
activities. When internal auditing gets strong management support and is considered to be a 
strategic and important function, more consulting activities are performed, mostly at specific 
management request.  Conversely, a lack of management support and the neglect of internal 
auditing as a strategic, important function is associated with the traditional assurance 
approach, reflected by a “tick and bash” audit approach.  
 
Moreover, a worldwide study by Birkett et al. (1999) suggests that management’s view of the 
role of internal auditing affects the types of work that are undertaken by internal auditors.  
They found that management’s lack of awareness of the role of internal audit results in non-
cooperation during the audits and non-implementation of recommendations.  Similarly, we 
can reasonably assume that management’s view of internal auditing also underlies the level of 
support they will provide to internal auditing, and probably the amount of resources they will 
distribute to internal audit, other aspects of organisational support.  Furthermore, Van 
Peursem (2005) found indications that acting alone and without broad management support, 
can be truly ineffective for internal audit.  Additionally, Nagy and Cenker (2002) revealed 
that it is management who ultimately determines the orientation of internal audit.  Birkett et 
al’s study (1999) indicates that countries where there exists a lack of awareness by 
management of the role of internal auditing and its potential to assist in achieving 
organisational objectives (internal audit is seen as a ‘necessary evil’) are characterised by a 
higher focus on traditional assurance oriented activities (e.g. financial audit, compliance audit, 
                                                
8
 Although these cases (see chapter five of their book) were done with the intention of identifying some 
characteristics in relation to what works well and what does not in the case of outsourcing, we noted a link 
between certain aspects of organisational support and the type of internal auditing activities. 
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fraud detection).  On the contrary, countries with a higher level of awareness about the value 
of internal audit show a lower proportion of pure internal control reviews and fraud detection.   
 
Besides this direct relationship, arguments can be found for an indirect influence of 
organisational support, through the concept of organisational commitment, on internal audit 
activities.  Ensuring that internal auditors perceive that they are valued by the organisation 
and that they can depend on the organisation is shown to result in increased organisational 
commitment of the internal audit department (Kwon and Banks, 2004), that should create an 
intrinsic ‘obligation’ to care about their organisation’s welfare (Eisenberger et al., 2001).  
Porter et al. (1974) conceptualised the construct ‘organisational commitment’ as having three 
primary components: (1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the organisation’s goals and 
values; (2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organisation; and (3) a 
strong desire to maintain membership in the organisation. Taking this into consideration, we 
expect that, when internal auditing has a higher level of organisational commitment, a larger 
proportion of their audit activities will be focused on the formulation of value adding 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of organisational processes and 
internal controls.  Moreover, the internal auditor probably will be more willing to become 
engaged in consulting activities.  By doing this, the internal auditor actively assists the 
organisation in achieving its goals and objectives.    
 
Empirical Evidence from Theory Specification Cases 
We found evidence for two constructs of organisational support, based on the definition of 
Eisenberger and Huntington (1986), that can be linked directly with internal auditing 
practices.  We observed, as suggested by Rittenberg and Covaleski (1997), a larger proportion 
of consulting activities in those three cases where internal auditing clearly receives more 
management support and a more active collaboration with management exists, and where the 
function in general, as well as their opinions and recommendations more specifically, are 
more accepted and appreciated by the people in the organisation.   
 
These three cases illustrate that stronger management support manifests itself in a relatively 
higher frequency of meetings with management (formal and informal) and a more meaningful 
dialogue with management, reflecting an active interest on their part in audit results and the 
follow-up of recommendations and action plans.  Furthermore, interviewees indicate a closer 
collaboration with management during the different stages of an internal audit (e.g. when 
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performing risk assessments or internal control evaluations, or developing action plans).  A 
higher extent of acceptance and appreciation of the internal auditing function is reflected by a 
higher degree in which the internal auditor’s opinions and recommendations are followed (in 
these cases, on average 90 percent of the recommendations are implemented within one year 
after the audit), by a higher degree in which internal auditors are trusted (e.g. as facilitators of 
whistle-blowing) and by the absence of a negative connotation (no “police man image”).  In 
these three cases, the internal audit planning clearly indicate a higher involvement of internal 
audit (through so-called special consulting engagements) in strategically important projects 
like acquisitions or ERP implementations.  Moreover, internal audit is also more engaged in 
so-called emergency consulting engagements, often initiated through ad hoc questions by 
management (e.g. in case of an unexpected deterioration of the credit situation or an urgent 
need to improve the stock registration of raw materials). 
 
In most cases, we notice a certain level of organisational commitment on behalf of the internal 
auditing department.  This is illustrated most clearly by the fact that their mission is aligned 
with overall organisational objectives, and that their planning focuses on high organisational 
risk areas (risk-based auditing) and reserves a sufficient proportion of working time for ad 
hoc management requests (25 percent, on average).  Although it is confirmed by some 
interviewees that “if internal auditing gets strong management support, internal auditing in 
turn is a strong support for management”, our empirical data do not provide us with 
sufficient evidence to conclude that, on one hand, a higher level of organisational support 
creates more organisational commitment on behalf of internal audit and, on the other hand, 
more organisational commitment incites internal auditing to focus more on the provision of 
value-adding recommendations.  Complementary to the indications found in the literature, we 
only suggest that taking this (intervening) variable into account can enrich the understanding 
of internal auditing practices (see Figure 1).   
 
Status of the Internal Control System  
The most recent definition of the IIA (1999) clearly states that internal auditing “evaluates 
and improves the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes”.  
Although there exists quite extensive literature on the role of internal auditing with respect to 
internal controls (e.g. Brink and Witt, 1982; Kowalczyk, 1987; Ratliff et al. 1988; Spira and 
Page, 2003; Vinten, 1991; Whittington and Adams, 1982), we did not identify any specific 
literature dealing with the influence of the status of the internal control system on internal 
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auditing practices.  Therefore, it would be interesting to look at which components of the 
internal control system have an impact on internal auditing practices and how this influence is 
manifested.   
 
Literature Review 
Consistent with methodology described in previous literature, we refer to the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 1992) that defines internal 
control as a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives 
related to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of financial reporting 
and the compliance with applicable laws and regulations.  Internal control consists of five 
interrelated components.  The control environment provides the atmosphere in which people 
conduct their activities and carry out their control responsibilities.  It serves as the foundation 
for the other components.  Within this environment, management assesses risks that can have 
a negative impact on the achievement of specified objectives.  Control activities are 
implemented to help ensure that management directives to address the risks are carried out.  
Meanwhile, relevant information on risk and control activities is captured and communicated 
throughout the organisation.  The entire process is monitored and modified as conditions 
warrant.   
 
As suggested by the COSO Report (1992), an internal auditing department or single internal 
auditor often plays a very significant (monitoring) role in effective internal control because of 
its organisational position and authority in an entity, and the objectivity with which it carries 
out its activities.  More specifically, Performance Standard 2120 (IIA, 2004) states that the 
internal audit activity should assist the organisation in maintaining effective controls by 
evaluating their effectiveness and efficiency and by promoting continuous improvement.  As 
internal control evaluations are part of internal audit’s regular duties, we expect that, in the 
opposite direction, the status of the internal control system will have an effect on the internal 
auditing practices themselves.  Besides management, internal auditors should be among the 
first to recognise significant internal control failures and to formulate recommendations for 
improvement.  By doing this, internal auditors are seen to contribute to a more effective 
internal control structure that subsequently improves the quality of information for decision-
making purposes (Bou-Raad, 2000).       
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If the control environment in general, and internal controls more specifically become weaker, 
there is a greater likelihood that material errors or irregularities will not be prevented or 
detected (Marden et al., 1997).  Given their mission, internal auditing will then focus 
primarily on the development and improvement of the internal controls by giving advice and 
recommendations.  Internal auditors are likely to be the most knowledgeable in controls and 
are able to provide management with sound advice to develop and improve internal controls 
(Bou-Raad, 2000; Bou-Raad and Capitanio, 1999).   
 
Empirical Evidence From Theory Specification Cases 
Our cases provided us with indications that the control environment (the first component of 
the COSO framework) and the effectiveness of the internal controls (the third component) 
have the greatest influence on internal auditing practices.  
 
In all cases (but especially in the first three), we found, to some extent, examples of weak 
internal controls (e.g. no time registration, no entrance registration, many non-uniform 
manual controls not integrated with processes, no adequate inventory protection, and lack of 
segregation of duties).  Instead of having formal and integrated internal controls, there often 
exists a kind of trust-based culture, where controls and procedures only are followed on an ad 
hoc basis for the most critical aspects of the business.  In the first three cases, this is 
reinforced by a rather weak control environment.  More specifically, the tone-at-the-top is not 
always control-oriented, which is sometimes an undesirable consequence of a strong focus on 
efficiency improvements and cost reductions at the expense of internal controls.  Moreover, 
our data indicate that the attitude of top management is not always sufficiently control-
minded, especially when staffed with non-economically trained people like engineers.  In 
other words, there exists a low level of control awareness in these cases. Some interviewees 
confess that “as long as there are no problems, we don’t have to follow rules and procedures 
too strictly” and “we find an up-to-date registration of procedures not relevant, because 
people are not interested in it”.   
 
The existence of weak internal controls, especially in the first three cases, can be associated 
with a relatively higher focus of internal auditing activities on improvements to the internal 
control system.  By providing a thorough internal control review, followed by extensive and 
well-documented recommendations and possible solutions (e.g. the implementation of more 
uniform, integrated and real-time internal controls, adapted to the specific organisational 
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characteristics), internal audit actively contributes to the improvement of the internal control 
system and, by doing so, adds value to the organisation (cf. Bou-Raad, 2000; Bou-Raad and 
Capitanio, 1999).  Moreover, in the first three cases, internal audit is also involved in 
consulting activities, like training in the development of procedures or facilitation of control-
self-assessment exercises, focused on the creation of an enhanced level of control awareness 
within the organisation and thereby an improvement of the control environment.  
 
Our empirical insights confirm our expectation by illustrating that the status of the internal 
control system (especially the control environment and internal controls) of a company have 
an important influence on internal audit practices (see Figure 1).    
 
CONCLUSIONS AND MODEL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Current internal auditing practices encompass assurance activities (including 
recommendations for improvement) and consulting activities.  This study, based on a focused 
literature review combined with insights from theory specification cases within six Belgian 
companies, identified three organisational variables that have an impact on internal auditing 
practices and specified how each of them can exert its influence.  It should mentioned that the 
influence of these three organisational variables on internal audit practices should be 
interpreted for each variable separately.  Figure 1 summarises these variables and 
relationships into a model to guide further research: 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
First, literature as well as our empirical insights reveal the influence of internal audit’s 
stakeholders on internal auditing practices.  On one hand, active interactions with senior 
management (CEO and/or CFO) exert a large influence on the internal auditing scope and 
stimulates additional focus on the formulation of recommendations for the further 
improvement of processes and internal controls and even become involved, to some extent, in 
separate consulting activities.  On the other hand, interactions with the audit committee are, in 
most cases, not intensive.  Consequently, the influence of the audit committee on internal 
auditing practices also is limited.  Nevertheless, based on the literature and one specific case, 
it can be expected that more intensive interactions with the audit committee will incite 
internal auditing to emphasise their assurance role.   
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Secondly, appealing to existing theory in applied psychology, we investigated the influence of 
organisational support on internal auditing practices.  A larger proportion of consulting 
activities can be noticed in those companies where internal auditing receives stronger 
management support and where more active collaboration with management exists.  This also 
applies where the function in general and the opinions and recommendations of the internal 
audit are to a higher extent accepted and appreciated.  Although we find, in most cases, 
indications of a certain level of organisational commitment on behalf of the internal auditing 
department, our data do not provide us with sufficient support to conjecture on the role and 
influence of this variable.  Consequently, further investigation of this variable, individually or 
as an intervening variable (see Figure 1), definitely is of interest for further research.   
 
Thirdly, we find that two components of the internal control system have an influence on 
internal auditing practices.  Weak internal controls, reinforced by a weak control environment, 
are associated with a more active focus of internal auditing practices on the improvement of 
the internal control system, through the formulation of recommendations to improve the 
internal controls or the involvement in specific consulting activities focused on enhancing the 
control awareness within the organisation. 
 
Limitations and other Suggestions for Further Research 
We want to draw attention to the fact that the relative weight or importance of each of these 
variables in determining the internal auditing practices is different for each company.  As the 
main purpose of this study was to develop a flexible model to guide further research, we do 
not have the intention to neither conclude on the combined effect of the three organisational 
variables on internal auditing practices nor to generalise specific findings from our case 
studies.  Moreover, we are convinced of the existence of interrelated effects between these 
variables.  Further research should integrate these variables and determine their relative 
weight.     
 
Although Goodwin (2004) suggests that internal auditing practices in the private and public 
sector are not very different from each other, Woodward and Selim (2004) still found some 
differences between these sectors, especially related to the performance of consulting 
activities.  Therefore, it would be interesting to apply and adapt the currently-proposed 
research model to study internal auditing practices in the public sector.   
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Table 1: Cross Case Analysis (Based on Collected Data) 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Internal 
Auditing 
Practices 
- Focus on 
recommendations 
(incl. those to 
improve the internal 
controls)  
- 69% consulting 
activities (incl. those 
to improve control 
awareness) 
- Focus on 
recommendations 
(incl. those to 
improve the internal 
controls)  
- 23% consulting 
activities (incl. those 
to improve control 
awareness) 
- Focus on 
recommendations 
(incl. those to 
improve the internal 
controls) 
- 42% consulting 
activities (incl. those 
to improve control 
awareness) 
- Focus on  
assurance 
 
 
 
- 15% consulting 
activities (no 
dominant focus on 
improvement of 
control awareness) 
- Focus on 
recommendations 
(no dominant focus 
on improvement of 
internal controls) 
- 20% consulting 
activities (no 
dominant focus on 
improvement of 
control awareness) 
- Focus on 
recommendations 
(no dominant focus 
on improvement of 
internal controls) 
- 39% consulting 
activities (no 
dominant focus on 
improvement of 
control awareness) 
Internal Audit’s 
Stakeholders 
- No audit 
committee present 
 
 
- Senior 
management is main 
stakeholder 
- Limited functional 
reporting 
relationship with the 
audit committee 
- Strong influence of 
senior management 
- No audit 
committee present  
 
 
- Senior 
management is main 
stakeholder 
- Audit committee is 
main stakeholder 
 
 
- Limited influence 
of senior 
management 
- Limited functional 
reporting 
relationship with the 
audit committee 
- Strong influence of 
senior management 
- Limited functional 
reporting 
relationship with the 
audit committee 
- Strong influence of 
senior management 
Organisational 
Support 
 
 
 
- More management 
support 
- More active 
collaboration with 
management 
- More acceptance 
and appreciation 
 
- Limited 
management support 
- Limited 
collaboration with 
management 
- Limited 
acceptance and 
appreciation 
- More management 
support 
- More active 
collaboration with 
management 
- More acceptance 
and appreciation 
 
- Limited 
management support 
- Limited 
collaboration with 
management 
- Limited 
acceptance and 
appreciation 
- Limited 
management support 
- Limited 
collaboration with 
management 
- Limited 
acceptance and 
appreciation 
- More management 
support 
- More active 
collaboration with 
management 
- More acceptance 
and appreciation 
Status of the 
Internal 
Control System 
- Weak control 
environment 
- Weak internal 
controls 
- Weak control 
environment 
- Weak internal 
controls 
- Weak control 
environment 
- Weak internal 
controls 
- Moderate control 
environment 
- Moderate internal 
controls 
- Strong control 
environment 
- Moderate internal 
controls 
- Moderate control 
environment 
- Moderate internal 
controls 
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Figure 1: Proposed Research Model 
 
 
Stakeholders of Internal Audit 
- Audit committee 
- Senior management (CEO / CFO)  
• Need for information 
• Input for internal audit planning  
 
Organisational Support for the Internal           Organisational Commitment   Internal Auditing Practices 
Auditing Function      ?         - Mission aligned with organisational  ? - Assurance (evaluation and opinion) 
- Replaceable by an external service provider?                             objectives     - Recommendations for improvement 
- Management support and collaboration             - Focus on high risk areas    - Consulting  
- Important strategic function                         - Open for ad hoc management requests  
- Acceptance and appreciation of opinions and 
   recommendations 
- Distribution of resources  
 
Status of the Internal Control System 
- Control environment 
- Risk assessment 
- Internal controls 
- Communication 
- Monitoring 
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PAPER 3 
INTERNAL AUDITORS’ PERCEPTION ABOUT  
THEIR ROLE IN RISK MANAGEMENT: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN US AND BELGIAN COMPANIES 
 
Paper three elaborates further on the second research question of this dissertation by 
describing contemporary internal audit practices and investigating in more detail some of the 
variables that influence these internal audit practices (micro level).  It should be noted that 
this paper only deals with the perceptions of internal auditors, whereas paper four and five 
take into account other stakeholders’ (audit committee and senior management) expectations 
and perceptions.        
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INTERNAL AUDITORS’ PERCEPTION ABOUT  
THEIR ROLE IN RISK MANAGEMENT: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN US AND BELGIAN COMPANIES9 
 
Gerrit Sarens  Ignace De Beelde 
 
Abstract:  In addition to a number of quantitative studies, this paper extends in a qualitative 
and comparative way the understanding of the specific role of internal auditors in risk 
management within US and Belgian companies.  In order to get adequate data, ten case 
studies were conducted.  In the Belgian cases, internal auditors’ focus on acute shortcomings 
in the risk management system creates opportunities to demonstrate their value.  Internal 
auditors are playing a pioneering role in the creation of a higher level of risk and control 
awareness and a more formalised risk management system.  In the US cases, internal auditors’ 
objective evaluations and opinions are a valuable input for the new internal control review 
and disclosure requirements mentioned in the Sarbanes Oxley Act.   
 
Keywords:  internal auditors, risk management, Sarbanes Oxley Act, qualitative study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments:  We appreciate the comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this 
paper received from Andrew Chambers (London South Bank University), Mahbub Zaman 
(University of Manchaster), Rogier Deumes (University of Maastricht), Abigail Levrau 
(Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School), Tom Baelden (Vlerick Leuven Gent 
Management School), Ann Vanstraelen (University of Antwerp and University of Maastricht) 
and Patricia Everaert (Ghent University).  A first draft of this paper was presented at the 3rd 
European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance, 7-8 April 2005 
(Cass Business School, London).  A second draft of this paper was presented at the 28th 
Annual Conference of the European Accounting Association, 18-20 May 2005 (Gothenburg). 
   
                                                
9
 This paper has been published in Managerial Auditing Journal, 21 (1), 2006, 63-80.  
 94
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
By stating that the internal audit activity should evaluate and contribute to the improvement of 
risk management, control and governance, the Institute of Internal Auditors (2004) recognises 
the assurance and consulting role of internal auditors in corporate governance.  Until now, no 
empirical research on the role of internal auditors in risk management (including internal 
control) has been conducted within a Belgian context.  In this study, we elaborate in more 
detail how internal auditors perceive their current role in risk management within the specific 
Belgian context, where internal auditing is still a relatively young profession and where many 
(large) companies have recently established an internal audit function.  Moreover, it is 
important to notice that the Belgian environment is different from the Anglo American 
environment where the internal auditing profession is more developed and where listed 
companies are subject to more stringent corporate governance regulations.  By incorporating 
four Belgian subsidiaries of US listed companies in this study, we are able to investigate the 
influence of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) on internal auditing practices and compare this 
with internal auditing practices in an emerging corporate governance context. Therefore, this 
study is a response to Scarbrough et al.’s (1998) call for studies to be undertaken in different 
jurisdictions with different corporate governance requirements.   
 
In order to collect data, ten case studies were conducted.  More specifically, we interviewed 
Chief Audit Executives in ten large manufacturing and service companies located in Belgium 
and collected relevant documents in order to provide an adequate qualitative view of the role 
of internal auditors in risk management and marked differences between Belgian companies 
(emerging corporate governance context) and Belgian subsidiaries of US companies 
(established corporate governance context).     
 
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section outlines the necessary theoretical 
background on risk management.  The third section deals with the role of internal auditors in 
risk management and gives an overview of the existing empirical studies in this area.  The 
fourth section focuses on the methodology, followed by the fifth section with the results of 
our interviews and document analysis.  The final section formulates conclusions, discusses the 
practical implications and outlines some major limitations of this study combined with 
suggestions for future research.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
For more than a decade, risk management in general, and internal control more specifically, 
have been considered as fundamental elements of organisational governance.  Over 60 percent 
of the respondents of a KPMG survey (2002) in eight European countries believed that their 
systems of risk management and internal control add value to their organisation.  As a 
consequence, risk management is beginning to be perceived as a new means of strategic 
business management, linking business strategy to day-to-day risks and then optimising those 
risks in order to realise value.  More recently, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Eight Annual Global 
CEO Survey (2005) revealed that CEOs worldwide consider governance, risk management 
and compliance as value drivers and a source of competitive advantage.  However, effective 
governance, risk management and compliance are not easily achieved and CEOs are 
struggling with their implementation.   
 
Selim and McNamee (1999b) define risk as ‘a concept used to express uncertainty about 
events and/or their outcomes that could have a material effect on the goals and objectives of 
the organisation’.  The key activity with respect to risk is to manage it.  Selim and McNamee 
(1999a) point out that this starts with a risk assessment where the organisation (management) 
attempts to estimate the probable consequences of threats and opportunities (risk 
identification, measurement and prioritisation), followed by risk management, where 
decisions need to be made about how to manage the perceived consequences of that risk.  It 
should be clear that internal controls are only one of the means to manage key organisational 
risks.  Other devices used to manage risks include the transfer of risks to third parties, sharing 
risks and the withdrawal from unacceptably risky activities.  Similar to Krogstad et al. (1999) 
and Spira and Page (2003), this study takes the view that a company’s system of internal 
control has a key role in the management of risks that are significant to the fulfilment of its 
business objectives and the promotion of effective governance processes.  This may be 
regarded as essential to the governance of the organisation and must be confirmed regularly.  
The UK Turnbull Report (1999), giving explicit guidance on the implementation of the UK 
Combined Code (1998), can be considered as one of the first public documents in the EU that 
clearly emphasises the relationship between internal control and risk management.  Finally, 
risk communication deals with articulating the results of the previous two components to the 
interested shareholders within and outside the organisation.  In this study, we will focus on 
how internal auditors perceive their role in each of these three aspects.  
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Internal control has been defined in many international studies and these definitions, although 
not identical, show great similarities.  We summarise the most important aspects based on the 
COSO Framework (1992) and The Turnbull Report (1999).  The system of internal control 
comprises those elements of an organisation (including its resources, systems, processes, 
culture and structure) that support people in the achievement of the organisation’s objectives.  
They facilitate the effective and efficient operation of companies by enabling them to respond 
appropriately to significant business, operational, financial, compliance and other risks.  This 
includes safeguarding assets from inappropriate use or from loss and fraud, and ensuring that 
liabilities are identified and managed.  Furthermore, internal controls help ensure the quality 
of internal and external reporting, which also includes procedures for reporting immediately 
to appropriate levels of management any significant control failings or weaknesses that are 
identified together with details of corrective action.  Finally, internal controls help ensure 
compliance with applicable laws, regulations and internal policies.  It is important to note that 
a sound system of internal control provides reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that a 
company will not be hindered in achieving its business objectives by circumstances which 
may reasonably be foreseen.   
 
International guidelines state that boards are ultimately responsible for the system of internal 
control.  In practice, this often means that the ‘tone at the top’ is set by the board but it is the 
role of management to identify and evaluate the risks (risk assessment) and design, operate 
and monitor an appropriate system of internal control (risk management).  The board should, 
at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the system of internal control, a 
responsibility that is often delegated to the audit committee.  The Turnbull Report (1999) 
states that effective systems of internal control are embedded into a company’s operations, 
form part of the corporate culture and are capable of adapting to evolving risks arising from 
changes within the company and in the business environment.  As Power (2004; 20) states: 
“internal control is an unshakeable part of the moral economy of organizations”.   
 
The increased (regulatory) demands for accountability has made organisation’s internal 
control systems part of public policy debates on corporate governance.  Many national 
corporate governance reports and reforms include recommendations for internal controls and 
reporting on internal controls.  Complementary to the rise of internal control, the public 
significance of internal auditors increased (Maijoor, 2000).  
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THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS IN RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Internal auditors are certainly exhorted in the professional literature to embrace the 
opportunity to contribute to the achievement of corporate objectives through risk 
management.  Chambers (2000) observed the increasing references to risk (management) over 
the last five years in professional journals related to internal audit.  It is clearly demonstrated 
that internal auditors aspire to this reframing of their role in terms of risk management.  An 
important step was the new definition of internal auditing issued by the IIA in June 1999, 
which clearly states that “the internal auditing activity should evaluate and contribute to the 
improvement of risk management, control and governance”.  In other words, a significant 
opportunity for internal audit emerge to demonstrate its potential to add value, to break away 
from its historical characterisation as the ‘organisational policeman and watchdog’ (Morgan, 
1979, p. 161). 
   
According to Spira and Page (2003), recent corporate governance guidelines assume that risks 
can be objectively identified, quantified and thus strategically managed.  Consequently, 
expertise in risk management techniques and knowledge about the internal control system 
become a source of power which enable internal auditors to advance and play an important 
role within their organisation.  Following their suggestion, this study wants to investigate in a 
Belgian context how internal auditors play these trumps in order to become a proactive player 
in risk management.       
 
The respondents of a study conducted by KPMG (1999) in the US recognise that one 
important way to contribute in today’s changing business arena is to refocus internal auditors 
towards the critical risks and exposures that can determine an organisation’s success or 
failure.  This requires internal auditors to gain a better understanding of the key business risks 
and the impact they can have on the organisation’s ability to build shareholder value (risk 
assessment).  Internal auditors must also be able to assess the responses to key exposures (e.g. 
internal controls) and determine if those responses are sufficient or relevant (risk 
management).  There was a high level of agreement among executives that internal auditors 
should shift part of their focus to strategic risk rather than focusing only on compliance.     
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Recently a limited number of (academic and semi academic) studies has been performed in 
this specific area.  Based on an electronic survey to all members in the worldwide GAIN10 
database, the IIA concluded that risk assessment and risk management had become an integral 
part of the internal audit activity and it was believed to be important to both management and 
audit committees, although the audit committee had a stronger focus on risk than 
management.  The Leung et al. (2003) large scale study within Australian companies revealed 
that a large majority of internal auditors regarded risk management (74 percent) and internal 
control (91 percent) as important internal audit objectives.  In practice, most of their audit 
work was performed with an emphasis on risks and controls.  Moreover, a majority reported 
regularly and detailed on topics like risk and internal control.  Paape et al. (2003) concluded, 
based on a survey conducted in 15 European countries, that risk assessment and risk 
management are making inroads into the internal audit function.  Two third of their 
respondents said they advise and/or support in this area.  Similarly, Allegrini and D’Onza 
(2003) revealed that, within large Italian companies, internal auditors contributed to the risk 
management process.  They were involved in customising the risk management methodology 
to the organisation, carried out consulting services in risk management activities or facilitated 
control and risk self assessments.  Summarised, internal auditors are potentially important 
providers of independent evaluations of the risk management and internal control system 
(assurance), eventually combined with more practice-oriented management assistance 
(consulting) in this area.  In this study, we take these rather general insights for granted and 
investigate in a more qualitative and descriptive way how internal auditors play a role in risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication.    
 
Based on their interviews with Chief Audit Executives in the US, Cenker and Nagy (2004) 
found that the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002), increasing the financial reporting oversight 
responsibilities for management, audit committees and external auditors, had changed the 
relationship between internal auditors and its constituents, at least for the short term.  Many 
executives are seeking the assistance from their internal auditors in satisfying the Section 404 
requirements, leaving internal auditors with the important task of ensuring that the 
corporation’s internal control system is properly documented and tested.  Managements’ call 
                                                
10
 GAIN, which stands for Global Audit Information Network, is a network of Chief Audit Executives who share 
benchmarking data and receive periodic benchmarks for similar audit activities.  The audit functions pay a fee to 
belong to GAIN and therefore are not random members.  However, the IIA has worked diligently to keep costs 
down and therefore the GAIN database is fairly representative of their constituency.  For further information, 
please check: http://www.theiia.org/index.cfm?doc_id=4865. 
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for Section 404 assistance has caused a short term shift of internal auditors’ orientation 
towards a higher focus on financial reporting.  Despite this change in orientation, the formal 
organisational position of internal auditors, as well as their long term view, have not changed, 
due to the general belief of the CAEs that this shift is only a short term reaction to the SOX 
Act.  They are convinced that their orientation will shift back to where it was prior to the SOX 
Act in the next few years.  As we are going to investigate whether a similar (short-term) shift 
can be observed within Belgian companies and Belgian subsidiaries of US companies, this 
study can be considered as a supplement to Cenker and Nagy’s conclusions.  
 
Summarised, by finding a qualitative and descriptive answer on the following research 
questions, this study attempts to complement the existing literature on internal audit: 
- How do internal auditors, within a Belgian context, perceive their current role in risk 
assessment, risk management and risk (and internal control) communication?  
- Do we observe, within a Belgian context, a shift towards a greater financial emphasis 
in internal auditors’ role in risk management?  
- What are marked differences between Belgian companies (emerging corporate 
governance context) and Belgian subsidiaries of US companies (established corporate 
governance context) with relation to internal auditors’ role in risk management?  
Before proceeding to a review of our empirical results, we reflect on some methodological 
issues.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The motivations for this study reflect a desire to enrich and extend our understanding of the 
specific role of internal auditors in risk management.  The relative lack of qualitative and 
descriptive research in this area indicates that theory specification case studies (Keating, 
1995) were an appropriate and even indispensable way to investigate this topic.  Moreover, 
Vinten (1996) stimulates the use of qualitative research, as this is more in tune with the nature 
of the profession.  
 
The selection of the companies for this study was theoretically driven, not by a concern of 
representativeness, as we did not want to generalise the findings to other settings.  More 
specifically, the selection of the companies was based on two criteria.  Previous research and 
anecdotal evidence has revealed that the total amount of potential wealth transfers, and thus 
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the related benefits from undertaking monitoring, increases with firm size.  Moreover, the 
opportunity to obtain economies of scale through the establishment of an internal audit 
department also increases with firm size (Chow, 1982; Parkinson, 2004).  Therefore, we 
controlled for firm size and selected companies with at least 1,000 employees.  Furthermore, 
we included four subsidiaries of US companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
because of our interest in specific differences between Belgian companies (called hereafter 
“the Belgian cases”) and US linked companies (called hereafter “the US cases”).  It is 
important to notice that we did not take into account the age and size of the internal audit 
department when selecting companies.  For an overview of the ten cases, we refer to 
Appendix 2 of this dissertation.  
 
Similar to Page and Spira (2004) in the UK, we conducted in depth interviews with the Chief 
Audit Executive in each of the 10 companies.  The interviews lasted from 60 to 90 minutes, 
were tape recorded and transcribed immediately after the interview took place11.  The 
valuable insights from six preliminary interviews formed a basis to develop a more structured 
and focused interview guide for this specific study on the role of internal audit in risk 
management. 
 
After explaining the purpose of this study, the interview started with some general questions 
about the number of internal auditors, the functional and administrative reporting 
relationships, the content of the audit charter, the input for the audit planning, the distribution 
of working time and the disclosure of risk and internal control statements.  The next part of 
the interview focused on the stage of development of the risk management system and the 
possible role of internal auditors in the implementation or improvement of a formal risk 
management system.  The major part of the interview dealt with the specific role of internal 
auditors in risk assessment, risk management through internal controls and risk and internal 
control communication.  We were interested in the purpose of their involvement and asked for 
specific examples.  To round off the interview, their expectations for the (near) future were 
discussed.             
    
                                                
11
 These steps in the data collection procedure were performed by research assistants.  They had the necessary 
background on the research topic and were sufficiently briefed in advance related to the specific objectives of 
this study.  A closed interview guide was used in order to minimise interviewer bias.  Moreover, interviews were 
transcribed literally so no information could get lost.   
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In order to triangulate the interview data, we used archival data, like the internal audit charter, 
the audit committee charter, the internal audit planning, risk and control assessment 
questionnaires, risk and control assessment reports (e.g. matrices), internal audit reports, audit 
quality surveys and risk and internal control disclosures from the annual report (where 
applicable), obtained from the interviewees.  
 
While interview data may enhance construct validity by studying phenomena in their natural 
context, it is suggested by Lillis (1999) to use a systematic analytical protocol to enhance the 
reliability of our results.  More specifically, we referred to the most important steps from the 
analytical protocol suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994).  First, all interview transcripts 
and archival documents were coded.  Next, we structured and summarised the insights of each 
company in order to get an overview of the most remarkable insights.  These insights were 
submitted to an IIA round table for early feedback12.  The ‘translation’ of these insights into a 
standardised and comparable matrix was an important tool to facilitate cross company 
analysis.  Finally, we compared the ten cases in order to discover certain patterns and reassure 
ourselves that conclusions from one company were not idiosyncratic.   
 
The fifth section discusses in detail the results of our empirical work, structured around the 
differences between both corporate governance contexts.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
General Insights on Risk Management Systems in the US Cases 
In all US cases, we see a well developed risk management system and a high overall focus on 
risks and internal controls.  In these cases, the risk management methodology is formalised, 
standardised, transparent and documented.  On the one hand, these companies use their own 
developed risk assessment methodology, in most cases consisting of questionnaires resulting 
in a company specific risk matrix.  On the other hand, the internal control methodology is to a 
large extent based on the COSO framework (1992), as strongly recommended by the SOX 
act.  As a consequence of the strong SOX influence, there is a higher level of risk and control 
awareness in these companies.  Most people in the US cases are convinced that “without a 
good internal control system, you are not able to reach your business objectives, that is 
                                                
12
 The researcher actively contributed to a round table on risk management in small audit shops organised by the 
Belgian chapter of the IIA (January 18th, 2005).  
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simply impossible”.  All board, audit committee and management responsibilities related to 
risk management and internal controls are clearly defined in and communicated through 
internal control policies, audit committee charters, company websites (intranet and internet) 
and annual reports.  Moreover, all these US companies (recently) developed, in most cases at 
high corporate level, separate risk management functions independent from the internal audit 
function.  These functions focus on the most important strategic and financial risks and are 
often involved in risk assessment activities.   
 
General Insights on Risk Management Systems in the Belgian Cases 
In only two of the six Belgian cases did we see a formalised and standardised risk 
management system.  All other companies do not have a formal risk management system at 
corporate level.  After analysing relevant documents, we could not find clearly defined risk 
and control responsibilities for the board, the audit committee and management.  In such a 
context, companies are rather dealing with risks in a reactive instead of a proactive way.  One 
of the interviewees admits that “they are dealing with risks, but especially after a risk has 
occurred. You should spend some time in our company to understand this, it’s part of our 
culture”.  In most of these companies we see, influenced by a constantly changing business 
environment on the one hand and recent corporate governance pressures on the other hand, 
clear intentions for an evolution towards more formalisation and more focus on risk 
management.  “In the past, risk management and internal control were considered of minor 
importance.  Thanks to certain corporate scandals, these topics appeared on the radar screen 
of the board and top management”.  In all these cases, internal auditors, sometimes in 
collaboration with the separately developed risk management function (in three of the four 
cases) plays an important pioneering role in this formalisation process.  As they are convinced 
of the usefulness of such a formalised risk management system, internal auditors try to create 
(more) risk and control awareness on behalf of the board and management.  A low level of 
awareness is considered as one of the main reasons for the lack of formalisation: “when 
someone asks us: who is responsible for internal control? We always have to answer them: 
you are responsible!”. 
 
General Insights on Internal Auditors’ Role in Risk Management 
Before elaborating the specific differences between the internal auditors’ roles in the Belgian 
cases and the US cases, we want to focus the attention on the general insights from both 
groups of cases.   
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Firstly, we can conclude that the role of internal auditors in risk management for all cases is 
time specific and changes quickly, especially as a consequence of the implementation of new 
corporate governance regulations.  Secondly, it becomes clear that the constantly emerging 
changes in the business environment (e.g. tendency towards further globalisation, new 
technologies) can be considered as an important basis for the role of internal auditors in risk 
management.  Changes in the environment lead to new risks, which create the need for new 
internal controls to manage these risks.  Each of these two steps creates opportunities for 
internal auditors to play an influencing role.  Related to the first step, internal auditors can 
work in a risk based way.  Most interviewees are convinced that an evolution towards a 
higher level of risk based auditing is absolutely needed and crucial when internal auditors 
want to play a role in risk management.  A regular update of their own risk assessments 
allows them to anticipate new risks and adjust their audit planning and assurance efforts to 
these new risks.  Related to the second step, internal auditors can actively contribute to the 
adjustment of the internal controls to these newly emerged or changed risks.  In other words, a 
proactive (consulting) role in the development or improvement of internal controls creates 
(new) ways to demonstrate their value.  Thirdly, we have to admit that internal auditors are 
concerned about their capacities to play an important role in risk management.  In most cases, 
quality or satisfaction surveys are conducted in order to investigate whether they meet the 
expectations of their stakeholders.  Fourthly, we have to remark that all consulting activities 
are only performed on specific (top) management request and often in close collaboration 
with (top) management.  The contemporary consulting role of internal auditors has changed 
towards a larger focus on internal controls instead of a more general business focus in the past 
(e.g. involvement in efficiency improvements of operations or integration after mergers and 
acquisitions).  It has to be noticed that most interviewees are convinced that the orientation of 
their consulting role will change again in the (near) future: “in one or two years, when this 
whole internal control hysteria is calmed down, I’m sure that internal audit will again focus 
more on business aspects… wait and see”.   
 
Let us now go deeper into the role of internal auditors in the three aspects of risk management 
(risk assessment, management and communication) suggested by Selim and McNamee 
(1999a).    
 
In all cases, internal auditors are rather limited in their involvement in risk assessment 
activities.  More specifically, management remains ultimately responsible for risk 
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assessments.  Internal auditors often perform their own risk assessments, but largely based on 
input coming from management and other risk management functions.  Internal auditors are 
playing a kind of integration role.  For those internal auditors working in a risk based way, the 
output of these risk assessments is an important input for the global internal audit planning as 
well as for individual audit assignments.  In other words, internal auditors’ role in risk 
assessment can be considered as a necessary input for their evaluation of the internal control 
system, an integral part of their assurance role.  The consulting role of internal auditors in risk 
assessments is in both groups of cases rather limited.  More specifically, by facilitating risk-
self-assessments (e.g. development of risk assessment questionnaires and assistance with the 
implementation of these questionnaires), internal auditors assist management in fulfilling their 
risk assessment responsibilities.   
 
It was clearly illustrated that the provision of an independent and objective evaluation of the 
internal control system (risk management) remains the major assurance task of internal 
auditors.  One of the internal auditors stresses that “the evaluation of the internal control 
system is the core business of internal audit”.  Internal auditors review and appraise the 
adequacy, effectiveness and efficiency of the internal control system in order to provide its 
independent opinion on it.  It becomes clear that most audits focusing on compliance with 
formal procedures and guidelines constitute an integral part of this assurance role.  
Recommendations on the further improvement of the internal control system (e.g. suggestions 
for new controls or update of existing procedures) should be considered as an integral and 
valuable aspect of this assurance role.   
 
When looking at their consulting role in risk management, internal auditors are actively 
involved in the development (e.g. design of a new questionnaire), reengineering (e.g. update 
of an existing questionnaire) and facilitation (e.g. help with filling in the questionnaire) of 
control-self-assessments (performed by management).  This clearly contributes to a further 
enhancement of the transparency and documentation of the risk management system.  One of 
the internal auditors emphasises: “control-self-assessment? That is something really special! 
We really need to introduce people of each level in the company to this technique. It takes 
about 25 percent of our time this year”.  It is important to notice that some interviewees stress 
the temporary character of this specific consulting activity: “the facilitation of control-self-
assessments is a kind of one shot event where internal audit assists management but from the 
beginning,  it should be clear that the business unit has to take over these responsibilities as 
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soon as they have enough competences”.  Consequently, it is expected that internal auditors’ 
involvement in this type of activity will decrease in the future.   
 
Furthermore we see, for the US as well as the Belgian cases, an involvement of internal 
auditors in the development, reengineering or improvement of the internal controls.  By doing 
this, internal auditors try to transfer their knowledge of internal controls to management.  On 
the one hand this can be a rather informative role in which internal auditors are asked to give 
a (limited) number of recommendations.  On the other hand, they can be proactively involved 
in this process (e.g. assistance with the development of an internal control manual in case of 
the implementation of a new ERP system).  They “want to be actively involved in internal 
control reengineering, instead of only watching and rejecting”.  The interviewees clearly 
admit that the valuable knowledge spillover effects to their assurance role outweigh the 
potential loss of independence that can arise as a consequence of their involvement in these 
consulting activities.   
 
It is recognised by all our interviewees that internal auditors play a crucial role in the spread 
of ‘best practices’ through their own developed company wide network (risk and control 
communication).  Management often benefits from internal auditors as a benchmarking source 
for the effectiveness and efficiency of their risk assessment and internal control practices.  
One of our interviewees gives a clear example: “when we see that our Belgian entity has 
performed good risk assessments, we can recommend the management in for example our 
Dutch entity, to meet their Belgian colleagues to learn from their way to perform risk 
assessments”.  Moreover, it is important to see that their communication role contributes to 
the creation or further improvement of risk and control awareness.   
   
Internal auditors’ reports on risks and internal controls are considered as an important 
communication instrument to a wide range of beneficiaries.  In some cases, internal auditors 
develop and maintain a centralised risk database containing the output of the various risk 
assessments performed by management and internal audit themselves.  It should be 
emphasised that a formalised, standardised, transparent and well-documented risk database 
represents an essential communication instrument.  In other words, the input (risk database) as 
well as the output (reports) of their assurance role, fulfil an important communication role in 
the corporate risk management system.   
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Additionally, the output of certain consulting activities is also part of the range of possible 
communication instruments.  As we have mentioned above, internal auditors are sometimes 
involved in the development of internal control manuals that are spread throughout all levels 
of the organisation.  Moreover, internal auditors often develop risk and control assessment 
questionnaires and provide management training as part of their facilitation role in risk- and 
control-self-assessments.  All these instruments aim at a formalised, standardised, transparent 
and well-documented way of risk and internal control communication.                                 
 
The Specific Role of Internal Auditors in Risk Management in the US Cases 
After analysing the received audit reports, we can conclude that in the US cases internal 
auditors’ assessments and evaluations of the internal control system are, strongly influenced 
by Section 302 and 404 of the SOX Act, clearly more focused on the provision of a global 
(instead of a fragmented) overview and opinion on the state of internal control.  Internal 
auditors are expected to provide annual and even quarterly reports on the overall effectiveness 
and efficiency of the internal control system to the audit committee, CEO, CFO and other 
members of top management.  Our interviewees emphasise the value of these reports as input 
for the disclosure statements these last three parties have to make: “the CEO and CFO are 
really interested in our evaluations and opinions, especially because they have to put their 
signature under the internal control statement and because they can go to jail when these 
statements are not correct!”  In this first phase after the approval of the SOX Act, internal 
auditors’ consulting role in risk management is in the US cases mainly oriented towards a 
further improvement of the transparency and documentation on risks and internal controls, 
which is considered as a valuable contribution to the compliance with new disclosure 
requirements.     
 
Especially for the US cases, we wanted to investigate in more detail to what extent the 
assurance role of internal auditors is influenced by the SOX focus on financial controls and 
procedures for financial reporting.  In three of the four US cases, we see a more extensive 
(administrative) reporting relationship with the CFO, as he/she is finally responsible for the 
design, implementation and effectiveness of financial controls as well as the related 
disclosures in the annual report.  We can wonder whether this does not impair the 
organisational independence of the internal auditors.  Moreover, internal auditors’ work is 
clearly more oriented towards the evaluation of internal controls related to financial reporting.  
It is confirmed by the interviewees that they have recently paid more attention to the link 
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between processes, accounting and financial reporting.  We can conclude that in a majority of 
the US cases, a general evolution towards more internal auditors’ work focused on financial 
controls was manifested.  One internal auditor reveals that “since two years, we incorporated 
much more financial audits in our audit planning, nowadays it even takes about 60% of our 
time”.  We can wonder whether this should (only) be considered as a temporary ‘over-
reaction’ on the new wave of corporate governance requirements…  
 
The Specific Role of  Internal Auditors in Risk Management in the Belgian Cases  
After analysing the six Belgian cases, it becomes clear that in four cases the internal audit 
department can be considered as a ‘small audit shop’ consisting of only one or two internal 
auditors.  It is stressed by the interviewees that limited resources (e.g. budget for personnel, 
operational costs and training) are an important constraint for their possibilities to play a 
significant role in risk management: “when you don’t get enough resources, you will never be 
able to work thoroughly”.  Although internal auditors have good and ambitious intentions, it 
is hard to convince people in these organisations of the value of the internal audit function.  
This can be linked with the fact that internal auditing is a relatively ‘new’ profession in 
Belgium, especially when compared with the US or UK.  The majority of (large) Belgian 
companies have recently created an internal audit function (cf. cases nine and ten).  As a 
consequence of recent changes in national and international corporate governance regulations 
the internal audit function gets now more attention and support from the board and 
management, which certainly creates new opportunities for them to become a significant 
player.   
 
Although until now there is no obligation for companies listed on Euronext Brussels to 
disclose internal control statements, in four of the six Belgian cases the board (including the 
audit committee) and top management are preparing themselves for compliance with such 
disclosure requirements in the (near) future.  In these cases, internal auditors are (again) 
playing a pioneering role.  Internal auditors have recently started, similar to their US 
colleagues, to sporadically provide overall assessments and reports on the internal control 
system in order to anticipate these future disclosures and create more awareness for this topic 
on behalf of top management and the board.  As our interviewees expect that a next revision 
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of the recently published Belgian Code on Corporate Governance13 will contain more clear 
requirements for internal control disclosures, the importance of the assurance role of internal 
auditors in Belgium is expected to increase in the (near) future.     
 
Concerning the evolution towards a greater financial focus in the internal audit work, the six 
Belgian cases can be divided into two categories.  In a first group of three cases, we do not 
see an important shift in the internal auditors’ work.  These interviewees stressed that in the 
past, present and future they look at all segments of internal controls, including procedures 
and controls related to financial reporting and financial controls.  In a second group, we 
generally see an enhanced attention to the quality of the financial reporting.  Similarly to the 
majority of US cases, these internal auditors have recently paid more attention to financial 
and accounting aspects.  This shift can be considered as a part of their pioneering role in 
relation to expected disclosure requirements in the (near) future. 
 
For the Belgian cases, internal auditors’ consulting role in risk management can be linked to 
the global stage of development of the risk management system.  In the two cases with a 
(strongly) formalised risk management system, internal auditors’ consulting role in risk 
management is very limited.  In the four other cases without a (completely) formalised risk 
management system on corporate level, their consulting role is much more elaborated.  In 
these cases, internal auditors’ proactive involvement in the development and improvement of 
internal controls is considered as an important aspect of their pioneering role.  Internal 
auditors play a valuable role because they actively enhance risk and control awareness on 
behalf of the management.  They should realise that internal control is an integral part of their 
responsibilities, because “some management levels do not realise that they are responsible 
for internal controls.  Currently, this is one of the major stumbling blocks”.  By focussing on 
these acute shortcomings, internal auditors have great opportunities to demonstrate their value 
in the short run by enhancing the level of formalisation, standardisation, transparency and 
documentation.  Their attention to the link between risks and internal controls makes them an 
important player in risk management.  Especially in those Belgian cases without a formalised 
and standardised risk management system, risk and internal control communication is a 
crucial aspect of internal auditors’ pioneering role.      
                                                
13
 A first draft of the Belgian Code on Corporate governance, the so-called Code Lippens, was published on the 
18th of June 2004.  After a successful public consultation period, the final version was published on the 9th of 
December 2004.  The full text of this Code can be found at: http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.be. 
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Table 2 summarises the general and country specific roles of internal auditors in risk 
assessment, risk management and risk and internal control communication: 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The final section of this paper summarises the most important conclusions, discusses the 
implications of our results for the internal audit profession, mentions some limitations of this 
study and ends with suggesting interesting topics for future research in this area. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this qualitative study, we found that the specific content of internal auditors’ role in risk 
management is time specific and changes quickly.  It is important to see that constantly 
emerging changes in the business environment are an important basis for the role of internal 
auditors in risk management.  It should be noted that the conclusions of this study are not 
linked neither with the size of the company nor with the size of the internal audit function.     
 
In both Belgian and US companies, internal auditors’ role in risk assessments can be 
considered as an important input for their global audit planning and individual audits.  It 
becomes clear that an evolution towards a higher level of risk based auditing is absolutely 
needed if internal auditors want to play an important role in risk management.  All our cases 
illustrate that the review and appraisal of the effectiveness and efficiency of the internal 
control system (including compliance audits) in order to provide an independent opinion on it, 
remain the major assurance task of internal auditors.  Recommendations on further 
improvements of the internal control system are an integral and valuable part of this assurance 
role.  Moreover, internal auditors are often involved in the development and facilitation of 
self-assessments as well as the development and improvement of internal controls.  By 
spreading ‘best practices’, internal auditors have a crucial benchmarking role for risk 
assessment and internal control practices.  It becomes clear that the input (centralised risk 
databases) as well as the output (annual and quarterly reports on risk and internal controls) of 
their assurance role fulfil an important communication role in the risk management system.  
Additionally, the output of certain consulting activities (e.g. internal control manuals, risk and 
control questionnaires, training) also contributes to an efficient risk and internal control 
communication.     
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Besides these general insights, we found that the role of internal auditors in the US cases, now 
strongly influenced by the new internal control review and disclosure requirements mentioned 
in the SOX Act, is different from their role in the Belgian cases.  For this last group, internal 
auditors’ focus on acute shortcomings in the risk management system creates great 
opportunities to demonstrate their value in the short run.   
 
In the US cases, the objective evaluations and opinions on the internal control system 
provided by internal auditors are a crucial and valuable input for the internal control 
disclosures made by the CEO, CFO and management.  Moreover, we see in the US cases an 
evolution towards more internal audits focused on financial controls and controls related to 
financial reporting.  Internal auditors’ consulting role in risk management is now mainly 
oriented towards a further improvement of the transparency and documentation of the risk 
management process.  This last aspect is considered as a significant contribution to the 
compliance with new disclosure requirements.   
 
For the Belgian cases, internal auditors are playing a proactive role in the preparation for 
similar internal control disclosures in the (near) future.  In only half of the Belgian cases, we 
see an enhanced attention to financial controls and controls related to financial reporting.  
Their consulting role in risk management can be linked with the global stage of development 
of the risk management system.  By being proactively involved in internal control 
development and improvement, internal auditors are playing an important pioneering role in 
the creation of a higher level of control awareness and a (more) formalised, standardised, 
transparent and documented risk management system. 
 
Based on the expectations of our interviewees, we can conclude that, within the Belgian 
context, the internal auditing profession is actually in a kind of “transition phase”.  During the 
last years, internal auditors have expanded their range of (especially consulting) services in 
order to demonstrate their added value to the organisation and to make their function become 
accepted.  Following their American colleagues, Belgian internal auditors should, within a 
reasonable time period, focus more on their core activity.  The current state in Belgium, 
however, is still quite different from the situation of their American counterparts.  
 
As clearly illustrated above, internal auditors’ role in risk management is strongly linked with 
the development stage of the risk management system.  It should be clear that top 
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management has to become aware of the usefulness of a formalised risk management system 
and their specific responsibilities in risk management.  Top management has to give the right 
signals to the lower management levels (top-down approach) in order to convince them of 
their operational responsibilities related to for example the development and implementation 
of internal controls.  When internal auditors want to survive this “transition phase”, they need 
to assume a kind of “teaching role” vis-à-vis the different management levels, which 
necessitates well-developed presentation skills, a sufficient dose of persuasiveness and an 
open dialogue.  Internal auditors have to demonstrate the potential and specific consequences 
(financial, reputation,…) for the organisation of not having a proactive and formalised risk 
management system, which should normally rouse top management.    
 
As soon as all management levels take their responsibility, risk management systems will 
certainly become more formalised.  Based on current observations, we can predict that 
Belgian internal auditors will be able to re-distribute their audit planning towards the 
provision of an independent and objective opinion on the state of risk management system as 
a whole and the internal control system more specifically and prepare themselves for 
disclosure requirements, similar to their American colleagues.  We are convinced that Belgian 
internal auditors will benefit from this “transition phase” in a way that will make their 
profession become more mature and accepted.        
 
Given the qualitative nature of this study and the limited number of companies, it is important 
to take into account that generalisation of the results to all Belgian and US companies is not 
possible.  With respect to the second group, further research could collect data within US 
parent companies or within subsidiaries of these US companies in other (European) countries 
in order to validate these conclusions.  Although this study gives a good impression of the 
specific role of internal auditors in risk management and the marked differences between both 
groups of companies, a large scale test of these findings will be an interesting future research 
activity.  When doing this, diverse sub-samples can be made by controlling certain variables 
suggested in this study.  It can reveal interesting new findings when making a comparison 
between for example large, well-sourced internal audit departments and small audit shops 
with limited resources.   
    
The time specific character of these results can be considered as a (logical) limitation of this 
study.  As mentioned before, the content of internal auditors’ role in risk management, 
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influenced by a constantly evolving business environment and regulations, changes regularly.  
This creates unique opportunities to conduct longitudinal research on how their role changes 
overtime.  In a specific Belgian context, it will be very interesting to see how further revisions 
of the Belgian Code on Corporate Governance will impact the internal audit profession.   
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Table 1: Overview of the Role of Internal Auditors in Risk Management 
 
General 
Insights 
- Their role in risk management is time specific and changes quickly; 
- Changes in the business environment are an important basis for their role in 
risk management; 
- Internal auditors are concerned about their capacities to play an important role 
in risk management (quality or satisfaction surveys); 
- Consulting activities are more focused on internal controls instead of a general 
business focus in the past; 
 
Risk assessment 
- Limited involvement in risk assessments (integration role);  
- Risk assessments are an important input for the evaluation of the internal 
control system; 
- Limited consulting role in risk assessment (facilitation of risk-self-
assessments); 
 
Risk management 
- Provision of an independent and objective evaluation of the internal control 
system remains their major assurance task (including recommendations); 
- Involvement in the development and facilitation of control-self-assessments; 
- (Pro-active) involvement in internal control development and improvement; 
 
Risk and control communication 
- Crucial role in the spread of best practices; 
- Benchmarking source; 
- Development and maintenance of a centralised risk database; 
- Spread of reports on risks and internal controls; 
- Spread of internal control manuals; 
- Spread of risk and control questionnaires for self-assessments.  
US Cases 
(established 
corporate 
governance 
context)
 
Risk management 
- Assurance role strongly focused on the provision of a global overview and 
opinion on the state of internal control (input for disclosures); 
- Consulting role oriented towards a further improvement of transparency and 
documentation on risks and internal controls (input for disclosures); 
- General evolution towards more internal audits on financial controls and 
controls related to financial reporting. 
Belgian Cases 
(emerging 
corporate 
governance 
context) 
- Small audit shops: limited resources are an important constraint for their role in 
risk management; 
 
Risk management 
- Proactive role in the preparation for internal control disclosures in the (near) 
future (sporadic overall assessments and reports); 
- Partial evolution towards more internal audits on financial controls and 
controls related to financial reporting;  
- Valuable pioneering role in the evolution towards a formal, standardised, 
transparent and well documented risk management system (creation of risk and 
control awareness). 
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PAPER 4 
INTERNAL AUDIT: THE EXPERT IN PROVIDING COMFORT  
TO THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
THE CASE OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL CONTROL 
 
Paper four refers to the second research question of this dissertation by studying the influence 
of one stakeholder of internal audit, namely the audit committee, on internal audit practices 
(micro level).  Complementary to existing research in this area, this paper applies a unique 
theoretical perspective to create new insights on this relationship.  The in-depth insights of 
this paper complement the more general indications elaborated in paper two as well as the 
internal auditors’ perceptions studied in paper three.  In paper five, senior management’s 
expectations and perceptions will also be taken into account.   
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INTERNAL AUDIT: THE EXPERT IN PROVIDING COMFORT  
TO THE AUDIT COMMITTEE. 
THE CASE OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL CONTROL14 
 
Gerrit Sarens  Ignace De Beelde 
 
Abstract:  This study investigates to what extent audit committees feel uncomfortable about 
risk management and internal control, and focuses on how internal audit can be the expert in 
providing comfort in these areas, building upon the sociology of professions literature.  Four 
case studies reveal that audit committees need comfort with respect to the control 
environment.  Thanks to their internal position, their familiarity with the company, and their 
position close to people across the company, internal audit seems to be the most suitable one 
to provide comfort and be the ‘guard of the corporate culture’.  Furthermore, audit committees 
need comfort regarding the internal controls in high-risk areas.  Besides internal audit’s 
assurance role, active involvement in the improvement of these internal controls provides a 
significant level of comfort to the audit committee.  Their unique conceptual and company-
specific knowledge about risk management and internal control, combined with the right 
inter-personal skills, enables internal audit to provide this comfort.  Formal audit reports and 
presentations, together with informal contacts, seem to be important ways of providing this 
comfort.  Finally, it becomes clear that the overall level of comfort in the audit committee can 
be enhanced through a ‘joint audit approach’ between internal and external audit. 
 
Keywords:  internal audit, audit committee, risk management, internal control, comfort, 
expert, sociology of professions, case studies       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14
 This paper is currently in the first review round for Corporate Governance: An International Review.  The 
referee reports were received in the beginning of April 2007.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Audit committees have a growing monitoring role in corporate governance.  Article 39 of the 
proposed Directive on Statutory Audit, published by the European Commission in 2004, 
stipulates that the audit committee shall monitor the financial reporting process, the 
effectiveness of the company’s internal controls, its internal audit where applicable, and its 
risk management systems.  Moreover, the audit committee shall oversee the statutory audit, 
and monitor the independence of the statutory auditor or audit firm.   
 
However, audit committee members, in most cases non-executive directors, are confronted 
with an important information asymmetry problem (Raghunandan et al., 1998; 2001).  More 
specifically, they often lack information on the status of the organisation-specific risk 
management and internal control system, resulting in uncertainty.  This uncertainty creates a 
certain level of discomfort among the audit committee members (cf. Pentland, 1993). 
 
Previous research in this area argues that this information asymmetry between audit 
committees and management is more likely to be reduced when there are high-quality 
interactions between audit committees and internal audit (Raghunandan et al., 1998, 2001), 
without going deeper into the meaning of this so-called ‘high-quality’ interaction.  These 
authors only mention that regular meetings between the audit committee and internal audit 
make it more likely that the audit committee remains informed and knowledgeable about 
relevant accounting and auditing issues.  The currently-presented study goes further and 
investigates to what extent uncertainty and discomfort encourage audit committees to look for 
internal audit support, especially with respect to risk management and internal control 
(Pentland, 1993).  Furthermore, we will focus on how internal audit can be the primary source 
of comfort for the audit committee with respect to risk management and internal control, 
thereby building upon the sociology of professions literature (Abbott, 1988; Reed, 1996).  
 
Most empirical research on audit committee effectiveness, applying a so-called ‘black box 
approach’, deals with the impact of audit committees (their existence and externally-
observable characteristics) on specific aspects of governance, by relying on several proxies 
(cf. Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Dechow et al., 1996; DeFond and 
DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Jiambalvo, 1991; McMullen, 1996; Raghunandan et al., 2001) 
and ignores the processes associated with audit committee operation, of which the 
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relationship with internal audit is part.  However, Spira (2003) and Turley and Zaman (2004) 
clearly express the need for explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit 
committee operation and, thereby, for opening the audit committee ‘black box’.  This study, 
investigating the relationship between internal audit and the audit committee, focuses more on 
the audit committee process (Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron and Bédard, 2006) instead of the 
relationship between audit committee input and output.  Furthermore, this study complements 
the existing, mainly quantitative literature in this area, by analysing qualitative empirical data 
(interviews and documents) derived from four case studies involving Belgian companies. 
 
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section presents an outline of the broader 
institutional context of this study.  The third section delves deeper into the theoretical 
underpinnings of this study, followed by presentation of the research questions.  The fourth 
section deals with the methodology used in this study, followed by a fifth section, in which 
the empirical material is analyzed.  The paper ends with conclusions and a discussion.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Audit committees have received considerable attention following both more distant and more 
recent corporate scandals.  Early recommendations, in Anglo-Saxon countries, for the 
voluntary adoption of audit committees were followed by proposals to extend their use to 
many other countries (Collier and Zaman, 2005).  The European Commission has been active 
in promoting the audit committee concept within its briefs, in attempts to create a fair internal 
market.  Audit committees are expected to have a key role in ensuring the high standards in 
financial reporting that underpin confidence in financial markets (European Commission, 
2003).  
 
Stakeholders of organisations increasingly are demanding that boards and executive 
management apply accepted governance principles, adhere to sound risk management, and 
demonstrate publicly that they are in control of their organisation.  Likewise, we see more 
effective internal control as contributing to, rather than being a drain upon, the bottom line 
(Chambers, 2005; ECIIA, 2005).  Several corporate governance guidelines, including the 
Belgian Code on Corporate Governance (2004), clearly stipulate the board’s monitoring 
responsibilities with respect to the system of risk management and internal control.  This 
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monitoring responsibility often is delegated to the audit committee, who will advise the board 
on the effectiveness of risk management and internal control.   
 
Principle five of the Belgian Code on Corporate Governance (2004) deals with the audit 
committee’s responsibilities, and clearly recommends that:  
• At least once a year, the audit committee should review the internal control and risk 
management systems set up by executive management, with a view to ensuring that 
the main risks are properly identified, managed and disclosed; 
• The audit committee should review the statements included in the annual report on 
internal control and risk management; and 
• The audit committee should review the specific arrangements made, by which staff of 
the company may, in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in 
financial reporting or other matters. If deemed necessary, arrangements should be 
made for proportionate and independent investigation of such matters, for appropriate 
follow-up action and arrangements, whereby staff can inform the chairman of the 
audit committee directly. 
 
As is the case with corporate governance mechanisms in general, recommendations and 
regulations related to audit committee responsibilities differ between countries and 
institutional settings.  Overall, in Europe, audit committee formation and practices typically 
are less regulated, even for listed companies.  In the US, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the stock exchange have issued rules with respect to audit committee 
composition and practices that are mandatory requirements.  
 
It should be clear that risk management and internal control are essential parts of corporate 
governance.  Given internal audit’s focus on risk management and internal controls, it is 
likely that internal audit becomes an important player in corporate governance, and that 
companies become more aware of the benefits of internal auditing (Carcello et al., 2005; 
Chambers, 2005).  This can be seen from the growing number of internal auditors in Europe, 
who now can be found in all sectors (ECIIA, 2005).   
 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) also plays an important role in the promotion of 
internal audit as a crucial player in corporate governance.  The most significant illustration of 
this was the publication of the new internal audit definition (1999), clearly describing internal 
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audit as an activity that “helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a 
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes.”  Moreover, a significant portion of the 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (2004) clearly 
refers to the role of internal audit in risk management, internal control and governance.  In 
other words, an internal auditor whose activity fulfils the definition and complies with the 
Standards is in a strong position to support the board (and audit committee) as an essential 
component of their governance mechanisms (ECIIA, 2005).  
 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
Recent studies by Gendron et at. (2004) and Gendron and Bédard (2006) show that practices 
carried out in audit committee meetings aim to make members comfortable with regards to 
matters such as the accuracy of financial statements and the quality of the work performed by 
internal and external auditors.  They argue that the notion of comfort, as introduced in 
Pentland’s study (1993) on audit engagements, also is a fundamental aspect of the work 
performed by audit committee members.  Their analysis shows that managers and auditors 
need to demonstrate to audit committee members that they are trustworthy.  Consequently, 
meetings in ‘effective’ audit committees may be conceived of as being arenas wherein 
attendees establish and secure their reputation of trustworthiness.  Likewise, Spira (1999), 
building upon actor-network theory, argues that the ceremonial components of audit 
committee meetings play an important part in offering comfort and reassurance to investors 
and lenders.     
 
Audit committee members in the study by Gendron et al. (2004) had an interest in the extent 
to which internal control is effective, not least because internal control underlies the 
credibility of financial reports.  Audit committee members are convinced that, to fulfil their 
responsibilities, they are dependent upon the quality of the work performed by the company’s 
internal and external auditors.  Gendron and Bédard (2006) found that audit committee 
members carry out diverse practices, in order to become comfortable with their company’s 
internal controls, and that several of these practices deal with reports from internal audit.  
They especially rely on the work of internal audit to develop their own appreciation of the 
controls’ effectiveness (cf. also Krishnan, 2005).       
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This argument is an interesting starting point to further elaborate on the specific relationship 
between the audit committee and internal audit.  We now will go into more specific detail 
about how internal audit can be a trustworthy provider of comfort with respect to risk 
management and internal control. 
            
Uncertainty and the Need for Comfort 
Pentland (1993) argues that a world without accounting or auditing would no doubt create a 
sense of discomfort.  The relative absence of this feeling in the normal conduct of affairs 
demonstrates how effectively the audit ritual generally has succeeded in transforming chaos 
into order.  Substantially, auditors are centrally implicated in the social production of trust in 
financial markets.  Auditors give ‘comfort’ to people who are vulnerable to erroneous, self-
interested, or possibly fraudulent statements from corporate management.  Although Pentland 
(1993) mainly focuses on external (financial) auditors as providers of comfort, a similar 
argument can be made for internal auditors. 
 
According to Pentland (1993), ‘purification’ is a central function of the audit ritual.  Moore 
and Myerhoff (1977) frame the concept of purification in terms of the difference between 
order and chaos, between form and indeterminacy.  Given the complexity of organisations, we 
can argue that the indeterminacy and vagueness of most risk management and internal control 
systems comprise a fundamental issue for audit committee members.  In other words, this 
makes audit committee members feel uncomfortable, especially given their increased 
monitoring responsibilities in these areas.  Therefore, we expect the process of purification to 
have considerable significance in internal audit work.  Similar to Pentland’s arguments 
(1993), internal audit work makes audit committee members feel ‘comfortable’ by 
transforming and purifying inherently vague and unclear risk management and internal 
control data.  More recently, Spira and Page (2003) found that internal auditors have been 
exhorted to present themselves as risk management experts, basing this expertise on their 
familiarity with internal control processes.  However, they argue that the extent to which this 
aspiration has been achieved, in practical terms, remains unclear.  
 
Power (1997) argues that ‘symbols of comfort’ only have value if they are produced by a 
credible and independent authority.  Based on Pentland’s reasoning (1993), we can argue that 
only those considered to be professional internal auditors can be trusted to perform internal 
audit work and create the necessary ‘symbols of comfort’.  In order to build arguments why 
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internal auditors may be considered the most suitable experts to provide audit committee 
members with comfort on risk management and internal control topics, we refer to arguments 
used in the sociology of professions literature. 
 
Internal Audit as a Trustworthy Expert Provider of Comfort 
The sociology of professions literature has reasoned that the key to survival and the claim of 
professional stature is the development and maintenance of an abstract system of knowledge, 
because it is from this knowledge base that a profession establishes its jurisdiction.  Thereby, 
this literature increasingly has focused on inter and intra-professional competition, while 
socially constituting a jurisdiction by controlling an abstract system of knowledge (Abbott, 
1988).  This basically means that one professional occupation, such as internal audit cannot be 
studied in isolation from other occupations, such as external audit (Covaleski et al., 2003; 
Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001).   
 
In the context of internal audit, the abstract system of knowledge largely refers to 
organisation-specific knowledge on risk management and internal control.  It is via this 
control that a profession can (1) define and redefine the problems it addresses; (2) develop the 
services and practical techniques that must be performed to address these problems (that 
Abbott defines as the profession’s jurisdiction); and (3) defend this resultant jurisdiction 
against competing professions or factions within the profession.  Abbott (1988) defines 
‘jurisdictional domains’ as areas of task performance in which expert groups make ‘more-or-
less’ exclusive claims to technical, social and cultural authority over the knowledge and skill 
that falls within their ambit.  Thus, the evaluation and improvement of risk management and 
internal control can be considered an important ‘jurisdictional domain’ of internal audit.  
Moreover, in this context, external audit can be considered to be a competing profession, as 
external auditors also can claim to possess relevant information on risk management and 
internal control systems, based upon their work carried out in the context of financial audits.   
  
Cooper (1992) argues that experts become the crucial social groups for mediating radical 
doubt and uncertainty, and that they establish some degree of collective trust and stability - in 
other words, ‘comfort’ - in highly mobile societies.  Several studies that have analysed expert 
power and control in late modernity highlight the strategic contribution that experts and 
expertise make to the much more sophisticated and pervasive systems of organizational 
surveillance and control that have been crystallizing in (post) modern societies.  This 
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argument can be transferred to the context of this study, by considering internal auditors to be 
the experts in risk management and internal control who are crucial to establishing trust and 
stability (or comfort, using Pentland’s terminology) for audit committee members.  This 
expertise will enable audit committees to fulfil their growing monitoring responsibilities in 
corporate governance.   
 
Relying on the sociology of professions, Reed (1996) defines three expert groups: (1) 
independent or liberal professionals; (2) organisational professionals; and (3) knowledge 
workers.  Covaleski et al. (2003) classify internal auditors as organisational professionals and 
external auditors as knowledge workers.  According to Reed (1996), the organizational 
profession’s basic power strategy and corresponding legitimating discourse lie in obtaining 
and displaying appropriate credentials that support the individual practitioner’s claim to 
esoteric knowledge.  In the context of internal auditors, these credentials may be interpreted 
as professional recognitions, such as the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) certificate, as well 
as overall professional expertise in areas related to risk management and internal control.  The 
second legitimating discourse lies in developing a knowledge base and repertoire of skills that 
are specific to serving the particular organization within which the professional is housed  
(Abbott, 1988).  The knowledge and skills of internal auditors relate to organisation-specific 
risk management and internal control topics.  
 
As Reed (1996; 576) reasoned, “it is the putative universality, codificability, neutrality and 
mobility of modern, entrepreneurial expertise that sets it apart from the localism, 
particularism and stability characteristic of traditional, organizational expertise.”  This last 
quote illustrates an important difference between external and internal audit: the knowledge of 
external auditors is universal, neutral and transferable to all client companies; whereas the 
knowledge of internal auditors is highly organisation-specific and less transferable to other 
organisations.   
 
Within the internal audit literature, Rittenberg and Covaleski (2001) draw from the sociology 
of professions literature to examine the clash between the public accounting profession and 
the internal audit profession over the provision of internal audit services.  A common theme in 
the in-house efforts to retain the provision of internal audit services is the attempt to reaffirm 
the boundaries of the external and internal audits, thus claiming exclusive rights to control 
specific work activities (cf. Abbott, 1988; Reed, 1996).   
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Furthermore, Covaleski et al. (2003) use the sociology of professions’ perspective to examine 
the dramaturgy of exchange relations among the Big Five public accounting firms, a well as 
the AICPA, the IIA, and the SEC in the context of the outsourcing of internal audit services to 
international external audit firms.  They refer to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1978), an 
act that underscored, for the first time, the importance of localised knowledge that is brought 
to bear by the internal auditor: “reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating the system of internal 
accounting control require a great deal of familiarity with the company and understanding of 
its potential exposures and related controls (Clarence Sampson, SEC Chief Accountant, 
1979).”  Furthermore, in the debate on outsourcing internal audit services, the IIA (1994) 
claimed that internal auditors are intimately acquainted with their organisations’ policies, 
procedures, operating practices and personnel.  Through day-to-day experience in the 
business, internal auditors acquire an intimate knowledge of an organization’s culture, 
processes, risks and controls, and thereby obtain the ‘proprietary knowledge’ that figures 
prominently in providing management and audit committees with tailored and relevant 
information on risk management and internal controls.   
 
Research Questions 
The aim of this study is to develop a better understanding of the specific relationship between 
internal audit and audit committee, particularly within the context of risk management and 
internal control, applying the theoretical concepts described above.  Two research questions 
guide the analysis of our empirical materials: 
1. To what extent do audit committees need comfort relating to risk management and 
internal control? 
2. How can internal audit be an expert, providing comfort to the audit committee about 
risk management and internal control?   
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Why do we Rely on Qualitative Research? 
The majority of previous research on audit committees and internal audit has been based on 
large samples using archival and survey data that mainly rely on proxies and externally-
observable characteristics.  However, Spira (1999) argues that “there is a dearth of studies 
which explore the perceptions of those involved in audit committee activity, through the use 
of qualitative research methodologies.”  Moreover, Turley and Zaman (2004) also advocate 
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field studies to complement extant research.  Qualitative data, including in-depth interviews 
combined with relevant internal documents, provide a significant potential for researching the 
relationship between the audit committee and internal audit in their organisational context (cf. 
Patton, 2002).   
 
While large-sample studies provide a generalizable set of findings pertaining to a few pre-
determined constructs, in-depth case studies produce much more detailed information, but 
about a limited number of people and cases (Patton, 2002).  In this study, we focus on 
understand-ability and theory specification (Keating, 1995), given the limited amount of in-
depth knowledge that exists on the relationship between audit committees and internal audit.  
It is important to see that the status of the risk management and internal control system, the 
broader context in which this relationship is studied, is, to a large extent, company-specific 
(Covaleski et al., 2003) and cannot be generalised across all Belgian companies (Sarens and 
De Beelde, 2006a).  Consequently, the needs of the audit committee for comfort, and the 
specific ways by which internal audit can provide that comfort, also are company-specific 
and, thus, must be studied from a holistic perspective (Patton, 2002) using in-depth company-
specific data gathered via case studies.   
 
Four Case Studies 
The selection of the four companies (cases) for this study was partially theoretically-driven 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and partially based upon experience with the internal audit 
profession in Belgium.  Based upon previous research (Chow, 1982), we controlled for firm 
size and selected companies with at least 1,000 employees.  All four companies operate on an 
international scale (Europe, US, Asia and Middle East).  Three companies (cases B, C and D) 
are listed on Euronext Brussels, and two companies (cases A and B) are controlled by a 
family.  Previous research on internal audit within a Belgian context (Sarens and De Beelde, 
2006a; 2006b) indicated two interesting parameters to control for: (1) the age of the internal 
audit function; and (2) the number of internal auditors.  Related to the first parameter, we 
included three companies with a mature internal audit function (having existed for more than 
five years) and one company that more recently has created an internal audit function (having 
existed for less than five years).  Related to the second parameter, we selected three 
companies with a small internal audit department (less than five internal auditors) and one 
company with a larger internal audit department (more than five internal auditors).  Table 1 
presents an overview of the four cases.    
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Case B, a service company, represents the smallest participant in this study, with annual 
revenues of less than 500 million Euro.  In this company, the internal audit function was 
created more than 15 years ago, and currently is represented by a single internal auditor.  In 
Case C, a manufacturing company with annual revenues between 500 million and 1 billion 
Euro, the internal audit function was created 16 years ago.  However, the internal audit 
function always has been performed by a single internal auditor.  The two other companies 
have annual revenues of more than 1 billion Euro; Case D is particularly large, having more 
than 10 000 employees.  In Case A, a service company, the internal audit function recently 
was created and is represented by one internal auditor.  In Case D, a manufacturing company, 
the internal audit department has existed for more than 20 years, and consists of 10 internal 
auditors.   
 
With respect to the audit committee, Table 2 provides, for each company, the number of audit 
committee members, non-executive audit committee members, independent audit committee 
members and audit committee meetings.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Data Collection 
For each case, we conducted in-depth interviews with the internal auditor (Cases A, B and C) 
or the Chief Audit Executive (Case D) and the head of the audit committee.  The interviews, 
taking place from June through September 2005, lasted from 60 to 120 minutes.  We took 
several steps to increase the reliability of the collected data.  We started each interview by 
describing the objectives of our study.  We regularly asked interviewees to provide specific 
examples to substantiate their thoughts.  Furthermore, all interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed immediately after the interview.  Complete anonymity and the guarantee that no 
other organisation member would examine the transcript were provided.  Finally, 
interviewees had the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the transcript and add changes, if 
they deemed this necessary, within one week of the interview (cf. Patton, 2002).   
 
In order to support the interview data and enhance the reliability of our conclusions, we 
obtained copies of several archival materials, like the internal audit charter and internal audit 
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plans, as well as even more confidential documents like internal audit reports, internal 
presentations, business control guides, audit committee reports, and so on.  Furthermore, we 
transcribed many field notes, containing all kinds of impressions, comments and anecdotes 
written down during or immediately after interviews.   
 
Data Analysis 
A key step in analysing data from case studies is within-case analysis, which helps us to cope 
with the deluge of data that springs from field work.  As suggested by the analytical protocol 
of Miles and Huberman (1994), all interview transcripts, archival documents and field notes 
were coded.  Then we performed detailed case study write-ups, using standardised matrices, 
for each company.  This process allowed the unique patterns among the relationship between 
the audit committee and internal audit within each case to emerge before we generalised 
patterns across cases.  The cross-case analysis we performed in the next step forced us to go 
beyond initial impressions, and it enhanced the probability that we would capture the novel 
findings which exist in the data.   
 
Each of the four cases offers different insights into the notions of seeking and providing 
comfort.  Therefore, we will describe the major insights of each case individually, before 
moving on to any formulation of cross-case insights.   
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: WITHIN-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
Case A  
 
Overall Status of the Risk Management and Internal Control System 
The interviews, as well as the document analysis, reveal that the overall risk management 
system is not well-developed within this company.  The company has a rather informal and 
passive way of dealing with risks, lacking any established risk management strategy.  The 
control environment can be described as ‘soft’, whereby top management sometimes gives the 
wrong signals to lower management levels, thereby encouraging unethical behaviour.   
 
Audit Committee Seeks Comfort 
The major source of discomfort or uncertainty for the audit committee can be found in some 
serious problems that emerged after a recent acquisition within another European country.  
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For the audit committee, these problems clearly illustrated the weaknesses of not having a 
formal and well-developed risk management system.  These feelings of discomfort made the 
audit committee more aware of the importance of risk management; for example, as a crucial 
decision-supporting tool in cases of mergers and acquisitions. 
 
When evaluating the different sources of comfort, the audit committee perceives the external 
auditor as being too superficial, and not able to provide thorough control of operational 
aspects:  
 
“What strikes me is that the results of the external audit work were not consistent with the 
problems we discovered afterwards.  I think their controls were too much focused on 
financial aspects, whereas most of the problems we discovered were at the operational 
level [head of the audit committee].” 
 
It seems that the universal, neutral and easy-transferable character of an external auditor’s 
knowledge (cf. Reed, 1996) does not provide sufficient comfort to the audit committee in this 
company.  The audit committee clearly perceives the internal auditor as being more able to 
exercise thorough control on the company, and thus more able to provide the necessary 
comfort, due to his internal position, his familiarity with the company and its operations, and 
his position close to the people on the floor (cf. Covaleski et al., 2003).  Therefore, the audit 
committee expects the internal auditor to make them feel more comfortable by playing an 
important communicator or translator role between the operational and monitoring levels. 
 
Overall, the audit committee is aware of the need for internal audit support in acquiring the 
necessary information from within the company, which enables the audit committee to fulfil 
its responsibilities:  
 
“We do not have enough contact with the field, as we call it, and that is what we really 
need to do our job.  Therefore, we need good interaction with the internal auditor [head of 
the audit committee].”          
  
More specifically, the audit committee seeks comfort in a limited number of specific, high-
risk areas.  The audit committee is convinced that the internal auditor’s specific knowledge 
and expertise makes it possible for him to focus his control work on a limited number of high-
risk areas, and give a limited number of specific recommendations to improve the internal 
controls in these areas.  A risk-based way of auditing seems to be a good way for the internal 
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auditor to provide comfort to the audit committee.  Given the overall status of the risk 
management and internal control system, and the averse attitude of management towards risk 
management, close follow-up on and even facilitation of the implementation of his 
recommendations would provide additional comfort to the audit committee.  By 
communicating with respect to the follow-up of his audits, and showing how the risk 
management and internal control systems are improving, the internal auditor will be able to 
provide valuable information, enabling the audit committee to formulate its own opinions and 
fulfil its monitoring responsibilities.  Furthermore, the audit committee wants to receive this 
information by means of short and focused audit reports.  
 
Internal Auditor Provides Comfort 
The internal auditor clearly indicated different ways to create a sense of comfort amid the 
audit committee, given the status of the risk management and internal control system.  
Overall, the internal auditor is convinced that he has to apply his knowledge and expertise by 
playing an active role in risk management.  His most important role is creating risk and 
control awareness on behalf of management.  In other words, providing the right signals and 
illustrating the importance of risk management and internal controls is the first step in the 
process of change that this company must adopt.   
 
More specifically, an important source of comfort results from the fact that the internal 
auditor is able ‘to make things happen’; in other words, from internal auditor-prompted 
discussions on risk management and internal control, increased awareness and appropriate 
control actions emerged in different layers of the company.  Furthermore, this discussion 
resulted in a number of projects aiming to document the internal control system and develop 
procedures.  In the words of the internal auditor:  
 
“Currently, I am like a challenger, a driver of innovation, a driver of change management 
[internal auditor].”   
 
Moreover, the internal auditor also intends to actively contribute to the formalisation of the 
risk management process, and to the evaluation of a new control strategy, a function which is 
confirmed by the internal audit charter.   
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Besides his active role in formalising the risk management and internal control system, the 
internal auditor considers it his mission to educate the audit committee members about 
frameworks like COSO and ERM:  
 
“They do not know frameworks like COSO and ERM, so I will have to introduce these 
concepts to them, step by step.  Recently, I illustrated to them the meaning of ‘tone at the 
top’, as this is a major risk area for the company [internal auditor].” 
 
Although the audit committee is aware of the importance of risk management and internal 
control, this education role will make its members more comfortable with the theoretical 
underpinnings.   
 
It becomes clear that the internal auditor’s abstract knowledge base, on which he claims to be 
an expert provider of comfort, consists of his general conceptual knowledge, as well as his 
more specific practical knowledge of risk management and internal control.  It is important to 
see that this knowledge and expertise primarily is based upon his prior work experience (in 
the financial sector and as an external auditor).  Furthermore, being resolute and persuasive 
are important interpersonal skills to create risk and control awareness and to drive the 
formalisation of the risk management and internal control system.  In other words, besides an 
abstract system of knowledge, interpersonal skills are crucial to becoming an expert provider 
of comfort (cf. Abbott, 1988; Cooper, 1992; Reed, 1996).         
 
As he is the only internal auditor in the company, he is aware of his limitations with respect to 
providing comfort to the audit committee.  Therefore, he has started to collaborate actively 
with the external auditor, as both are convinced that they have the same goal, namely, creating 
risk and control awareness and assisting with the formalisation of a risk management system.  
By combining their knowledge and expertise, this collaboration can enhance the overall level 
of comfort within the audit committee, and can be considered the opposite of the ‘inter-
professional competition’ suggested by Abbott (1988).  Despite their different knowledge 
bases and power strategies (cf. Covaleski et al., 2003; Reed, 1996), this case illustrates that 
the jurisdictional domain of risk management and internal control is, to some extent, shared 
by the internal and external auditor, which makes a ‘joint audit approach’ easier and even 
desirable.  
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Case B 
 
Overall Status of the Risk Management and Internal Control System 
Both the head of the audit committee and the internal auditor described the risk management 
system as rather informal.  The head of the audit committee makes the link between the trust-
based corporate culture, which requires less formal risk management and fewer internal 
controls, and the family-dominated shareholder structure.  The internal auditor concludes that 
a good balance exists between formal and informal internal controls within the company.  
Essential internal controls exist that are adopted to address the major potential risks.         
 
Audit Committee Seeks Comfort 
The head of the audit committee clearly indicates that the audit committee almost exclusively 
focuses on financial results and financial reporting issues.  With respect to internal control, 
the members mainly are concerned with financial controls, as they provide assurance on the 
correctness of the financial figures.  In other words, their major information asymmetry (cf. 
Raghunandan et al., 1998, 2001) lies within financial aspects and financial controls, two areas 
in which they feel uncertainty and discomfort (cf. Pentland, 1993).  Consequently, the audit 
committee perceives the external auditor as being its major potential source of comfort in 
these areas.  It appears that the audit committee is not convinced of the potential role of the 
internal auditor in providing them with comfort related to internal controls, especially because 
the members do not perceive him as independent:  
 
“The internal auditor is working for management and is strongly influenced by 
management, so there is still an independence problem.  We rely on the external auditor.  
He is the only source of neutral information on the internal control system [head of the 
audit committee].”   
 
Nevertheless, based upon information received from the external auditor, the audit committee 
wants to provide input to the internal auditor, so that he can investigate specific issues in more 
detail.  Contrary to Case A, it seems that the audit committee is responsible for proposing a 
collaboration between the internal and external auditor.  In other words, the audit committee 
attempts to combine these two sources of comfort.  On one hand, the audit committee 
perceives the external auditor as being the expert responsible for reducing the audit committee 
member’s major information asymmetry and, thus, providing them comfort (cf. Cooper, 1992; 
Reed, 1996).  On the other hand, they want to involve the internal auditor, in order to provide 
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additional comfort on specific issues and, by doing so, to reduce the remaining information 
asymmetry.  It seems like they are aware of the importance of localised knowledge and 
sufficient familiarity with the company in order to make more detailed investigations and, 
thus, provide comfort (cf. Reed, 1996; Covaleski et al., 2003).  Again, and similar to Case A, 
this illustrates that the inter-professional competition suggested by Abbott (1988) is less 
relevant in the context of risk management and internal control.   
 
A more thorough investigation reveals that the relationship between the internal auditor and 
the audit committee is rather superficial in both directions.  Currently, the audit committee 
perceives its role, vis-à-vis the internal auditor, purely as an overseer or monitor.  Because the 
members do not perceive the internal auditor as a major source of comfort, their input to him 
is minimal.  Similarly, it appears that the internal auditor provides a very limited amount of 
information to the audit committee.  Important symbols of comfort, like internal audit 
planning and audit reports (cf. Moore and Myerhoff, 1977; Power, 1997), remain vague.   
 
Even though the head of the audit committee, inspired by recent corporate governance 
guidelines, is convinced that risk management should become a major topic for the audit 
committee, the audit committee itself is not aware of its role in risk management.  
Consequently, the members do not feel discomfort or uncertainty is this area (cf. Pentland, 
1993).  They are convinced that risk management is an internal audit responsibility, but do not 
see how the internal auditor can provide comfort in this area:  
 
“The internal auditor is dealing with risk management in a more formal way… but we do 
not know much about it.  However, I do not feel that the audit committee members really 
need this information. Do we have to know it? [head of the audit committee]” 
 
Nevertheless, he is convinced that, given the overall corporate culture, top management 
would not appreciate it if the audit committee deals too much with risk management in a 
formal way. Thus, without a change in the overall attitude towards risk management, it will be 
hard for the internal auditor to become perceived by the audit committee as an important 
provider of comfort in this area.   
 
Internal Auditor Provides Comfort 
Our data analysis reveals that the internal auditor’s relationship with the CEO is perceived as 
more important than his relationship with the audit committee.  It appears that the internal 
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auditor is more a provider of comfort for management than for the audit committee.  By 
indicating the major risks the company has, the CEO provides clear input for audit planning, 
which enables the internal auditor to focus his efforts on the CEO’s major areas of concern.  
The CEO also provides feedback on the audit reports, indicating that these provide comfort to 
him. 
 
Moreover, the internal auditor provided several examples illustrating how management 
appeals more and more to the internal auditor with specific concerns, problems and requests 
for evaluations of internal control or assistance with improvement of internal controls.  This 
illustrates that, contrary to the audit committee, management perceives the internal auditor as 
an important source of comfort with respect to internal control, because of his expertise 
providing independent reviews and valuable suggestions for improvement (cf. Cooper, 1992; 
Reed, 1996).   
 
Although the internal auditor seems to provide more comfort to management, he also wants to 
become a provider of comfort for the audit committee.  Therefore, he expects the audit 
committee to give him specific input for his annual audit planning.  By doing this, the audit 
committee can indicate its major areas of concern (uncertainty, discomfort); in other words, 
the areas in which the audit committee members want the internal auditor to provide comfort.  
Moreover, the internal auditor expects the audit committee to provide feedback on his audit 
reports, thereby indicating to him whether the members are satisfied with it; in other words, to 
what extent do these reports provide them with sufficient comfort?  Although these are the 
clear intentions of the internal auditor, to date this has not occurred.  The internal auditor 
confirms that the internal audit charter is an important tool for him to demonstrate the areas in 
which he can provide comfort.  Nevertheless, it seems that the audit committee has not 
understood the charter’s core message.  Furthermore, an analysis of the audit reports indicates 
that they have the potential to become valuable symbols of comfort for the audit committee 
(cf. Moore and Myerhoff, 1977; Power, 1997).  However, the audit committee only receives a 
summarised version of these audit reports.   
 
The internal auditor is aware of the current intentions of management to start formalising risk 
management.  Given his specific expertise as a former external auditor, the internal auditor 
plays an important role assisting management with this formalisation process:  
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“I am used to working in a formal and well-documented environment, so I can help them 
to formalise the risk management system [internal auditor].”   
 
It is important to see that, if the audit committee becomes aware of its monitoring role in risk 
management and the importance of formalising risk management, this assisting role of the 
internal auditor can become a source of comfort for the audit  committee members.   
 
Furthermore, his experience as an external auditor creates opportunities for the internal 
auditor to formalise the collaboration with the external auditor that the audit committee is 
looking for as the ultimate source of comfort (cf. above).  He indicates that this collaboration 
with the external auditor already exists, but in a rather informal way.  Thus, demonstrating the 
results of this collaboration more formally to the audit committee would enable the internal 
auditor to become recognised by them as a provider of comfort.  The internal audit charter 
clearly refers to this collaboration, stipulating that:  
 
“The internal audit department will liaise with the external auditors to foster a cooperative 
working relationship, reduce the incidence of duplication of effort, ensure appropriate 
sharing of information, and ensure coordination of the overall audit effort [internal audit 
charter].”           
 
Case C 
 
Overall Status of the Risk Management and Internal Control System 
Although this company has an overall informal way of dealing with risks, the internal auditor 
is convinced that a certain level of risk awareness exists.  Both the internal auditor and the 
head of the audit committee are advocates of a more formal way of managing risks, which is, 
according to them, a major challenge for the future.  It seems like this formalisation process 
recently started with the performance of a company-wide risk assessment.  According to the 
internal auditor, the internal control system largely is based on a kind of informal ‘common 
sense’, instead of being well-documented.  
 
Audit Committee Seeks Comfort 
In general, the audit committee works in a pro-active way, which means that the members 
strongly focus on high-risk areas that might create problems for the company in the future.  
This pro-active focus on high-risk areas creates a specific need for comfort on behalf of the 
audit committee (cf. Pentland, 1993).  The audit committee is convinced that the internal 
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auditor is an important provider of comfort in certain of these high-risk areas and, therefore, 
clearly signals its need for comfort by giving specific input for his audit planning.  The audit 
committee’s focused interest in high-risk areas is reflected by the way the head of the audit 
committee deals with audit reports.  Although the audit committee receives all audit reports, 
the members only read those audit reports that are related to these high-risk areas.  
 
These audit reports clearly are considered to be working instruments for the audit committee, 
a fact which is confirmed by the numerous notes written on them by the head of the audit 
committee.  Besides these formal symbols of comfort (cf. Power, 1997), the audit committee 
also has regular informal contacts with the internal auditor to discuss specific aspects of his 
work.  These informal contacts are an important aspect of the relationship between the 
internal auditor and the audit committee (cf. Moore and Myerhoff, 1977), and represent an 
important way of providing comfort to the audit committee:  
 
“If we have a question on an audit report, we often deal with this in an informal way by 
phone, so we do not always have to wait until the next audit committee meeting [head of 
the audit committee].”     
 
The head of the audit committee illustrates the committee’s way of working by describing 
some major high-risk areas that have created uncertainty and discomfort, and on which the 
committee currently is focussing (cf. Pentland, 1993).  He also illustrates how the internal 
auditor has created comfort in these areas.  For example, the possible emergence of fraud in 
the Asian subsidiaries is something about which the audit committee truly is worried.  The 
fact that, as of now, the company does not have an answer for this problem, creates a 
significant feeling of discomfort and prompts the audit committee to ask the internal auditor 
to perform specific audits on the Asian subsidiaries.  Another major issue of concern relates to 
receivables and stock issues.  Over the past several years, the audit committee has asked the 
internal auditor to focus on these high-risk areas in order to provide them with some degree of 
comfort.  An investigation into the audit planning confirms the influence of these high-risk 
areas on the working agenda of the internal auditor.  As a result of the internal auditor’s work 
in this area, management has initiated some important actions.  The fact that the internal 
auditor was able to encourage management to take actions for improvement - in other words, 
that “the internal auditor can make things happen” - has created a sense of comfort within the 
audit committee.   
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Similar to Case A, the audit committee also seeks comfort regarding the control environment, 
as the basis for risk management and internal control.  In other words, the ‘translator role’ of 
the internal auditor also is, in this case, appreciated by the audit committee as an important 
source of comfort about “what is going on in the company.”  Furthermore, the internal auditor 
should be a facilitator for whistle-blowing, especially for people with a financial function.  In 
order to play this ‘translator role’, it is very important for the internal auditor to have the right 
communication skills, as well as an open and friendly attitude towards others in the company.   
 
Internal Auditor Provides Comfort 
Given his limitations as a single internal auditor, he finds it hard to provide an opinion on the 
global status of the internal control system.  Instead, he prefers to focus on reviewing the 
internal controls and recommending improvements in a limited number of high-risk areas, 
which clearly is reflected in his audit planning and audit reports.  By doing this, he wants to 
provide assurance regarding the existence and effectiveness of the internal controls in these 
high-risk areas, especially because they have a direct impact on financial results.  His major 
role corresponds with the philosophy of the audit committee and its specific needs for 
comfort.  Furthermore, and if possible, the internal auditor attempts to improve the efficiency 
of the processes by providing additional recommendations.   
 
In most instances, management is positive about his work and is interested in his suggestions 
to improve internal controls and processes, which have become important items at their 
business review meetings.  The fact that management is reacting positively and wants to 
implement his suggestions gives a clear signal to the audit committee, a signal which is an 
important source of comfort for them: 
 
“Things are improving, thanks to my work that has incited management to take action 
[internal auditor].” 
 
Moreover, the internal auditor also finds it important to listen to others in the company and 
give them the chance to talk about problems or inefficiencies they encounter, in order to 
become aware of potential internal risks.  It seems that he perceives the ‘translator role’ the 
audit committee wants him to play as inherent to the performance of his function. 
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Even though the internal auditor perceives the input of the audit committee as relatively 
limited, especially when compared with the input coming from management, he considers its 
input to be unconditional priorities.  Because he is convinced that the major focus of the audit 
committee remains on financial results and reporting, the internal auditor clearly expresses his 
intentions to have his work receive more attention from the audit committee, by promoting 
himself as a credible and trustworthy provider of comfort with respect to risk management 
and internal controls (cf. Gendron et al., 2004).  Given some significant new risks for the 
company, like IT and fraud, both of which clearly are reflected as audit committee priorities, 
the internal auditor wants to focus his working agenda more on the provision of assurance 
with respect to internal controls in these high-risk areas.  He clearly wants to highlight this 
assurance aspect in his audit reports, all of which are sent to the audit committee.  Again, this 
illustrates the crucial role of audit reports as a symbol of comfort (cf. Moore and Myerhoff, 
1977; Power, 1997).  Additionally, the internal auditor is convinced that, as soon as the audit 
committee intends to provide a formal opinion on the status of the internal control system, its 
members will become even more interested in his work as a source of comfort. 
 
Given his familiarity with the many divisions of the company and his intimate knowledge 
about the processes and internal controls (cf. Abbott, 1988; Reed, 1996), the internal auditor 
considers himself to be the most appropriate person to start formalising risk management.  
More specifically, he intends to play an important educational role for the audit committee, in 
order to make its members aware of the specificities of risk management and their own 
monitoring responsibilities.  The internal auditor admits that, until now, he did not have the 
time to do this; but this will be an important challenge for him in the future.  Given the fact 
that the audit committee already is convinced about the importance of formalising risk 
management, a more profound ‘education’ related to different aspects of risk management 
will be an important additional source of comfort for them.   
 
Case D 
 
Overall Status of the Risk Management and Internal Control System 
Contrary to the three previous companies, this company has a strong, formal, internally-
developed risk management system.  In order to follow-up on corporate evolutions, and 
taking into account the changing risks, the risk management system is updated yearly by top 
management, the audit committee and the head of internal audit.  The company strives to 
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achieve a uniform corporate culture.  Therefore, top management, together with the head of 
internal audit, have developed a uniform and standardised Code of Conduct and Guide to 
Business Control.  This Guide to Business Control summarises all policies and procedures 
that the company has, at a group level, so as to enable and enforce business ethics and control.  
This guide also creates control awareness among all managers, and explains their specific 
responsibilities in each of the areas for which the company has developed internal controls 
and conduct rules.   
 
Audit Committee Seeks Comfort 
Generally, internal audit is considered by the audit committee to be a ‘business partner’.  
More specifically, the audit committee wants to become comfortable with respect to  
compliance with the overall company standards, as stipulated by the Code of Conduct and 
Guide to Business Control (cf. Pentland, 1993).  Therefore, the audit committee members 
clearly expect internal audit to monitor compliance with this standard, and to make sure that 
all controls and standards are followed.  By doing this, they provide a significant level of 
comfort to the audit committee.  In other words, internal audit acting as ‘guard of the 
corporate culture’ creates the necessary comfort for the audit committee.  It also is clearly 
mentioned in the company Guide to Business Control that company employees can contact 
internal audit to report a concern or breach of conduct rules.  According to the head of the 
audit committee:  
 
“It is comfortable to know that people can go to internal audit when they want to 
report a problem or concern [head of the audit committee].”   
 
Moreover, the audit committee expects internal audit to play an important advisory and 
assistive role in the implementation of internal control improvements.  Knowing that 
management can call on internal audit as a management tool actively contributing to the 
improvement of internal controls is a significant source of comfort for the audit committee.  
This philosophy also is clearly reflected in the Guide to Business Control.  Until now, the 
audit committee feels comfortable with respect to this role.  
 
The audit committee discusses, in an intensive way, the internal audit priorities and indicates 
its areas of discomfort and uncertainty (cf. Pentland, 1993) by adding new priorities to the 
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audit planning.  During each audit committee meeting, the members also systematically 
discuss the audit results.  
 
Besides formal interactions that occur during the audit committee meetings, the head of the 
audit committee has regular informal contacts with internal audit.  He regularly meets one-to-
one with the head of internal audit, and even attends internal audit team meetings as an 
informal observer.  It seems like these informal interactions reveal valuable information for 
the audit committee and, consequently, are an important source of comfort for the audit 
committee.     
    
Similar to Cases A and B, we found indications of the potential value of a collaboration 
between internal and external audit.  The audit committee has the intention of combining 
these two sources of comfort through the development of complete synergy between internal 
and external audit in other words, an optimising the collaboration between them. 
 
Internal Audit Provides Comfort 
The head of internal audit admits that she regularly receives specific requests from the audit 
committee.  Through the members’ questions on the coverage of the internal audit planning, 
specific audits reflecting major areas of discomfort are suggested.  She illustrated this with 
several examples.  Each audit committee request reflects a high-risk area for the company 
and, finally, becomes a priority during internal audit planning.   
 
Similar to the head of the audit committee, internal audit focuses intensely on new risks that 
are emerging, as a result of cultural differences within the company worldwide; and on the 
resultant different levels of risk and control awareness that exist within the company.  
Therefore, given the strongly-formalised corporate culture, it is an important mission of 
internal audit to actively assist with the integration of newly-acquired companies, in order to 
make them evolve towards standardised, global company policies and procedures.  This is an 
important aspect of their role as ‘guard of the corporate culture’.  More practically, by 
providing training and advice in local procedure development, internal audit tries to create 
comfort in this area.  In order to meet these new challenges, the internal audit department also 
recently decided to engage two additional internal auditors: one based in the U.S. and one 
based in China.   
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General as well as specific internal control reviews, combined with suggestions for 
improvement, are the core tasks of internal auditing.  When reviewing specific parts of the 
internal control system, internal audit applies a unique approach, based upon its own 
internally-developed control framework.  By applying this approach, internal audit can 
develop unique knowledge regarding internal controls (cf. Abbott, 1988), which is a sound 
basis for providing a well-founded opinions on these internal controls.  These opinions 
comprise an important source of comfort.   
 
Besides the important assurance role illustrated above, internal audit clearly stresses its role 
supporting and assisting management.  The internal audit website on the company intranet 
illustrates this vision: 
 
“Did you ever think about calling in internal audit?  In many situations, internal audit may 
be the partner you are looking for.  We regard all audit projects as opportunities to assist 
you as partners in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the business processes or 
activities you are responsible for [internal audit website on intranet].” 
 
More specifically, internal audit has an important advisory role in developing and improving 
new controls, which can be considered as an important source of comfort.  Moreover, having 
expertise as a member of working teams enables them to build valuable and unique 
knowledge, knowledge which they can use in their internal control reviews.  In other words, 
the resulting abstract system of knowledge (cf. Abbott, 1988) makes them experts in 
providing comfort with respect to the internal control system (cf. Cooper, 1992; Reed, 1996).   
 
In accordance with the expectations of the audit committee, the head of internal audit makes 
significant efforts to improve the relationship with the external auditor and, by doing so, 
actively contributes to an intensive collaboration.  This is considered to be an important audit 
challenge for the future.  More specifically, the head of internal audit regularly meets with the 
external auditor to exchange information on risks, problems and work performed, in order to 
avoid duplication.  They even have the intention of developing a coverage chart, in an attempt 
to jointly achieve broader and better coverage of risk and internal control reviews, which will 
create even more comfort for the audit committee.  Similar to Cases A and B, these efforts 
illustrate that the inter-professional competition suggested by Abbott (1988) and previously 
illustrated by Covaleski et al. (2003) is less apparent in the context of providing comfort to 
the audit committee on risk management and internal controls.  Nevertheless, the head of 
 147
internal audit is convinced that the internal auditors have a unique perspective on the 
company and its operations (cf. Covaleski et al., 2003), which enables them to provide even 
more comfort than the external auditors might:  
 
“I always say to my auditors, your first working instrument is safety goggles, so that 
you can enter the plants… actually, that’s our favourite task.  If you want to do an 
inventory audit and you’ve never been in the plant, then you don’t know what you’re 
talking about, and you can’t give an opinion on it [head of internal audit].”         
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS  
 
With respect to the overall status of their risk management and internal control systems, Cases 
A and D represent two extremes.  In Case A, the company has a soft control environment and 
a very informal way of dealing with risk management and internal control.  A well-developed 
risk management system and a clearly-defined risk management strategy are missing.  In 
contrast, in Case D, the company aims to achieve a strong and uniform corporate culture with 
a high level of control awareness, guided by a company-wide and standardised Code of 
Conduct and Guide to Business Control.  Accordingly, the company implemented an 
internally-developed and highly-formalised risk management system.  Cases B and C appear 
to be situated somewhere between these two extreme cases.  These companies, overall, have 
an informal way of approaching risk management and internal control, based upon a rather 
trust-based corporate culture and informal ‘common sense’.  Nevertheless, there exists a 
sufficient level of risk and control awareness and essential formal internal controls to manage 
major risks.  In other words, the formalisation of risk management and internal controls has 
started, and these companies now are in a ‘transition phase’.  We found indications that this 
increasing interest in formalising risk management and internal control has resulted from the 
growing attention for it in corporate governance guidelines and best practices.   
 
Based on a comparison between Case B and the other three cases, it becomes clear that the 
more the audit committee is aware of the importance of risk management and internal control 
for the company, as well as their own monitoring responsibilities, the more the audit 
committee deals with these topics during its meetings and, consequently, the more likely the 
members will encounter an information asymmetry problem (cf. Raghunandan et al., 1998; 
2001) creating feelings of uncertainty and discomfort. (cf. Pentland, 1993).  Given their own 
growing monitoring responsibilities, feeling uncomfortable about risk management and 
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internal control strongly encourages the audit committee members to look for one or more 
sources of comfort.  Moreover, we found indications that these feelings of discomfort are 
strengthened by the overall corporate approach and attitude towards risk management and 
internal control.  Apart from Case B, wherein the audit committee perceives the internal 
auditor to be insufficiently independent from management, all audit committees view internal 
audit as playing an important purification role (cf. Pentland, 1993), and as a major source of 
comfort in the jurisdictional domain of risk management and internal control (cf. Abbott, 
1988).   
  
Except for Case B, all audit committees clearly expressed their needs for comfort with respect 
to the control environment, as the basis for risk management and internal control.  Given the 
great distance between the audit committee and the operational level, thereby creating feelings 
of uncertainty and discomfort, the committee expects internal audit to play an important 
communicator role, so as to provide an overall impression of the risk and control culture, the 
integrity of people, and the different kinds of internal problems.  Playing this translator role 
makes internal audit like a ‘guard of the corporate culture’.  In Case D, given the strongly 
formalised risk management system this company has, the need for comfort related to the 
control environment becomes more formalised, as internal audit is expected to monitor 
compliance with company standards of business conduct.  Due to their internal position, their 
familiarity with and unique perspectives on the company, and their position close to the 
people on the floor, internal auditors seem to be the most suitable to provide comfort on the 
overall control environment (cf. Covaleski et al., 2003).  In some cases, the audit committee 
even expects internal auditors to become facilitators for whistle blowing, thereby enabling 
people in the company to raise concerns about possible improprieties in financial reporting or 
other matters.  Furthermore, having the right communication skills, as well as being able to 
listen to all kinds of people with an open and friendly attitude, is an attribute that seems 
crucial for playing this translator or facilitator role.   
 
Besides the control environment, the case studies indicate that audit committees clearly need 
comfort related to internal controls in a limited number of company-specific high-risk areas.  
In order to signal their uncertainty and discomfort, audit committees (should) give clear input 
for the internal audit planning.  With respect to these high-risk areas, audit committees expect 
internal audit to review the existence and effectiveness of existing internal controls, thereby 
providing them with a basic level of comfort, complete with recommendations.  Furthermore, 
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audit committees feel more comfortable fulfilling their monitoring responsibilities with 
respect to internal control, when they see that internal audit is able to facilitate improvements 
in internal controls.  The audit committee members derive comfort from the active 
involvement of internal audit in the improvement of internal controls.  More specifically, this 
ranges from follow-up of their recommendations, to facilitating the implementation of 
recommendations, even to actively assisting management with the implementation of 
recommendations.   
 
In those companies without a formalised risk management system, internal audit expresses 
their intentions to play a role in the formalisation process, by creating risk and control 
awareness and stimulating discussions on risk management and internal controls, which also 
can be considered to be a crucial source of comfort for the audit committee in this 
‘transitional phase’.  Overall, being resolute and persuasive are important inter-personal skills 
for creating risk and control awareness and driving the formalisation process.  Furthermore, 
internal audit often plays the role of educator to the audit committee, by providing them with 
background information, making the audit committee feel more comfortable with the 
theoretical underpinnings and importance of risk management, as well as its own monitoring 
responsibilities.  Irrespective of the overall status of the risk management system, this 
educating role can be an important strategy by which internal audit can promote themselves as 
the expert in the jurisdictional domain of risk management and internal control (cf. Reed, 
1996). 
 
The case studies contained herein indicate that the basis for internal audit to provide comfort 
to the audit committee stems from a unique abstract knowledge base (cf. Abbott, 1988; Reed, 
1996).  This knowledge consists of general conceptual knowledge, as well as more specific 
company-related and practical knowledge on risk management and internal controls.  It is 
important to see that the first component often results from prior work experience, often in 
external audit.  This illustrates that the knowledge bases of internal audit and external audit 
not necessarily conflict, as suggested by Reed (1996) and Covaleski et al. (2003); rather, 
working together, internal and external auditors can create valuable synergies for the 
provision of comfort.  The second component of knowledge comes from the internal auditors’ 
familiarity with the many divisions of the company and their intimate knowledge regarding 
processes and procedures.  Furthermore, Case D illustrates that internal audit’s own unique 
approach towards reviewing internal controls, through the use of an internally-developed 
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control framework, enables them to develop idiosyncratic knowledge about internal controls, 
which is a sound and unique basis for providing comfort with respect to internal controls.  
Moreover, playing an active management supporting role in the improvement of internal 
controls often enables internal audit to build valuable knowledge that afterwards can be used 
in their internal control reviews.                          
 
These four case studies illustrate the point that internal audit reports and formal presentations 
at audit committee meetings - discussing major findings, recommendations, management 
reactions and action plans - are considered to be crucial output of the internal audit ritual (cf. 
Moore and Myerhoff, 1977; Pentland, 1993), transforming uncertainty and doubt about risk 
management and internal control into trust and stability (Cooper, 1992).  Besides these formal 
symbols of comfort, informal contacts through face-to-face meetings with the head of internal 
audit or even attending internal audit team meetings seem to be important ways of providing 
comfort to the audit committee.  Moreover, the internal audit charter, a regularly-used 
communication instrument that describes auditing roles and objectives, also is an essential 
instrument for internal audit to demonstrate the jurisdictional domains (cf. Abbott, 1988) in 
which they can provide comfort (cf. Reed, 1996).   
 
We found indications that, despite their different knowledge bases and power strategies, the 
supposed inter-professional competition between internal and external audit suggested by 
Abbott (1988), Covaleski et al. (2003) and Rittenberg and Covaleski (2001), is less apparent 
in the context of providing comfort to the audit committee regarding risk management and 
internal controls.  It becomes clear that combining the knowledge and expertise of internal 
and external audit via well-considered collaboration, offers an ideal way of combining both 
sources of comfort, and enhancing the overall level of comfort for the audit committee.  It can 
be argued that the jurisdictional domain of risk management and internal control (cf. Abbott, 
1988) is, to some extent, shared by the internal and external auditor, which makes a 
collaboration more attractive.  In Case A, this collaboration specifically was launched to 
compensate for the limitations of having a single internal auditor.  In Case B, the audit 
committee considers the external auditor to be the expert in reducing their major information 
asymmetry on internal controls, whereas the internal auditor provides the audit committee 
with more detailed investigations based upon input from the external auditor, as an additional 
expert aiming to reduce the remaining information asymmetry.   
 151
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
  
We can conclude that the notion of comfort (Pentland, 1993), as suggested by Gendron and 
Bédard (2006); Gendron et al., (2004) and Spira (1999) combined with concepts from the 
sociology of professions literature (Abbott, 1988; Cooper, 1992; Reed, 1996) provide a 
relevant theoretical framework to study the relationship between internal audit and the audit 
committee.  This study contributes to the opening of the audit committee ‘black box’ (Spira, 
2003; Turley and Zaman, 2004); and, given its limitations, also introduces some interesting 
areas for further research.    
 
With respect to risk management and internal control systems, all four cases can be situated 
somewhere on a continuum ranging from ‘not formalised’ to ‘strongly formalised’.  Similar to 
what was found by Sarens and De Beelde (2006a), Belgian companies are moving towards a 
more formalised way of managing risks and developing internal controls, inspired by recent 
changes in corporate governance guidelines and best practices.  This paper provided evidence 
that the status of the risk management and internal control system has a significant influence 
upon the specific needs for comfort among audit committees and, consequently, upon the 
specific ways in which internal audit can provide this comfort.  In our opinion, this offers 
interesting opportunities for longitudinal research, to investigate how requirements for 
comfort change as the status of the risk management and internal control system changes over 
time.   
 
We found that, the more the audit committee is aware of risk management and internal control 
issues and its own monitoring responsibilities, the more its members are dealing with them 
during their meetings and, consequently, the more they will be looking for sources of comfort, 
inspired by feelings of uncertainty and discomfort resulting from the information asymmetry 
problem suggested by Raghunandan et al. (1998; 2001).  It became clear that, apart from one 
case, audit committees perceive internal audit to be an important source of comfort in the 
jurisdictional domain of risk management and internal control.   
 
We found that audit committees require comfort in two specific areas.  First, they often feel 
uncomfortable about the overall control environment of the company.  Therefore, they expect 
internal audit to be the ‘guard of the corporate culture’, playing a communicator role between 
the operational and monitoring levels.  Second, they need comfort with respect to internal 
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controls in a limited number of high-risk areas.  In order to provide this comfort, internal audit 
must become actively involved in improving internal controls, which complements the basic 
level of comfort resulting from their regular review of internal controls Knowing that 
management can call on internal audit to support and assist them, thereby actively 
contributing to the improvement of internal controls, seems to be a significant source of 
comfort for audit committees.  This conclusion is in line with that of Gendron et al. (2004), 
who found that audit committee members become comfortable with internal controls by 
assessing the extent to which managers adopt appropriate measures to solve deficiencies 
highlighted in internal audit reports.         
 
As suggested by Abbott (1988) and Reed (1996), a unique abstract knowledge base enables 
internal audit to develop a basic power strategy to provide comfort to the audit committee.  
This knowledge consists of general conceptual knowledge and more company-specific and 
practical knowledge on risk management and internal control.  The former often results from 
previous work experiences in external audit; conversely, the latter comes from the internal 
audit’s familiarity with the company, and intimate knowledge regarding its processes and 
procedures, which is in line with the findings of Covaleski et al. (2003).  It should be clear 
that active involvement in improving internal controls allows internal audit to develop this 
important type of knowledge.  Our study also confirms the importance of the inter-personal 
skills (e.g. communication skills) and attitudes of internal auditors when striving to be major 
providers of comfort to the audit committee.              
 
Inspired by Power (1997), we found evidence that internal audit reports and presentations at 
audit committee meetings are important formal symbols that can generate a sense of increased 
comfort within audit committees.  Additionally, informal or private contacts between internal 
audit and audit committees seem the be crucial to providing comfort, thereby confirming the 
growing importance of private meetings for audit committee effectiveness, as previously 
suggested by Gendron and Bédard (2006) and Gendron et al. (2004).  We can argue that more 
thorough investigation of internal audit reports will provide additional, valuable insights into 
the notion of comfort in this context.  Furthermore, observations of informal interactions 
between audit committees and internal audit would be the ultimate way to enhance our 
understanding of the complex relationship between them, as suggested also by Gendron and 
Bédard (2006) and Spira (2002).    
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Contrary to the concept of inter-professional competition suggested by Abbott (1988) and 
previously illustrated by Covaleski et al. (2003) and Rittenberg and Covaleski (2001), we 
found that combining the knowledge and expertise of internal and external audit via a 
collaboration is the ultimate way to combine both sources of comfort, and enhance the overall 
level of comfort for the audit committee.  Using Abbott’s (1988) terminology, we can 
conclude that the jurisdictional domain of risk management and internal control is, to some 
extent, shared by the internal and external audit profession.  A more detailed study of this, 
let’s call it ‘combined comfort approach’, including interviews with external auditors and an 
analysis of external audit reports, certainly would be an interesting contribution to the 
literature.   
 
Besides internal and external audit, the case studies described in this paper indicate that 
CFOs, controllers and accounting professionals can be considered to be other relevant sources 
of comfort for the audit committee.  Investigating the relative importance of all these 
providers of comfort more thoroughly will be an important challenge for future investigators.    
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Table 1: Overview of the Four Cases based on the Internal Audit Department 
 
 Small IA Department Large IA Department 
Recently Started IA 
Department 
Case A 
 
 Less common 
 
Mature IA Department Case B  
Case C 
Case D 
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    Table 2: Overview of the Four Cases based on the Audit Committee 
 
 Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Number of AC members 4 3 3 5 
Number of non-executive AC 
members 
4  3  3  3  
Number of independent AC 
members 
2  2  2  1  
Number of AC meetings in 2005 3 4 6 3 
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PAPER 5 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AUDIT 
 AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
A QUALITATIVE ANALYIS OF EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
Paper five studies the influence of another stakeholder of internal audit, namely senior 
management, on internal audit practices, which fits within the second research question of this 
dissertation (micro level).  A thorough investigation of senior management and internal 
audit’s expectations and perceptions towards each other, a relationship that has gained 
increased attention given contemporary corporate governance requirements, is an important 
contribution to the comprehensive picture this dissertation wants to draw.  
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AUDIT  
AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS15 
 
Gerrit Sarens  Ignace De Beelde 
 
Abstract:  This study, based upon Belgian case studies, provides a qualitative assessment of 
the relationship between internal audit and senior management, analysing the expectations 
and perceptions of both parties.  We found that senior management’s expectations have a 
significant influence on internal audit and that internal audit, generally, is able to meet most 
of these expectations.  Senior management wants internal audit to compensate for the loss of 
control they experience resulting from increased organisational complexity.  Senior 
management expects internal audit to fulfil a supporting role in the monitoring and 
improvement of risk management and internal control, and wants them to monitor the 
corporate culture.  Furthermore, they expect internal audit to be a training ground for future 
managers.  On the other hand, internal audit expects senior management to take the first steps 
in the formalisation of the risk management system.  They are looking for senior management 
support, as this benefits their overall acceptance.       
 
Keywords: internal audit, senior management, expectations, perceptions, case studies, 
Belgium. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Internal auditors are rock stars now.  This is their day in the sun…”  
(Bruce Nolop, an American CFO in Handy and Paterson, 2005, pp. 48)  
 
Stakeholders of organisations increasingly are demanding that boards and executive 
management apply accepted governance principles, adhere to sound risk management, and 
demonstrate publicly that they are in control of their organisations.  The Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA)’ definition of internal auditing includes references both to assurance and 
consulting activities directed at the governance, risk management and internal control 
processes.  Consequently, an internal audit activity that fulfils this definition is uniquely 
positioned to support the board and management as an essential component of their 
governance mechanisms (ECIIA, 2005).  Moreover, Carcello et al. (2005) found indications 
that, thanks to this enhanced focus on corporate governance, effective oversight and sound 
internal controls, the importance assigned to internal auditing by management has increased.  
Furthermore, they suggest that senior management’s expectations of the internal audit 
function have changed in profound ways.      
 
Additionally, it has been found that an expectations gap arises when audit customers (for e.g. 
senior management) do not recognise the value of the internal audit (IA) function.  In order to 
function effectively, internal auditors and the customers of audit services should possess a 
similar understanding of what makes internal auditing a value-adding activity.  Failure to 
reach this understanding could result in the perception that internal audit simply is an obstacle 
to achieving organisational objectives.  This can result in underutilised audit services and 
ignored audit recommendations (Flesher and Zanzig, 2000).   
 
In academic research, most empirical work related to internal audit’s relationship with other 
organisational parties deals with the relationship between internal audit and the audit 
committee (e.g. Goodwin, 2003; Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Raghunandan et al., 1998; 2001; 
Spira, 1999).  Even though, in practice, internal audit regularly interact with senior 
management (CEO and/or CFO) with respect to day-to-day activities, academic research on 
this relationship is very limited.  Therefore, and given the importance of contemporary 
corporate governance requirements, this study, based on five Belgian case studies, aims to 
understand the relationship between internal audit and senior management (CEO and CFO).  
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More specifically, this paper provides a qualitative assessment of each side’s expectations and 
perceptions with regard to the other.   
 
For each case study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with the internal auditor or 
head of internal audit, the CEO and / or CFO.  Moreover, we sought access to relevant, often 
confidential documents to support the insights we gleaned from these interviews.     
 
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section briefly describes the institutional context 
of this study. The third section reviews relevant literature and formulates the research 
questions. The fourth section outlines some methodological aspects. The fifth section presents 
the insights we gleaned from each individual case study and formulates cross-case insights.  
The last section summarises and discusses the conclusions of this study.   
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
 
European companies face a challenging environment characterised by significant change, 
changes which include the globalisation of markets, the modernisation of communication 
technologies, and the enlargement of the European Union (EU), to name but a few.  In such 
an environment, companies should benefit from a regulatory framework that encourages 
efficiency and competitiveness, while fostering sound and transparent corporate governance 
practices.  It is with that aim in mind that the European Commission, in 2003, launched the 
Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union.  The plan currently is being implemented by the EU Commission through 
various legal initiatives aimed at improving governance and strengthening stakeholders’ 
rights.  In Belgium, there were three separate sets of rules drawn up by different authorities 
(1998), that needed to be updated and consolidated (Belgian Corporate Governance 
Committee, 2004).   
 
At the initiative of the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (BFIC), Euronext 
Brussels and the Federation of Belgian Enterprises (FEB-VBO), a committee was established 
to draft a single code of best practice on corporate governance for all listed companies.  The 
committee’s aim was to draft a code aligned with international practice and EU 
recommendations.  The comments received regarding its first draft, together with recent EU 
Commission initiatives, helped the committee to finalise the code, which was published on 9 
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December 2004 (the so-called Code Lippens).  The code is based upon a ‘comply or explain’ 
system, which allows companies to deviate from the provisions of the code when their 
specificities so justify, subject to providing adequate explanation (Belgian Corporate 
Governance Committee, 2004).     
 
On 21 September 2005, a corporate governance code for non-listed companies (the so-called 
Code Buysse) was launched,  in order to meet the specific needs of this significant group of 
companies.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This section will provide necessary background information on the responsibilities of senior 
management in corporate governance, risk management and internal control, as well as on the 
two-way relationship between internal audit and senior management.  This section also will 
provide insights from previously-published research on the relationship between internal audit 
and senior management.   
 
Responsibilities of Senior Management in Corporate Governance, Risk Management 
and Internal Control 
Investigating national and international corporate governance guidelines and best practices, it 
becomes clear that good governance requires that the board of directors is responsible for 
applying high ethical standards; for guiding strategy and risk policy; for monitoring corporate 
performance; and for ensuring that appropriate systems of internal control are in place, 
including adequate identification and management of risks.  The board often sets up an audit 
committee to assist in fulfilling its monitoring responsibilities, with respect to control in the 
broadest sense (Belgian Corporate Governance Committee, 2004; UK Combined Code, 
2003).   
 
It is the role of management to implement board policies on risk and internal control.  In 
fulfilling its responsibilities, management should identify and evaluate the risks faced by the 
company for consideration by the board, and they should design, operate and monitor a 
suitable system of internal control which implements the policies adopted by the board 
(Belgian Corporate Governance Committee, 2004; UK Turnbull Guidance, 2005).  
Management should also strive to assure itself that the controls are working effectively, by 
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undertaking regular review activities (continuous monitoring) and receiving periodic reports 
(separate monitoring) from their own departments.  This assurance activity is an essential part 
of a good control framework.  Following recent scandals, and as part of measures to improve 
governance, management is required to demonstrate that it is fulfilling its responsibilities 
relative to the system of internal control.  Therefore, not only does management need to have 
effective controls and to assure itself that these controls exist, they also must be able to 
demonstrate these facts to third parties: to the board, to statutory audit and even to the general 
public (ECIIA, 2005). 
 
Note that all employees have some responsibility for internal control, as part of their 
accountability for achieving objectives.  They, collectively, should have the necessary 
knowledge, skills, information and authority to establish, operate and monitor the system of 
internal control.  This will require an understanding of the company, its objectives, the 
industries and markets in which it operates, and the risks it faces (UK Turnbull Guidance, 
2005).  
 
Internal audit as Support for Senior Management 
Senior management and the board may desire objective assurance and advice on risks and 
controls.  An adequately-resourced internal audit function may provide such assurance and 
advice (UK Turnbull Guidance, 2005).  
 
A professional internal audit activity will supplement senior management’s actions, by 
providing independent and objective assurance on the effectiveness of the organisation’s 
governance processes, how well it manages all kinds of risks, and whether internal control 
processes are operating, as required, to manage risks to an acceptable level.  In other words, 
the CEO receives an independent and objective assurance on the quality of internal controls 
from someone other than the CFO or line managers, and/or the CFO receives independent and 
objective assurance on the quality of internal controls from someone other than the line 
managers and decentralised finance staff.  Furthermore, internal audit can play a key role in 
monitoring a company’s risk profile and identifying areas in which to improve risk 
management processes.  Internal auditors also support management by providing consulting 
services, which contribute to the establishment of sound risk management processes, by 
facilitating management’s efforts to improve the system of internal control, and by giving 
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advice on the implications of organisational changes to that system (ECIIA, 2005; Leithhead, 
2000; Lindow and Race, 2002; Page and Spira, 2004; Spira and Page, 2003).   
 
Even before the recent changes in corporate governance guidelines, a number of finance 
directors, surveyed in a study by Griffiths (1999), already recognised the major challenge for 
internal audit to lead the corporate governance agenda, which provides an opportunity for 
them to directly support senior management’s requirements and responsibilities in this regard.  
A more recent study, by Page and Spira (2004), concludes that internal auditors generally 
view corporate governance guidelines - such as for example, the first UK Turnbull report 
(1999) - as beneficial to their cause, and reported that internal auditors claim that  these 
guidelines have helped to alter perceptions of internal audit in a positive way, such that 
operating departments frequently sought the advice of internal audit when implementing new 
or changed processes.  Furthermore, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found evidence that 
companies with an integrated risk management framework are more likely to use internal 
audit.  Additionally, their study confirms that internal audit is complementary to other risk 
management mechanisms, such as a designated risk manager.    
 
Besides their significant assurance and consulting role in risk management, internal control 
and corporate governance, internal audit also can act as a support for management in terms of 
reviewing operational efficiency, investigating outcomes of financial initiatives, and 
providing knowledge of business activities (Cooper et al., 1996).  Furthermore, internal audit 
sometimes is asked to work with senior management in various other (ad hoc) activities of the 
organisation, such as, for example, acquisitions, mergers, and systems development and 
implementation (Brody and Lowe, 2000).  The rationale is that more can be accomplished 
through review, providing advice up front to management to assist it in setting business 
objectives (Bou-Raad, 2000).  
 
Senior Management as Support for Internal Audit 
Besides the valuable supportive role that internal audit can play for senior management, a 
solid and constructive relationship with senior management also is critical for effective 
functioning of the internal audit activity (ECIIA, 2005).  More specifically, Attribute Standard 
1110 of the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (2004) 
stipulates that “the chief audit executive should report to a level within the organization that 
allows the internal audit activity to accomplish its responsibilities”.  The related Practice 
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Advisory 1110-2 recommends that, besides having a functional reporting relationship with the 
audit committee, the Chief Audit Executive (CAE) must have an administrative reporting 
relationship with senior management (preferably, the CEO or another executive with 
sufficient authority) in order to achieve appropriate support to accomplish internal audit’s 
day-to-day activities.  In general, this support should include positioning the function and the 
CAE in the organisation’s structure in such a manner that affords appropriate stature for the 
function within the organisation (e.g. unrestricted access to staff, information and 
documentation).   
 
Additionally, certain Performance Standards (2010; 2020; 2060) address more specific means 
by which senior management can support internal audit.  It is mentioned that the CAE should 
consider the input of senior management (CEO / CFO) during internal audit planning (see 
also Doyon, 1996; Hubbard, 2000).  Thus, senior management can support internal audit by 
giving them specific input (requests), which often reflects high-risk areas or important 
business opportunities.  The CAE, in turn, should inform senior management of the internal 
audit planning and resource requirements, including significant interim changes, both for 
review and approval.  The CAE also should report periodically to senior management on the 
internal audit activity’s purpose, authority, responsibility and performance relative to its plan 
(see also Leithhead, 2000).  Furthermore, different levels of management, including senior 
management, should commit to providing prompt responses to recommendations from 
internal audit, to monitoring the implementation of action plans, and to keeping internal audit 
informed of plans, of changes to the risk and internal control profile of the organisation, and 
of major changes to the organisation’s policies and procedures.   
 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the two-way relationship that should exist between senior 
management and internal audit:  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The Relationship between Senior Management and Internal Audit: Insights from 
Previous Studies 
Due to an often strong direct or indirect relationship between internal audit and the CEO 
and/or CFO, as suggested above, it is reasonable to expect that senior management is in a 
position to exert a significant influence over internal audit.  Although Griffiths (1999) argues 
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that financial directors’ expectations of internal audit are significant in relation to their role 
and development, the number of empirical studies that have investigated the relationship 
between senior management and internal audit is limited.   
 
Although the audit committee should be responsible for the (re)appointment and dismissal of 
the CAE, McHugh and Raghunandan (1994) found that, especially in large companies, CFOs 
often have the authority to hire (31 percent of the companies) and fire (29 percent) the CAE.  
If the hiring/firing authority is vested with the audit committee, but senior management 
continues to have authority over the budget and evaluation of the internal audit department, 
internal audit remains highly ‘dependent’ upon the CEO and/or CFO.  
 
An early Australian study, by Cooper et al. (1994), revealed a number of inconsistencies 
among CEOs and internal audit managers about the areas covered by internal audit.  The areas 
which were most strongly supported by CEOs were not necessarily those in which internal 
audit managers indicated they spent a proportionate amount of their time.  For example, there 
are clear differences in the perceptions of CEOs with respect to the audit of financial areas, 
compared with the reality reported by internal audit managers.  The gap between CEOs’ 
understanding of the extent of audit coverage and the time, in fact, being devoted to these 
areas truly only can be bridged by closer consultation within organisations (see also Mathews 
et al., 1995).  Similarly, Galloway (1995) points out that managers may restrict the internal 
audit’s role to that of evaluating internal controls over traditional areas such as accounting and 
finance.   
 
Cooper et al. (1996) examined CEOs’ perceptions with respect to internal audit in Australia, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong.  The majority of the CEOs in their study perceived that internal 
audit had a consultative/participative approach.  A large proportion of CEOs from all three 
countries believe in the traditional internal audit role of providing an independent appraisal of 
the internal control system.  However, there was growing support for the more participative 
processes of an independent review of operational efficiency, and of management 
effectiveness.   
 
Ridley and D’Silva (1997), comparing and contrasting senior managers’ perceptions of 
internal audit value, also found that most senior managers saw internal audit in its traditional 
role of providing assurance through investigation, checks and assessment.  Some recognised a 
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widening internal audit scope into new roles as consultants and advisers, particularly into 
controls associated with information technology and management performance.  Remarkably, 
the pattern of management perceptions of the value derived from internal audit contributions 
was different between CEOs and CFOs.  More CEOs than CFOs saw growth in the value of 
reports to regulators and reports on environmental issues.  More CFOs than CEOs saw growth 
in the value of reports on internal control.         
     
Contrary to what is recommended by the IIA, Griffiths’ study (1999), which involved 92 
FTSE 200 companies reveals that financial directors’ perception of internal audit is by no 
means universally positive.  The main concern was that the function was too low key and 
basic (and, therefore, insufficiently operationally- or business risk- oriented) or that the 
function was lacking in skills (or had a poor mix of skills and staff).  In line with the views of 
financial directors in his study, internal audit needs to become much more business (risk) and 
operationally-oriented; it also needs to be more proactive, responsive and innovative, and to 
enhance the skills within the function, as well as the quality of its staff.  In general, providing 
a more constructive contribution, via involvement in the assessment and management of 
business risk, would enhance financial directors’ perception of the internal audit function.  
More specifically, managing the control and risk self-assessment process, or having 
significant involvement in its delivery, provides an opportunity for internal audit to directly 
support the financial directors’ requirements and responsibilities in this regard.   
 
A recent study by Van Peursem (2005) found that internal audits are conducted in an 
environment of close and, sometimes, dependent associations with management, which makes 
their independence from management structurally at risk.  She found that those who seem to 
be able to meet their own expectations also are those who most carefully balance the 
sometimes conflicting interests of their managers with the interests of their profession.   
Essentially, a key issue is that internal audit would assume whatever position is in the best 
interests of their employer and would be reluctant to counter management, irrespective of the 
consequences (Van Peursem, 2004).   
 
Research Questions 
This study attempts to formulate qualitative answers for the following research questions and, 
thereby, tries to extend the literature on the relationship between internal audit and senior 
management.   
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Research Question 1: 
What does senior management expect the role of internal audit to be?  
Research Question 2: 
Does internal audit meet the expectations of senior management?  
Research Question 3: 
What does internal audit expect from senior management?  
Research Question 4: 
Does senior management meet the expectations of internal audit?  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Complementary to the existing research in this area, which primarily is based upon 
quantitative data (e.g. Cooper et al., 1994; Cooper et al. 1996; Griffiths, 1999; McHugh and 
Raghunandan, 1994; Ridley and D’Silva, 1997) and similar to the recent study by Van 
Peursem (2005), this study uses theory specification cases (Keating, 1995), in order to achieve 
more in-depth insights into the dynamic relationship between internal audit and senior 
management.   
 
Contrary to large-sample studies that provide a generalisable set of findings related to a few 
pre-determined constructs, in-depth case studies produce much more detailed information, but 
about a limited number of people and cases (Patton, 2002).  In this study, we focus on 
understandability, given the limited amount of in-depth knowledge on the relationship 
between internal audit and senior management.  The inability to generalise from the data 
gathered in case studies to some larger population often is cited as a major weakness of case 
study research (Shaughnessy and Zechmeiser, 1985).  Schofield (1990) argues that, instead of 
producing a standardised set of results that any other researcher in the same situation or 
studying the same issue would have produced, the goal of case study research is to produce a 
coherent and illuminating description of and perspective on a situation that is based on and 
consistent with detailed study of that situation.    
 
The selection of the five companies (cases) for this study was partially theoretically driven 
and partially based upon experience with internal audit in Belgium.  Previous research 
indicates a positive relationship between firm size and the establishment of the internal audit 
function (e.g. Chow, 1982); therefore, we controlled for firm size and selected companies 
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with at least 1,000 employees.  Furthermore, all five companies operate on an international 
scale (Europe, US, Asia and Middle East).  All companies, except Case A, were listed on 
Euronext Brussels at the time of the case study.  Every company had an audit committee that 
consisted of a majority of non-executive directors and which met three to six times in 2005.  
Inspired by previous research on internal audit in Belgium (cf. Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 
2006b), we also took into account the age of the internal audit function, as well as the number 
of internal auditors.  Related to the first parameter, we included four companies with a mature 
internal audit function (having existed for more than five years) and one company that only 
recently had created an internal audit function (in 2004).  Related to the second parameter, we 
selected four companies with a small internal audit department (less than five internal 
auditors) and one company with a larger internal audit department (five or more internal 
auditors).  We refer to Appendix 2 of this dissertation for an overview of the five cases of this 
study.   
 
For each case, we conducted a semi-structured interview (60 to 120 minutes) with the internal 
auditor (in Cases A, B and C) or the head of internal audit (in Case D and E) and with the 
CEO (in Cases A, B and E) or the CFO (in Cases C and D), depending upon the reporting 
relationship.  Note that all interviews were conducted independent of each other, such that, for 
example, the answers of the CEO were not taken as input for the interview with the head of 
internal audit at that company.  All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed 
immediately after the interview had taken place.  The interview instrument, containing 
guiding questions, was developed based upon the research questions, the literature review, 
and our experience with the internal audit profession in Belgium.  In order to support the 
interview data and enhance the reliability of our conclusions, we obtained copies of a 
considerable amount of archival material such as the internal audit charter and the internal 
audit planning, and even more confidential documents like internal audit reports and internal 
presentations.  Only one company (Case B) was reluctant to release these kinds of documents.  
Table 1 presents an overview of all collected data:  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Analysis of these qualitative data was based upon the analytical protocol recommended by 
Miles and Huberman (1994).  More specifically, all interview transcripts and documents were 
coded.  Next, the most important observations were summarised for each company (within-
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case analysis) and sent back to the interviewees to obtain their confirmation.  They were 
asked to react openly and add new comments, if necessary.  These adjusted insights were 
translated into standardised matrices that facilitated the discovery of patterns through cross-
case analysis.   
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we will outline the major insights from each case study (within-case analysis), 
followed by an overview of the cross-case analysis.   
 
Case A 
The expectations and perceptions in this case are strongly influenced by the fact that the 
internal audit function had been in existence only one year.  The internal auditor reports 
administratively to the CEO.  The CEO is aware that the internal audit function still is not 
fully accepted by everyone in the company.  He is convinced that it is not easy to install such 
a function, as this requires a change of mentality which will take a few years:  
“Starting such a function is not easy. (…)  We will have to work to change the 
mentality.  I think this will take three to four years… it is a long-term investment 
[CEO]” 
 
Therefore, he expects the internal auditor to spend enough time and effort on the promotion 
and marketing of his function.  Furthermore, he finds it very important that the internal 
auditor becomes acquainted with the company, in order to become fully accepted, especially 
by senior management. 
 
Besides these general expectations, the CEO also has more specific expectations with regards 
to the internal auditor.  First, the CEO expects the internal auditor to compensate for the loss 
of control that arises from the recent growth of the company through foreign acquisitions.  
This was clearly the major driver to install the internal audit function: 
“We are a  growing company.  Our growth almost exclusively is based on foreign 
acquisitions, which leads to a potential loss of control, as well as to cultural problems. 
(…) The internal auditor should be located between the corporate level and the local 
network.  They then should conduct audits in our local network and report their 
findings to us [CEO]” 
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Second, the CEO wants the internal auditor to become a supporting function in those 
activities that receive high management priority (e.g. future acquisitions).  Therefore, together 
with the executive committee, he attempts to strongly influence the internal audit agenda.  
The internal auditor is aware that he will have to adapt his agenda to the expectations of the 
CEO, in order to become accepted.  To some extent, the internal auditor is prepared to play 
the expected management supporting role in order to get this support and, therefore, to receive 
input pertaining to his audit planning from the CEO and other senior managers.  However, he 
does not want to service a purely consulting function for senior management, as he wants to 
maintain sufficient autonomy to determine his agenda.  As soon as senior management has 
accepted his function, the internal auditor expects productive discussions with them on his 
findings, conclusions and recommendations, which should improve their relationship.  To 
date, these discussions have not taken place.   
 
Third, the CEO wants the internal auditor to approach risk management from a broader, 
company-wide perspective, complementary to local managers who have a more-focused view 
on the specific risks of their division.  More specifically, the internal auditor is expected to 
complete a company-wide risk map.  Furthermore, the CEO expects the internal auditor to 
create, through his work, a reasonable level of risk awareness within the company.  However, 
given the corporate culture that stimulates risk-taking, the CEO wants the internal auditor to 
avoid creating too much risk awareness, which would temper the company’s growth.  In other 
words, he expects the internal auditor to work “in line with the existing corporate culture.”  
 
The internal auditor is convinced that he has to play a pioneering role in the introduction of a 
more formal way of risk management within the company.  Nevertheless, he perceives senior 
management as not giving the right signals to operational management, as they stimulate 
uncontrolled and extreme risk-taking behaviour.  Besides, senior management has a rather 
averse attitude towards internal controls.  Therefore, he expects senior management to change 
their attitude towards risk management and internal control.  More specifically, senior 
management must start thinking about a clear and specific risk and control strategy:  
“A consistent strategy with regards to control and the internal control system should 
be designed by management [internal audit presentation]” 
“That is a fundamental objective that I have to meet: getting management to start 
thinking about a control strategy [internal auditor]” 
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Furthermore, senior management is expected to formulate clear policies and procedures, in 
order to indicate what is acceptable to achieve objectives:  
“There are no policies that define the perimeter within which the strategic objectives 
must be reached [internal audit presentation]”  
 
He is convinced that this is necessary to create a supportive environment for internal audit: 
“I can not work in an organisation that does not say what is acceptable and what is not, 
while striving to meet objectives [internal auditor]”  
 
Although the CFO and the Chief Operations Officer are aware of the importance of 
formalising risk management and internal controls, the internal auditor knows that convincing 
the CEO will be a fundamental step.  He wants to make it clear to him that he will support 
senior management in this process.   
 
Case B 
In this company, the internal audit function has existed for more than 15 years, but always has 
been performed by a single internal auditor.  The most recent internal auditor had been 
appointed six months before the case study took place.  The internal auditor reports 
administratively to the CEO.  According to the CEO, internal auditors always have been 
accepted within the company, thanks to their practice-oriented way of working, close to the 
people in the field.  The CEO perceives his relationship with the internal auditor as strong.  
Furthermore, the CEO and CFO both attach great importance to promoting the internal audit 
function within the company:  
“When this internal auditor was engaged, we sent a note to everyone in the company 
to make sure that they all know the role of internal audit and what is expected from 
them as a reaction to his work [CEO]” 
 
Thanks to the open communication about his function, the internal auditor is convinced that 
everyone in the company perceives his role in the same way. 
 
Data analysis reveals three specific expectations of the CEO regarding the current internal 
auditor.  First, he expects the internal auditor to perform independent evaluations of systems 
and procedures, in order to provide him with a sufficient level of assurance.  The internal 
auditor confirms that an important part of the added value of his work results from his 
provision of assurance regarding internal controls to senior management and the audit 
committee. 
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Second, the internal auditor is expected to be a continuous improvement tool, focused on 
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of processes and procedures.  The internal auditor 
stresses that, besides his assurance role, he clearly operates as a management assistant in 
improving processes and procedures.  This is confirmed by the recently-updated internal audit 
charter:  
“The overall objective of the program of internal audit is (i) to assist all levels of 
management in the effective discharge of their responsibilities by providing 
independent analysis, appraisals, advice and recommendations concerning the 
activities reviewed; and (ii) to assist management in obtaining the company’s goals 
and objectives.  Internal auditing is an advisory function having independent status 
within the company [internal audit charter]”  
 
The CEO confirms that the internal auditor meets these two expectations.  Thanks to his 
work, the efficiency of some specific processes clearly has improved.  Therefore, the CEO 
wants internal audit to focus even more on continuous improvement through the engagement 
of an additional internal auditor: 
“It is because we saw all these improvements, that we are thinking about hiring an 
additional junior auditor. (…) We reviewed the internal audit tasks and decided that 
we want to extend this more toward continuous improvement [CEO]” 
  
Third, the CEO expects the internal auditor to play a role in the formalisation of the risk 
management system; for example, by coordinating the development of a centralised risk 
database.  Inspired by his working experience in external audit, the internal auditor agrees that 
he wants to become actively engaged in the evolution towards more formalisation: 
“I am used to working in a very formal environment, where everything is well-documented 
[internal auditor]” 
 
More specifically, he will indicate the weaknesses in the current risk management approach, 
provide recommendations based upon his experience within other companies and even assist 
management by providing them with tools to implement these recommendations.     
 
While constructing his audit planning, the internal auditor expects the CEO and CFO to 
indicate high-risk areas on which to focus his work, as he still lacks sufficient knowledge 
about the company.  The CEO agrees that he, as well as the CFO, have a strong influence on 
the internal audit planning by suggesting specific topics to include and asking the internal 
auditor to reserve sufficient time for ad hoc requests during the year.  Before every audit, the 
CEO and CFO also can suggest specific issues they want to have included in that specific 
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audit.  Furthermore, the CEO and CFO both are actively interested in the internal audit reports 
and the follow-up of recommendations.  They have monthly meetings with the internal 
auditor to discuss the internal audit work and the reactions of operational management to it.  
If necessary, they intervene to has the implementation of his recommendations which the 
internal auditor feels is important.    
 
Case C 
In this company, the internal audit function has existed for 16 years and has, similar to Case 
B, always been performed by one internal auditor.  The current internal auditor has performed 
this function for two years and reports administratively to the CFO.  Although the CFO 
notices that the current internal auditor generally is accepted and positively perceived within 
the company, thanks to his constructive way of working, he has to admit that the current 
internal auditor still has limited maturity and experience in the business.  The CFO does not 
rule out that this can have an impact on the perception of his work.  The internal auditor 
agrees that, contrary to how it is with senior management, among those at the lower levels of 
the company, he is still perceived as a police officer focused on finding problems and 
mistakes:  
“Last week, I was at our Australian subsidiary and their first reaction was: there is the 
ABC [name of the company] police [internal auditor]”   
 
Fortunately, this is in most cases, only the initial reaction, which is precipitated by ignorance 
about the role of internal audit.  As soon as people know what the internal auditor is doing 
and what they can expect from him, their perception changes.  The expertise of the current 
internal auditor is limited to financial, accounting and organisational areas, which has an 
impact on the scope of the audit planning.  The internal auditor would prefer to hire an 
additional internal auditor, but he is not sure whether senior management would be keen on 
this.    
 
The major expectation of the CFO vis-à-vis the internal auditor can be summarised as a 
detailed and focused control of processes and procedures to investigate whether they are 
adequate and correctly followed.  He expects the internal auditor to provide him with 
feedback on this (assurance), as well as with sufficient recommendations to improve the 
processes and procedures.  The core task of internal audit, as described by the internal auditor, 
corresponds more or less with this expectation.  He describes his work as focused on 
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evaluating the internal controls, especially because they have an important influence on 
financial reporting, in order to provide assurance on these controls and recommendations to 
improve them.  Thus, his most primary focus is on the internal controls.  Improving the 
processes, from a broader point of view, is rather a secondary objective.    
 
More specifically, the CFO expects the internal auditor to base his work on personal contacts 
with people in the field: 
“I expect the internal auditor to base his work on personal contacts with the people 
who are audited… we do not have a culture to arrange such things by mail or email… 
he has to do his work on site [CFO]” 
 
The internal auditor agrees that the most important aspect of an audit is listening to the 
people, giving them the opportunity to raise issues, and provide their opinions.  Furthermore, 
the internal auditor perceives himself as a facilitator for whistle-blowing, especially for 
financial people.  However, the CFO is not convinced of this role, given the internal auditor’s 
limited maturity and experience with the company.     
 
The CFO perceives his relationship with the internal auditor as constructive.  Together with 
the CEO, he is involved with the development of the internal audit planning.  Their input 
primarily is based on the monthly business review meetings they have with lower 
management, combined with their own risk assessments.  The internal auditor confirms that 
every internal audit planning is discussed with the CEO and CFO, in order to ensure that all 
proposed audits are relevant in their eyes.  Furthermore, the internal auditor is satisfied that 
the CEO and CFO pay sufficient attention to his recommendations and their follow-up.  The 
CFO confirmed that they pay attention to the results of the internal audit work during their 
business review meetings.  He agrees that the internal audit reports meet his expectations and 
that they create a certain level of risk and control awareness within the company.  Besides, the 
CFO is convinced that the work of the internal auditor adds value to the company, although 
only on a limited scale: 
“There are value adding aspects in his audit reports, but no world-shaking things… but 
he adds value.  They are perceived like that by most people in the company [CFO]” 
 
Although the CFO does not express any expectations about the role of the internal auditor in 
risk management, the internal auditor expects senior management to start formalising their 
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way of risk management in a more professional way, as well as documenting the internal 
control system:  
“Policies and procedures… most of them are rather common sense and informal, 
which does not mean that they are not working well, but there is still room for 
improvement.  It is mainly because top management still prefers to arrange things 
rather informally [internal auditor]” 
 
Nonetheless, he is convinced that the company is not yet ready for this.  Remarkably, he does 
not see an important role for himself in this formalisation process, which probably can be 
explained by his limited capacities (resources and expertise).    
 
Case D 
In this company, the internal audit department has existed for more than 20 years and recently 
increased from seven to ten internal auditors.  The internal audit manager reports 
administratively to the CFO.  Both the CFO and the internal audit manager agree that internal 
audit is appreciated and positively perceived within the company.  This has increased 
significantly over the last three years, thanks to the support internal audit receives from senior 
management, which has increased the level of awareness regarding their work.  Besides his 
significant influence on the internal audit agenda through involvement in annual risk 
assessments and specific ad hoc requests during the year (note that these represent 25 percent 
of the annual audit planning), the CFO openly reacts to audit reports and supports the internal 
audit findings and recommendations.  He clearly shows to everyone that he perceives internal 
audit as an important function.  Senior management also supported the recent appointment of 
three additional internal auditors.  Furthermore, internal audit has improved the 
communication of their added value to the company significantly, especially through their 
risk assessments, audit reports and meetings, all of which has enhanced the acceptance of 
their function:  
“By performing risk analyses, we show them the risks they are exposed to… this 
really helped us to receive recognition, especially within the older business units 
[internal audit manager]” 
 
Additionally, the CFO and internal audit manager confirm that the corporate scandals of the 
last decade and the resulting legislative initiatives (especially the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act) 
have had a positive impact on the level of attention to controls in general and to internal audit 
more specifically.  Furthermore, they agree that two recent small fraud cases within the 
company positively contributed to the acceptance of internal audit: 
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“I am not happy that this happens, but it is good to have such cases, that shake people 
awake and prove the benefit of having an internal audit function. (…) You could argue 
that they could have given signs that this was going to happen [CFO]” 
 
Overall, the CFO expects the internal audit department to be an adequate training ground for 
future potential managers, where they can work for two or three years and collect relevant 
expertise and knowledge about the company.  To date, he is satisfied with the rotation of the 
internal auditors.  Conversely, the internal audit manager is less happy with the high degree of 
rotation:  
“Currently, I do not have enough people with audit experience and company 
experience.  This is becoming a problem. (…) Internal audit is a kind of fishing pond 
full of high potential, but they can’t empty it completely [internal audit manager]” 
 
We were able to distinguish additional specific expectations of the CFO with regards to 
internal audit.  He expects internal audit to be a supportive function for management, instead 
of a pure control function.  More specifically, he expects internal audit to support 
management in risk identification, risk assessment and risk management, as well as in 
monitoring and improving risk management and internal controls.  It seems that the current 
internal audit program, which focuses on overall internal control reviews, meets the 
expectations of the CFO.  It is interesting to note that the internal audit department has 
developed its own approach to evaluating the internal control system, which enables internal 
audit to perform a more thorough evaluation and provide a higher level of assurance.  
Moreover, the internal audit manager stresses that it is more important for them to assist 
management via improvements in internal controls than by formulating mere opinions about 
them.  Internal audit also reserves a certain amount of their work time to become engaged as 
advisors in consulting projects.  By playing this supportive role, they are able to meet this 
important expectation of senior management.  This is clearly communicated through the 
company intranet: 
“Internal Audit’s services are available to all divisions and may provide useful support 
in a wide variety of business processes [company intranet]”  
 
With respect to internal controls, the CFO expects internal audit to play an active role in the 
implementation of a uniform internal control system within the whole company, thereby 
taking into account the cultural and human differences between the various subsidiaries. The 
internal audit manager agrees that the department regularly provides training and advice in 
local procedure development and, thereby, monitors and contributes actively to the 
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application of standardised policies and procedures.  Furthermore, the CFO expects internal 
audit to create the necessary level of control awareness.  The internal audit manager is 
convinced that internal audit’s work contributes to a higher level of control awareness, 
especially among non-financial managers.  In this context, internal audit also wrote the 
Company Guide to Business Control that concisely summarises all policies and procedures at 
a group level; the guide was distributed to all management levels.   
 
Case E 
In this company, internal audit has existed as an independent function for 13 years and 
currently is staffed with three internal auditors.  The Chief Internal Auditor reports 
administratively to the CEO.  Overall, the CEO is convinced that internal audit currently is 
perceived within the company as supportive and value adding.  According to the Chief 
Internal Auditor, his department has been more valued over the last three years thanks to its 
more systematic and professional approach.  More specifically, internal audit started to 
develop their cycle-based audit planning in a more formalised way with the intention of 
providing an “in control statement” combined with a more systematic way of reporting and 
following-up on the implementation of their recommendations.  The Chief Internal Auditor 
also admits that, thanks to the new senior management team and especially the new CEO, the 
level of attention paid to internal audit in general and their audit reports more specifically has 
increased significantly, which led to some important improvements within the company: 
“I have received some positive echoes from local managers: thanks to the 
recommendations of internal audit, a process of change has been started… that is nice 
to hear [Chief Internal Auditor]” 
   
The CEO agrees that he is satisfied with internal audit.  He sometimes provides input for the 
audit planning and is actively following up on the recommendations of internal audit, by 
putting them on the agenda of his business meetings with local divisions, an important way 
“to make things happen”:  
“If necessary, I pick up the phone and ask the local manager why he did not react to 
the recommendations [CEO]” 
 
Again, this illustrates the crucial importance of senior management support for the acceptance 
and impact of internal audit within a company.   
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Similar to the CFO in Case D, the CEO expects the internal audit department to be a training 
ground for future mangers who can be of great value in other functions.  Contrary to Case D, 
the Chief Internal Auditor considers this to be a valuable attribute of his department.  
Recently, one of his internal auditors moved to another department, and the Chief Internal 
Auditor is convinced that he will take the internal audit philosophy with him and will actively 
contribute to improving the processes and internal controls within his new department.       
 
Data analysis reveals four more specific expectations of the CEO, vis-à-vis internal audit.  
First, and similar to Case A, the CEO clearly expects internal audit to compensate, through 
their work, for the loss of control that has resulted from the rapid growth of the company 
through many international acquisitions:  
“I have no problem with decentralisation, but this also means that you have the right to 
control them.  You can control through reports, but also through those things that are 
not emerging in the reports and that is where internal audit comes in. (…) Internal 
audit has to make sure that I sleep soundly [CEO]”     
 
The Chief Internal Auditor confirms that, given the growth that has occurred through 
acquisitions, the creation of a uniform reference framework of policies always has been an 
important priority for his department.   
 
Second, the CEO expects the internal audit department, staffed with people who know the 
business, to focus their monitoring work on processes and procedures.  The Chief Internal 
Auditor agrees that the internal auditor’s major objective is to provide assurance to 
management via performance of operational audits.  More specifically, they want to make 
sure that processes and related internal controls are effective and efficient and that relevant 
and important risks are identified and managed.  Moreover, they always look at the effect of 
the processes under review on financial reporting.   
 
Third, the CEO wants internal audit to safeguard the corporate culture, especially because of 
their regular personal contacts with people in the field: 
“They hang around in the divisions of the company and sometimes they have 
particular feelings about certain topics… although they do not have hard data to 
support these suppositions, these feelings often are of great interest to me [CEO]”  
 
This is a major driver for the CEO to have regular informal contacts with the Chief Internal 
Auditor. 
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Fourth and given the importance of acquisitions for the growth of the company, the CEO 
expects the internal audit department to play a value-adding role in due diligence work.  He 
perceives their judgment and advice as invaluable, particularly because they know the 
business very well.  Therefore, internal audit always has a member on any ad hoc composed 
acquisition teams.  The Chief Internal Auditor confirms that the internal auditors spend, on 
average, 15 percent of their annual work time on due diligence work.  More generally, the 
CEO expects that internal audit’s advisory role in strategically-important projects will become 
more prominent in the future.  Similarly, the Chief Internal Auditor has clear intentions of 
focussing more on assisting and supporting management, by playing a proactive consultative 
role, which will make management more capable of anticipating potential problems.  
 
Similar to Cases A and C, the Chief Internal Auditor expects senior management to pay more 
attention to the integration and formalisation of the risk management policy, as this currently 
is rather fragmented throughout the company.  Internal audit regularly signals this 
shortcoming, which recently led to increased awareness, as several departments put particular 
aspects of risk management into practice.  Because the Chief Internal Auditor is convinced 
that the risk management policy still is far from well-structured at the corporate level, he is 
prepared to assist management in this process, without assuming any responsibility for it.   
 
Cross-Case Analysis 
In three of the five cases, internal audit reports administratively to the CEO; in the two 
remaining cases, to the CFO.  Cross-case analysis reveals four general expectations of senior 
management vis-à-vis internal audit.  First, senior management expects internal audit to 
compensate for the loss of control that results from the increased corporate complexity that, in 
turn, is the result of growth through mergers and acquisitions internationally, as well as the 
continuous trend towards decentralisation.  Second and contrary to Galloway’s findings 
(1995), they expect internal audit to serve a supporting function, instead of a pure control 
function.  The meaning of this role depends upon the specific case and will be summarised 
below.  Third, senior management sometimes wants internal audit to be a training ground for 
future high potentials.  It is understandable that internal audit departments consisting of 
several internal auditors are better able to cope with a high rotation rate and, consequently, to 
meet this expectation.  Note that internal audit’s perception of its role as a training ground is 
not uniformly positive.  Fourth, senior management expects internal audit to be the safeguard 
of the corporate culture and, consequently, attach great importance to the personal contacts 
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the internal auditors have during their work with people in the company.  Therefore, they 
expect internal auditors to have appropriate communications skills.  Sometimes, they even 
expect internal audit to be facilitator for whistle-blowing.   
        
When looking into the specific meaning of the supporting role senior management expects 
internal audit to play, we could distinguish several areas.  First, and similar to what was 
reported in Cooper et al. (1996), senior managers expect internal audit to evaluate, in an 
independent way, the effectiveness and efficiency of processes in general, and of internal 
controls more specifically, in order to provide them with a sufficient level of assurance, which 
supports them in fulfilling their growing monitoring responsibilities.  Internal audit confirms 
that they still focus on the provision of assurance, primarily with respect to internal controls, 
to their different ‘clients’, which include senior management.   
 
Second and in addition to the provision of assurance, senior management expects internal 
audit to actively contribute to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the internal 
controls and processes.  Internal audit agrees that they spend a significant proportion of their 
time and effort supporting management by providing recommendations, assisting 
management with the implementation of these recommendations, and performing of ad hoc 
consultative work in strategically-important projects (e.g. acquisitions), often as the result of 
specific management demand (cf. Brody and Lowe, 2000; Ridley and D’Silva, 1997).  
Furthermore, they actively contribute to the development and implementation of a uniform 
and standardised internal control system throughout the several subsidiaries of the company, 
thereby attempting to compensate for the loss of control experienced by senior management.  
Internal audit is convinced that this role adds value to their company.   
 
Third and depending on the status of the risk management system, senior management often 
expects internal audit to assist with the formalisation of the risk management system.  
Moreover, senior management expects internal audit’s work to create a sufficient level of risk 
and control awareness within the company, taking into account the overall corporate culture 
and attitudes towards risk and control.  Besides their own role in risk management, internal 
audit expects senior management, which has the final operational responsibility for risk 
management, to take the first steps in this formalisation process, by changing their own (often 
averse) attitudes towards risk management and internal control and by giving the right signals 
and stimuli to the lower management levels.  As also suggested by Goodwin-Stewart and 
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Kent (2006), internal audit appears to be convinced that a formalised risk management and 
internal control system is a more supportive environment in which they can work.  Internal 
audit is, in most cases, convinced of their own (pioneering) role in formalising risk 
management (see also Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a).  This role differs from case to case, and 
ranges from creating awareness to becoming actively involved in the formalisation process.   
 
The cross-case analysis clearly indicates that the acceptance and appreciation of the internal 
audit function within the company is strongly dependent upon the support of senior 
management.  In other words, the extent to which senior management supports the internal 
audit function, has a strong signalling function within the company.  More specifically, this 
support is translated into the input senior management provides for the annual internal audit 
planning, the number of ad hoc requests senior managers have during the year, the attention 
they pay to the outcomes of internal audit work, the way they follow-up on internal audit’s 
recommendations and resulting action plans and their support for an expansion of the internal 
audit function through the engagement of additional internal auditors.  It should be clear that 
these are indicators of the strength of the relationship between internal audit and senior 
management.  Consequently, internal audit, who actively is looking for senior management 
support, expects to receive input from the CEO and CFO on a regular basis, as well as to have 
productive discussions with senior management on the results and follow-up of their work.  
Furthermore and complementary to senior management’s support, internal audit’s own efforts 
to promote their function through, for example more explicit communication regarding their 
added value, also augment the acceptance of their function.  Similar to Carcello et al. (2005), 
we found indications that the recent corporate scandals and resulting increased attention for 
corporate governance, have contributed to an increase in the overall level of appreciation for 
internal audit.  Even some small fraud cases at company level can enhance the level of 
attention paid to internal audit’s work.  The cross-case analysis also suggests that the 
acceptance and appreciation of internal audit by senior management is influenced by the 
maturity of the internal audit function.  In Case A, the young internal audit function was 
confronted by some ignorance about the role of internal audit, which necessitates the 
promotion of the function through clear and intensive communication (cf. also Cooper et al., 
1994).    
 
Similar to Griffiths’ findings (1999), it becomes clear that senior management’s expectations 
have a significant influence on internal audit.  Contrary to Cooper et al. (1994), the cross-case 
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analysis did not reveal significant inconsistencies between senior management’s expectations 
and the actual internal audit work.  Furthermore and contrary to Griffiths (1999), most CEOs 
and CFOs are satisfied with the work of internal audit in their company.  In other words, 
internal audit more or less is able to meet the expectations of senior management and, in most 
cases, they receive the expected support from senior management in return.         
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This study focused on the relationship between internal audit and senior management, by 
investigating qualitatively their expectations and perceptions with respect to each other.  
Based on extended data analysis, we can conclude that senior management’s expectations 
have a significant influence on internal audit.  Overall, internal audit is able to meet most of 
these expectations, which makes senior management support them.   
 
When investigating the expectations of CEOs and CFOs in this study, it became clear that 
they expect internal audit to compensate for their loss of control resulting from increased 
organisational complexity.  Given that, in three of the five cases, the internal audit function is 
performed by a single internal auditor, it probably is not easy for them to meet this lofty 
expectation.  Expansion of the internal audit function or collaboration with other individuals 
(e.g. controllers) would not seem to be a superfluous luxury.  Given internal audit’s contacts 
with people in the field, senior management also wants internal audit to be the safeguard of 
the corporate culture.   
 
Overall, senior management expects internal audit to serve a supportive function by (1) 
providing independent assurance on the effectiveness and efficiency of processes and internal 
controls; (2) actively contributing to the improvement of processes and internal controls; and 
(3) assisting with the formalisation of the risk management system.  In most cases, internal 
audit is able to meet these expectations by focussing on the provision of assurance combined 
with sufficient recommendations and the performance of ad hoc consultative work.  
Furthermore, they actively contribute to the development and implementation of a uniform 
and standardised internal control system and the creation of a sufficient level of risk and 
control awareness throughout the company.  With respect to the formalisation of the risk 
management system, internal audit expects senior management to take the first steps in this 
process, by changing their own attitudes and giving the right signals and stimuli to lower 
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management levels.  A formalised risk management and internal control system is considered 
to be a more supportive environment for internal audit.  Because many companies only 
recently initiated this formalisation process, an interesting research opportunity exists to 
monitor the changing role of internal audit through this formalisation process.   
 
Moreover, it became clear that larger internal audit departments, those staffed with more than 
one internal auditor, are expected to be training grounds for future managers.  Contrary to 
senior management, internal audit managers do not always like this idea, given the resulting 
high rate of rotation within their staff.  Further research can go deeper into the motivations 
behind recruiting former internal auditors as managers and possible ways for management to 
convince an internal audit department to become a ‘school’ for management prospects. 
 
We conclude that the acceptance and appreciation of internal audit within the company is 
strongly depending on the support they get from senior management reflected by their input 
for the internal audit planning, their ad hoc requests during the year, their follow-up on the 
outcomes of the internal audit work and their support for an extension of the internal audit 
function.  It became clear that internal audit is actively looking for this management support 
and combines it with their own efforts to promote the function, taking into account the 
maturity of the internal audit function within the company.  Furthermore, the enhanced 
attention for corporate governance and sometimes fraud cases within the company have also 
contributed to an increase of the appreciation for internal audit.      
               
In Belgium, internal auditing is a relatively young profession.  Therefore, it would be 
interesting to conduct the same in-depth study within other countries, wherein the internal 
audit profession is more mature, and see whether such case studies lead to the same 
conclusions.  Given that case studies do not lead to generalisable results, a large-scale study, 
using, for example a questionnaire, might be used to validate the insights of this study.  This 
study focused on the interactions between internal audit and people highly-positioned in the 
organisational hierarchy.  Investigating how people at other organisational levels (e.g. middle 
and operational management) look upon internal audit definitely would complement this 
study.  Probably, difficulties related to the ignorance of the internal audit function would be 
more predominant at lower operational levels. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between Internal Audit and Senior Management 
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- Support for day-to-day activities 
- Open and direct communication 
- Input for internal audit planning 
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performance relative to its plan 
- Response to internal audit recommendations 
- Monitoring implementation of action plans 
- Keep internal audit informed 
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Objective Assurance on: 
- Effectiveness of governance processes 
- Risk management system 
- Internal control system 
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- Improve the internal control system 
- Support in other (ad hoc) strategic important activities 
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Table 1: Overview of the Qualitative Data 
 
Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E 
I
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
s
 
• CEO 
• Internal 
Auditor 
 
• CEO 
• Internal 
Auditor 
 
• CFO 
• Internal 
Auditor 
 
• 
 CFO 
• Internal Audit 
Manager 
 
• CEO 
• Chief Internal 
Auditor 
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
• Internal audit 
charter 
• Internal audit 
planning 
• Internal audit 
report 
• Internal audit 
presentation  
• Control 
matrices 
• Internal audit 
charter  
• Corporate 
Governance 
Charter 
• Management 
letter external 
auditor 
• Internal audit 
reports  
• Internal audit 
planning 
• Follow-up 
document 
• Code of Ethics 
• Business 
Control Guide 
• Internal audit 
planning 
• Internal audit 
presentation 
• Intranet pages 
on internal 
audit           
• Internal audit 
charter 
• Presentation 
audit                 
methodology 
• Internal audit 
planning 
• Overview 
audits 
conducted 
• Internal audit 
report 
• Internal audit 
presentation  
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PAPER 6 
A RESEARCH NOTE ON 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT 
AND THE SIZE OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION 
 
The sixth paper combines the insights from the previous four qualitative papers to develop 
alternative explanations for the size of the internal audit function, and therefore refers to the 
first research question of this dissertation (macro level).  Instead of being conclusive, this 
paper is focused on the development and operationalisation of new explanatory variables that 
complement the existing agency variables tested in paper one.  The major aim of this paper is 
to validate conclusions coming out of the case studies and to draw a conceptual model for 
further research on the size of the internal audit function.      
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A RESEARCH NOTE ON 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONTROL ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE SIZE OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION16 
 
Gerrit Sarens 
 
Abstract:  This study attempts to contribute to the literature by developing three control 
environment variables, reflecting the contemporary context in which internal auditing is 
operating, and testing how these variables are related to the size of the internal audit function.  
Data were collected through a questionnaire sent to Chief Audit Executives.  The new control 
environment variables turned out to be relevant when studying the size of the internal audit 
function.  The results show that the degree of formalisation of the risk management system 
and the risk culture are both positively associated with the size of the internal audit function.  
Furthermore, the significance of the control environment variables seems to be different 
between the smallest and largest companies in this study.  The results of this study lead to a 
conceptual model for further research.      
 
Keywords: internal auditing, control environment, Belgium 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Increased demands for accountability have made organisations’ risk management and internal 
control systems part of public policy debates on corporate governance.  Many national and 
international corporate governance regulations and guidelines, including recent initiatives 
taken by the European Commission (2003), clearly demand that boards of directors and 
executive management adopt sound risk management and internal control.  By stating that 
internal auditing should evaluate and contribute to the improvement of risk management, 
control and governance, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 2004) formally recognises the 
assurance and consulting role of internal auditing in corporate governance.   
 
Recent studies in different countries have illustrated the growing importance of internal 
auditing as a crucial player in corporate governance (Carcello et al., 2005a; 2005b; Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent, 2006; Paape et al., 2003; Spira and Page, 2003).  Nevertheless, establishing 
an internal audit function is only formally required for companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (SEC, 2003) and for companies operating in the banking and insurance 
industry (Basel Committee, 2001).  Although all other companies are stimulated by corporate 
governance best practices to consider the establishment of an internal audit function, it still 
remains voluntary.  Few studies have investigated voluntary demand for internal auditing in 
the US (Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991) and Australia (Anderson et al., 1993; Carey et al., 
2000), illustrating the relevance of agency variables.  Recently, Sarens (2007) found that 
agency variables are highly relevant when explaining the size of the internal audit function 
within Belgian companies.  It was confirmed that the more diffused the ownership structure of 
the company, the larger the company and the more reporting levels within the company, the 
larger the internal audit function.   
 
Complementary to existing explanatory models, recent studies in this area (cf. Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent, 2006; Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 2006b) describe the growing influence 
of the control environment on internal auditing practices.  This study develops three variables 
reflecting the control environment in which internal audit functions are operating, and tests 
whether these variables can be associated with the size of the internal audit function.  These 
new variables better fit with the increased attention for risk management and internal control 
and the growing role of internal auditing in these areas.  Given the exploratory character of 
these variables, this paper opens new ways of conducting research on internal auditing 
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characteristics.  These variables also offer practitioners a tool to evaluate and benchmark the 
size of their internal audit function based on specific characteristics of their control 
environment.   
 
The results of this study confirm the relationship between the control environment and the 
size of the internal audit function.  It is shown that the degree of formalisation of the risk 
management system and the risk culture are positively associated with the size of the internal 
audit function.  Besides, interesting differences appear between the smallest and the largest 
companies in this study.     
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The second section describes the control 
environment variables and develops hypotheses based on a review of the literature.  The third 
section outlines the methodology of this study.  The fourth section presents the empirical 
results.  Finally, the paper ends with a summary and discussion of the conclusions.     
 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONTROL ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES AND 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The study by Wallace and Kreutzfeldt (1991) is among the first to demonstrate the importance 
of control environment characteristics in explaining the existence of an internal audit 
function.  More than ten years later, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) elaborate on this idea.  
They take into account factors related to risk management and internal control.  When 
explaining the existence of an internal audit function within Australian companies, they found 
that the existence of an internal audit function is positively associated with the use of a 
separate risk management committee and the use of a designated risk manager.  These results 
suggest that firms with an integrated risk management framework are more likely to have an 
internal audit function, and that internal auditing is complementary to other risk management 
mechanisms.   
 
Recent case based research studies on internal auditing in Belgium illustrate the importance of 
the control environment.  Sarens and De Beelde (2006b) found that the tone-at-the-top and the 
control awareness are important when studying internal auditing practices.  Another recent 
study by Sarens and De Beelde (2006a) revealed that the status of the risk management 
system has a strong impact on the role of internal auditing within an organisation.  Factors 
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that turned out to affect internal auditing are: the level of risk and control awareness, the 
degree of formalisation of the risk management system, the extent to which responsibilities 
related to risk management and internal controls are clearly defined and communicated, and 
the existence of a separate risk management function.       
 
The risk management environment seems to have an important effect on how the internal 
audit function operates within an organisation (Selim and McNamee, 1999b; Spira and Page, 
2003).  The description of the control environment provided by the Enterprise Risk 
Management framework (ERM, 2004) is used as the basis for this study.  The ERM 
framework (2004) describes the control environment of a company as: 
“…the foundation for all other components of enterprise risk management, providing 
discipline and structure.  The internal environment influences how strategy and 
objectives are established, business activities are structured and risks are identified, 
assessed and acted upon.  It influences the design and functioning of control activities, 
information and communication systems, and monitoring activities”.  
 
This description suggests that the control environment has an influence on all other 
components of a risk management system, and thus, also on internal auditing.  Internal 
auditing plays a crucial monitoring role with respect to risk management and internal control 
systems, as clearly outlined by the IIA (2004) and confirmed by recent studies (Allegrini and 
D’Onza, 2003; Paape et al., 2003; Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; Spira and Page, 2003).  
Given these indications, this study has the intention to develop three variables reflecting 
different dimensions of the control environment.  Three hypotheses will test the relationship 
between these variables and the size of internal audit functions.   
 
Tone-at-the-Top  
According to the ERM framework (2004), the tone-at-the-top is an important element of the 
control environment.  This refers to a company’s ethical values, management’s philosophy 
and operating style (Cohen et al., 2002) which are reflected by the company’s code of conduct 
or code of ethics.  Schein (1990) suggests that the modelling by leaders and powerful 
organisational members enables other group members to identify with them and internalise 
their values and assumptions.  Sarens and De Beelde (2006b) examine the influence of the 
tone-at-the-top on the scope of internal audit activities.  Based on this study, it can be 
reasonably assumed that when the company pursues integrity and clear ethical values and 
when management shows integrity in its philosophy and operating style, the independent and 
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objective monitoring role of internal auditing will take on greater importance.  This can be 
seen as a way of translating and communicating the tone-at-the-top throughout the company.  
Furthermore, Sarens and De Beelde (2006a; 2006b) show that risk and control awareness at 
management level is another element that can be considered as part of the tone-at-the-top, and 
that has an influence on the scope of internal audit work.  It can be assumed that the more 
management is aware of risks and controls, the more they will appreciate internal auditing’s 
supportive role in monitoring and improving risk management and internal control.  
Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: A more supportive tone-at-the-top in the company is associated with a larger 
internal audit function.  
 
Formalisation of the Risk Management System 
In addition to the overall risk and control awareness within the company, Sarens and De 
Beelde (2006a) and Selim and McNamee (1999b) demonstrate the relationship between the 
status of the risk management system and internal audit activities.  A company with a more 
formalised risk management system, in which the responsibilities are clearly defined, is a 
more supportive environment for internal auditing.  The more formalised the risk 
management system, the more the systematic and disciplined assurance and consulting role of 
internal auditing in evaluating and improving the risk management system will be valued.  
Following Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) and Selim and McNamee (1999b), who both 
found that risk management functions interact with internal auditing, the existence of a 
separate risk manager or risk management function, as part of the overall risk management 
system, will presumably enhance the role of internal auditing.  It can be argued that a separate 
risk manager, supporting management in their risk management responsibilities, will more 
appreciate the complementary role of internal auditing in monitoring and improving the risk 
management system.  We will test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: A more formalised risk management system is associated with a larger internal 
audit function.             
 
Risk Culture  
Selim and McNamee (1999a) found that an organisation’s culture is greatly influenced by the 
tacit acceptance that business risks, both in their negative and positive facets, are paramount 
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in all decisions relating to the strategic and tactical levels.  As described by the ERM 
framework (2004), the risk culture characterises how a company considers risk in its day-to-
day activities, the extent to which the company seeks out or avoids high risk projects or 
solutions in its day-to-day activities.  For many companies, the risk culture flows from the 
company’s risk appetite, influencing the final extent of risk a company wants to accept when 
pursuing its goals and objectives.  Companies with a higher (lower) risk appetite will more 
(less) actively look for high risk projects or solutions.  It would be expected that in a high-risk 
culture, the probability of a fraud case will be enhanced.  Selim and McNamee (1999a) found 
empirical evidence that the risk culture cascaded down the organisational structure to include 
managers at all levels.  By implication, this can be internal auditing.  It is supposed that within 
a high-risk culture, internal auditing can play a more value adding role in monitoring risk 
taking and the way of managing risks as well as looking for potential fraud indicators 
resulting from this high risk-taking behaviour.  This leads to a third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  A higher risk culture in the company is associated with a larger internal audit 
function.       
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Target Population  
Our target population consists of two groups of companies.  The first is banks and insurance 
companies, as they have internal audit functions in order to comply with regulatory 
requirements (Basel Committee, 2001).  The second, based on the membership database of 
the Belgian Institute of Internal Auditors (IIABEL), consists of manufacturing and service 
companies that have an internal audit function.  This results in a target population of 260 
companies.   
 
Data Collection 
Data for this study were collected using a questionnaire based on literature and pre-tested with 
nine experienced Chief Audit Executives17.  This questionnaire was e-mailed in November 
2005 to the head of the internal audit department of all 260 companies from the target 
                                                
17
 Note that all these Chief Audit Executives have more than 15 years of experience in internal auditing.  Three 
of them are working in a financial company (bank and insurance) and six are working in a non-financial 
company.  
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population.  By March 2006, after an intensive follow-up by e-mail and phone18, 85 
questionnaires were returned (overall response rate of 32.69 percent).  After leaving out 12 
questionnaires containing many missing values, the final count of usable questionnaires was 
73.  This represents 28.08 percent of the target population, which is comparable to recent 
studies in this area (e.g. Carcello et al., 2005a, Mat Zain et al., 2006).        
 
Non-Response Bias 
To detect a possible non-response bias, Armstrong and Overton (1977) suggest comparing 
key constructs between early and late respondents19.  The analysis reveals no significant 
differences in terms of number of employees (p = .702) and total assets (.109) between early 
and late respondents.  Comparing the size of the internal audit function and the control 
environment variables did not show significant differences between early and late 
respondents.  It can be concluded that the data do not suffer from a non-response bias.     
   
Size of the Internal Audit Function 
Respondents were asked to indicate the number of internal auditors (FTE) in their internal 
audit department.   
 
Company Size 
Consistent with previous research, total assets as stated in the 2005 annual report are used to 
measure company size (cf. Carey et al., 2000; Chow, 1982; Sarens, 2007; Wallace and 
Kreutzfeldt, 1991). 
 
Operationalization of the Control Environment Variables  
Table 1 gives an overview of the different items for each of the three variables and the results 
of the factor analysis (Varimax).  Together, these three variables account for 69 percent of the 
total variance.  All items were measured through the questionnaire using a Likert scale 
ranging from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree).  The first variable (Tone-at-the-
Top) is measured using four items based on the ERM framework (2004) as well as previous 
research done by Sarens and De Beelde (2006a; 2006b).  It has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85, 
which is quite high for a new developed measure.  The second variable (Formalisation of the 
                                                
18
 We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of IIABEL in this part of the data collection.  
19
 We consider those respondents returning their questionnaire during the last week of the data collection, who 
lasted 18 weeks in total, as ‘late respondents’.  
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Risk Management System) is measured using three items based on Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent (2006) and Sarens and De Beelde (2006a), resulting in a sufficiently reliable measure 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.74).  The third variable (Risk Culture) is measured based on three 
items inspired by the ERM framework (2004).  The reliability of this measure is still 
acceptable (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.66) given the exploratory character of this study.  For each 
variable, the average of the items was calculated and will be used in further analysis.    
             
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A of Table 2 shows a breakdown of the respondents by industry.  It becomes clear that 
almost one third (32 percent) of the respondents comes from the production, energy and 
utility sector, whereas one fourth (26 percent) of the respondents operates in the financial 
sector (bank or insurance company).  Panel B of Table 2 divides the respondents into three 
groups based on their size (total assets).  A first group contains the relatively smaller 
companies (total assets < 500 million Euro) and represents about 29 percent of the 
respondents.  A third group contains the largest companies (total assets > 7.5 billion Euro) 
and represents 22 percent of the respondents.  Almost half of the respondents (49 percent) 
falls within the middle group.   
 
Table 3 reveals substantial variability in the number of internal auditors, ranging from 1 to 
130, with a mean of about 11 internal auditors.  The scores for the control environment 
variables show that the tone-at-the-top is supportive (overall average score above 4) in 73 
percent of the responding companies.  This is supported by an average score of 4.07.  The risk 
management system of the responding companies is, on average, somewhat formalised 
(average score of 3.14).  Only 34 percent of the responding companies has a formalised risk 
management system (overall average score above 4).  Overall, the culture seems to be 
relatively risk averse (average score of 2.92).  Only one fourth (26 percent) of the companies 
has a high risk culture (overall average score above 4).      
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
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Correlations and Significance Tests 
Table 4 gives of an overview of the correlations when taking into account all respondents.  
Consistent with previous research (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Anderson et al., 1993; Chow, 1982; 
Sarens, 2007) the size of the internal audit function is strongly positively correlated (p < .01) 
with the company size.   
 
Besides, the correlation matrix indicates a significantly positive correlation (p < .01) between 
the formalisation of the risk management system and the size of the internal audit function.  
An ANOVA test reveals a significantly larger internal audit function in those companies with 
a formalised risk management system (F = 12.594; p < .01).  This result confirms the second 
hypothesis and indicates that a more formalised risk management system is associated with a 
larger internal audit function.  It is suggested that a more formalised risk management system 
in which responsibilities are clearly defined and in which a separate risk manager or risk 
management function exists, can be considered as a more supportive environment for internal 
auditing (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a).  This is reflected in a larger internal audit function.  
Furthermore, this result is consistent with previous findings of Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006) and Selim and McNamee (1999b), indicating the complementary role between the 
internal audit function and the risk manager.     
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
A closer investigation of Table 4 reveals that the formalisation of the risk management system 
is significantly positively related (p < .01) with the company size and the tone-at-the-top.  A 
more formalised risk management system is associated with larger companies and a more 
supportive tone-at-the-top.  
 
Company size seems to be a dominant variable.  Therefore, the group of respondents is 
divided into three sub-groups based on the company size (cf. Panel B of Table 2).  Table 5 
shows the correlation matrix for the smallest companies (total assets < 500 million Euro).  
The size of the internal audit function is only significantly positively (p < .05) correlated with 
the formalisation of the risk management system.  This is supported by an ANOVA test 
indicating a significantly larger internal audit function (F = 5.867; p < .05) in those companies 
with a formalised risk management system.  Within the smallest companies, the formalisation 
of the risk management is not significantly correlated with other variables.   
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[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
   
Table 6 shows the correlation matrix for the largest companies (total assets > 7.5 billion 
Euro).  Contrary to the smallest companies, the size of the internal audit function is only 
significantly positively (p < .01) correlated with the risk culture.  This is supported by an 
ANOVA test revealing a significantly larger internal audit function (F = 4.421; p = .05) in 
those companies with a high risk culture.  A further investigation of Table 6 shows a 
significantly positive correlation (p < .05) between the risk culture and the company size.  It 
seems that, within this group, the largest companies are associated with a higher risk culture.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Table 7, showing the correlation matrix for all other companies that fall within the middle 
group (total assets > 500 million Euro and < 7.5 billion Euro), reveals no significant 
correlation between the size of the internal audit function and neither with the control 
environment variables, nor with the company size.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, three control environment variables were developed and their relationship to  
the size of the internal audit function was tested.  In contrast to previous research, 
incorporating single characteristics of the control environment (cf. Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent, 2006; Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991), this study reflects different dimensions of the 
control environment measured by well-considered items.  The operationalisation of this new 
model was inspired by the ERM framework (2004) and recent findings on internal auditing in 
Belgium (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 2006b).  It can be concluded that some characteristics 
of the control environment are significantly correlated with the size of the internal audit 
function.  This alternative approach opens new areas for further research.   
 
The results suggest that companies with a more formalised risk management system have a 
larger internal audit function.  Given previous research (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; 
Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a), this may lead to the conclusion that the monitoring role of 
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internal auditing with respect to risk management and internal controls is more valued in 
companies that adopt a formalised risk management approach.  A company in which risk 
management responsibilities are clearly defined and communicated and a separate risk 
management function exists, would be a more supportive environment for the development of 
the internal audit function.   
 
Further analysis indicates a significant positive relationship between the tone-at-the-top and 
the degree of formalisation of the risk management system.  This suggests that when a 
company pursues integrity and clear ethical values, and when management has an honest 
philosophy and operating style, combined with a high level of risk and control awareness, a 
more formalised risk management system will be implemented.  Further research could 
elaborate on this by investigating whether the following assumption makes sense: the more 
supportive the tone-at-the-top, the more formalised the risk management system, and 
consequently, the larger the internal audit function.  In other words, could the formalisation of 
the risk management system be considered as an intermediate variable?      
 
Further examination also reveals a significant positive correlation between company size and 
the degree of formalisation of the risk management system, suggesting that larger companies 
are likely to have a more formalised risk management system.  Given previous research 
indicating the positive relationship between company size and the size of the internal audit 
function (Sarens, 2007), one can wonder whether the degree of formalisation of the risk 
management system is an intermediate variable between the company size and the size of the 
internal audit function.  Can it be assumed that larger companies are more likely to have a 
formalised risk management system, and therefore, are more likely to appreciate the 
monitoring role of internal auditing with respect to risk management and internal controls?  
This may suggest that the control environment variables are, to some extent, complementary 
to the agency model adopted by previous studies in this area (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Anderson 
et al., 1993; Carey et al., 2000; Sarens, 2007; Wallace and Kreutzfeldt, 1991).  Further 
research could elaborate on this relationship.    
                      
Further analysis suggests that the control environment variables are more relevant when 
investigating the size of the internal audit function within the smallest and largest companies 
in this study.  It was found that the size of the internal audit function within the smallest 
companies is strongly related with the degree of formalisation of the risk management system.   
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Within smaller companies, the degree of formalisation of the risk management system can 
vary much more (cf. Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a), and therefore, it seems reasonable that it 
has a more significant influence on the size of the internal audit function.  As soon as the 
company reaches a certain size, a formalised risk management system becomes more 
common.  Therefore, it can be assumed that the influence of the formalisation of the risk 
management system on the size of the internal audit function becomes less significant when 
the company becomes larger.  This may suggest that company size could be considered as a 
moderating variable between the formalisation of the risk management system and the size of 
the internal audit function.        
 
Within the largest companies, the size of the internal audit function is strongly associated with 
the risk culture of the company.  This suggests that, within the largest companies, the role of 
internal auditing in monitoring risk taking, and the related internal controls as well as its 
potential role in detecting fraud become more important.  Furthermore, it was suggested that, 
within this group of largest companies, the risk culture becomes even higher when the 
company continues to grow.  Or is it the other way around?  In other words, does a company 
grow thanks to a higher risk culture, which in its turn, leads to a larger internal audit function?  
Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the influence of the risk culture on the size of the internal 
audit function becomes more significant when the company becomes larger.  Again, this may 
suggest that company size could be considered as a moderating variable.            
 
Figure 1 summarises the relationships that were supported by this study, without indicating 
any direction.  Figure 2 presents the assumed relationships and their direction, which could 
become the focus of further research.  
 
Limitations  
Although providing interesting exploratory evidence, this study is merely a first attempt to 
come up with alternative explanations for the size of the internal audit function.  More 
conclusive statistical techniques need to be performed in order to conclude on the direction of 
each of the assumed relationships.  Further research could also improve the operationalisation 
of the current variables to increase their explanatory power.  Adding new constructs, for 
example, characteristics of the board and/or the audit committee, could further enhance the 
relevance of this control environment approach in explaining the size of the internal audit 
function.  Besides the size the internal audit function, further research could also apply these 
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control environment variables to explain specific internal audit practices, such as the 
involvement in the formalisation of the risk management and internal control system, 
measured as a percentage of the annual working time.       
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Table 1: Control Environment Variables 
Measures and Items Alpha Factor 
Loading 
Source (based on) 
Tone-at-the-Top  .848   
We pursue formalised integrity and clear ethical values  .881 ERM framework (2004); 
Management has an integer philosophy and operating style  .744 Sarens and De Beelde  
There exists a code of conduct and/or code of ethics  .852 (2006a; 2006b) 
There is a high level of risk and control awareness at 
management level 
 .783  
Formalisation of the Risk Management System .739   
A formal risk management system is used within our 
company 
 .887 Sarens and De Beelde 
(2006a); 
Responsibilities related to risk management and internal 
controls are clearly defined within our company 
 .769 Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent (2006) 
There exists a separate risk manager or risk management 
function within our company 
 .740  
Risk Culture  .660   
In our company, it is common to avoid risks  .714  
Management avoids high risk projects or solutions  .852 ERM framework (2004) 
There did not happen any serious fraud case during the last 
five years 
 .734  
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Table 2 : Breakdown of the Respondents 
 Frequency Percentage 
Panel A : Industry   
Production, energy, utilities 23 31.50% 
Telecom, IT, media, entertainment 9 12.33% 
Trade, Transport, logistics 9 12.33% 
Professional services 13 17.81% 
Financial services and insurances 19 26.03% 
 73 100% 
 
  
Panel B: Company Size (Total Assets in thousand Euro)  
< 500 000 Euro 21 28.77% 
500 000 – 7 500 000 Euro 36 49.31% 
> 7 500 000 Euro  16 21.92% 
 73 100% 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (n = 73) 
 Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
Number of internal auditors 1 130 10.71 21.19 
Tone-at-the-top 1 5 4.07 0.99 
Formalisation of the risk management system 1 5 3.14 1.24 
Risk culture 1 5 2.92 1.05 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix (all companies) 
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Number_IA 1     
Total_Assets .522** 1    
Tone_at_the_Top .167 .193 1   
Formalisation .371** .315** .428** 1  
Risk_Culture .178 .193 -.205 -.009 1 
    * : p <.05 ** : p <.01 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix (smallest companies) 
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Number_IA 1     
Total_Assets .222 1    
Tone_at_the_Top .091 .245 1   
Formalisation .484* .102 .431 1  
Risk_Culture .085 .068 -.277 -.159 1 
    * : p <.05 ** : p <.01 
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Table 6: Correlation Matrix (largest companies) 
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Number_IA 1     
Total_Assets .377 1    
Tone_at_the_Top .105 .347 1   
Formalisation .260 .347 .445 1  
Risk_Culture .653** .531* .359 .064 1 
    * : p <.05 ** : p <.01 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix (middle group) 
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Number_IA 1     
Total_Assets .190 1    
Tone_at_the_Top -.180 .095 1   
Formalisation .073 .282 .593 1  
Risk_Culture -.058 .210 -.262 .146 1 
   * : p <.05 ** : p <.01 
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Figure 1: The Relationship between the Control Environment and the Size of the Internal Audit Function 
(Supported Associations) 
 
      
   Tone-at-the-Top  +    Formalisation of the  + 
       Risk Management System 
 
 
        
                Risk Culture   +  Size of the Internal  
                 Audit Function 
                +        + 
 
              Company Size   + 
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Figure 2: The Relationship between the Control Environment and the Size of the Internal Audit Function 
(Assumed Direction of the Relationships) 
 
      
   Tone-at-the-Top  +    Formalisation of the  + 
       Risk Management System 
 
 
        
                Risk Culture   +  Size of the Internal  
                 Audit Function 
                +          +          +  -         + 
 
              Company Size    
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation, consisting of six related papers, dealt with two research questions.  First, the 
size of the internal audit function (macro level) was explained, and second, organisational 
variables, influencing internal audit practices (micro level) were studied.  Overall, this 
dissertation provided a comprehensive picture of the internal audit profession.   
 
This dissertation contributes to the academic literature by positioning internal audit in the 
contemporary corporate governance context, a context that has changed a lot during the past 
decade.  As a consequence, the role of internal audit in corporate governance has also changed 
significantly, creating a need for updated and refined research and theory specification.  
Contrary to most academic research on internal audit, this dissertation studied internal audit in 
a continental European context in which corporate governance requirements are less stringent, 
compared to an Anglo-Saxon context.  This creates a unique context in which, for a majority 
of companies, the establishment of an internal audit function still remains voluntary.   
 
In this dissertation, a unique mix of theories was used to enhance the understanding of 
internal auditing and specify an advanced theoretical framework to study the role of internal 
audit in corporate governance, something that was missing until now.  More specifically, 
agency theory, sociology of professions theory and applied psychological theory were 
combined with insights from previous empirical research on internal audit, the Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Audit and current corporate governance guidelines and 
best practices.  Studying the empirical data from such a rich theoretical point of view created 
many new insights that contribute both to the academic literature in this area as well as to the 
development of the internal audit profession.  In order to attain the overall goal of this 
dissertation to provide a comprehensive picture of the internal audit profession, a balanced 
combination of qualitative and quantitative data was used, leading to sound and well-founded 
conclusions.   
 
Appendix 4 reviews the key constructs of this dissertation, linked with the six papers.  
 
At the macro level, this dissertation explained the size of the internal audit function from two 
different theoretical approaches.  Traditional agency theory was validated as a relevant 
explanation for the size of the internal audit function.  More specifically, internal audit turned 
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out to be an important monitoring mechanism in reducing information asymmetries stemming 
from the separation of ownership and control of companies, a problem that can be considered 
as the root of corporate governance principles.  Furthermore, it turned out that internal audit is 
also a mechanism to reduce internal information asymmetries between those who delegate 
responsibilities (senior management) and those who assume these responsibilities (lower 
management).  More specifically, the size of the internal audit function seemed to be 
positively related to the size of the company and the number of reporting levels within the 
company.  Keeping these findings in mind, one can wonder why current corporate governance 
guidelines and recommendations in Belgium, as well as in other European countries, only 
limitedly focus on the monitoring role of internal audit in corporate governance.  This 
dissertation illustrated that a well-developed internal audit function seems to be a necessary 
element to achieve good corporate governance.  Without falling into the extreme of making an 
internal audit function mandatory (e.g. NYSE listed companies), corporate governance 
guidelines and recommendations should definitely stimulate more intensively the 
establishment and development of an internal audit function and highlight its key role in 
monitoring risk management, internal control and governance.  This will not only benefit 
corporate governance, but, also, increase the maturity of the internal audit profession.     
 
Complementary to agency theory, this dissertation specified three new control environment 
variables (tone-at-the-top, formalisation of the risk management system and risk culture) 
offering alternative explanations for the size of the internal audit function.  Empirical tests 
demonstrated that a more formalised risk management system, as well as a higher risk culture 
within the company, are associated with a larger internal audit function.  This alternative 
theoretical approach opens new ways to study the importance of internal audit and fits within 
the increased attention to risk management and internal control as crucial parts of corporate 
governance.  Future research could refine these variables and add new dimensions of the 
control environment to this research model in order to enhance its relevance and explanatory 
power.  It can be argued that a stronger focus of corporate governance guidelines and best 
practices on the importance of risk management and internal control, as well as a more 
detailed specification of the responsibilities of the board of directors (audit committee) and 
executive management within this area, would stimulate companies to further develop and 
formalise their risk management and internal control system.  This would contribute to good 
corporate governance and create a more supportive environment for the development of the 
internal audit function.  Given its crucial role in risk management and internal control, 
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internal audit would benefit from an increased attention to risk management and internal 
control in corporate governance guidelines and recommendations.     
 
Besides explaining the size of the internal audit function, this dissertation specified new 
organisational variables that influence internal audit practices (micro level).  Well-considered 
case studies specified the influence of three organisational variables: the stakeholders of 
internal audit, the risk management and internal control system and the organisational support 
for internal audit.  Basically, it was found that internal audit practices should be studied from 
the two-way interaction between internal audit and its two major stakeholders, the audit 
committee (as a sub-committee of the board of directors) and senior management.  This 
dissertation clearly demonstrated that this two-way interaction is characterised by, on the one 
hand, the search for comfort by the audit committee and senior management, and, on the other 
hand, the provision of comfort by internal audit.  More specifically, the needs of the internal 
audit’s stakeholders for comfort turned out to be influenced by the corporate governance 
context imposing specific requirements with respect to financial reporting, risk management 
and internal control, as well as the status of the risk management and internal control system.   
 
Overall, stakeholders need comfort on the control environment of the company and expect 
internal audit to be the ‘guard of the corporate culture’.  Furthermore, stakeholders want 
internal audit to be a supporting function, instead of purely a control function.  Internal audit 
creates this comfort by providing its stakeholders with an independent evaluation of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of processes and internal controls, combined with 
recommendations to improve their effectiveness and efficiency.  It has been illustrated that 
more stringent corporate governance requirements, such as internal control review and 
disclosure requirements (e.g. Sarbanes Oxley Act), stimulate stakeholders to look more 
actively for internal audit’s objective evaluations and opinions as a basis to fulfil their 
responsibilities.  Moreover, a less developed and formalised risk management and internal 
control system creates specific feelings of discomfort on behalf of the audit committee and 
senior management.  Consequently, internal audit’s active supporting role in the formalisation 
of the risk management and internal control system creates a significant level of comfort for 
the audit committee and senior management.  It has been found that internal audit’s unique 
knowledge, consisting of general conceptual knowledge combined with more specific 
company-related and practical knowledge on processes, procedures, risk management and 
internal controls, forms the basis to provide comfort.   
 230
The case studies indicated that internal audit’s stakeholders reciprocate this comfort by 
providing them with the necessary support.  It turned out that this organisational support is 
strongly influencing the acceptance and appreciation of the internal audit function within the 
company, and, as a consequence, also internal audit practices.  More specifically, this support 
is translated into input for the annual audit planning, ad hoc requests, attention paid to the 
results of internal audit, follow-up of recommendations and action plans and support for the 
expansion of the internal audit function.  Indications were found that the recent increased 
attention to corporate governance has contributed to increased organisational support for 
internal audit, which can be explained by the significant level of comfort that internal audit 
can provide to its stakeholders.   
 
In addition to its academic contribution, this dissertation adds value to the development of the 
internal audit profession.  It has to be stressed that this dissertation was realised thanks to an 
intensive collaboration with practitioners and, therefore, it would be an honour for me to 
reciprocate their willingness to provide data for this research.  This dissertation offers 
valuable benchmarking information on current best practices.  In particular, the insights of 
this dissertation enable practitioners to evaluate the size of their function and their current 
activities based on the specific influence of stakeholders, such as the audit committee and 
senior management, or the specific characteristics of the control environment in which they 
are working.  Moreover, the conclusions of this dissertation provide guidance on how to 
strengthen their position within the contemporary corporate governance field and, thereby, 
enhance their added value for the company.      
 
It should be noted that each of the research methods applied in this dissertation has its 
limitations.  Qualitative samples have the intention of being purposive instead of random.  
Therefore, the conclusions resulting from these case studies can not be generalised, but need 
to be interpreted as specifying new theoretical concepts and relationships.  Moreover, the 
selection of cases is partially theoretically driven and partially based upon experience with the 
internal audit profession.  Besides, only a limited number of people were interviewed, thereby 
focusing on the perceptions of internal auditors, audit committee members and senior 
managers.  Further research could take into account the perceptions of other stakeholders, 
such as lower managers.  With respect to the quantitative data, it needs to be stressed that, in 
paper one, proxies were used to measure independent variables, such as diffusion of 
ownership and geographical dispersion of the activities.  Besides, the measurement of the 
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control environment variables in paper six is based upon subjective assessments made by the 
responding Chief Audit Executives.  It would be an interesting challenge for further 
researchers to come up with more objective measures for these control environment variables.      
 
Given that the influence of the organisational variables has been studied at the level of 
internal audit practices, further research could extrapolate these conclusions to the broader 
corporate governance field and investigate to what extent comfort provided by internal audit 
leads to improved performance by the board of directors and audit committee, or increased 
quality in financial reporting.  When elaborating on these interesting topics, researchers could 
contribute to the theory and literature in each of these specific research areas by applying the 
theoretical insights of this dissertation.  The case studies also indicated that internal audit’s 
stakeholders, especially the audit committee, often rely on other sources of comfort such as 
the external auditor.  Indications were found that an intensive collaboration between internal 
and external audit can significantly enhance the overall level of comfort for the audit 
committee.  Therefore, it could be an interesting challenge to elaborate further on this idea 
and investigate whether this collaboration enhances, for example, overall audit quality.  A 
quantitative approach, relying on, for example, a combination of archival and questionnaire 
data, seems to be an appropriate way to study this relationship.     
 
As this dissertation mainly focuses on the specific needs for comfort of internal audit’s 
stakeholders and how internal audit can provide this comfort, this dissertation ignores the 
specific motivations and incentives that stimulate audit committee members and senior 
managers to seek this comfort.  In this dissertation, it is assumed that feelings of discomfort 
were created by enhanced corporate governance requirements imposed on the audit committee 
and senior management.  Nevertheless, it can be argued that more specific personal 
motivations underlie the behaviour of audit committee members and senior managers in 
assuming their responsibilities and seeking for comfort.  Therefore, a whole new research 
area, combining the theoretical contributions of this dissertation with concepts from 
management control literature, still remains unexplored and is, as a consequence, an attractive 
way to contribute to the literature.  Consistent with the methodological approach of this 
dissertation, further research in this area could use qualitative data in a first step to explore 
this new dimension, followed by quantitative data collected on a larger scale to validate 
conclusions. 
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To end with, I want to adjust a quote mentioned in paper two: “The area of internal auditing is 
still ripe for a wide variety of research (Rittenberg, 1999; 35)”.   
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Appendix 1: Overview of the Six Papers (Subject and Research Method) 
 
 Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 Paper 4 Paper 5 Paper 6 
Subject  Agency Model to 
Explain the Size of 
the Internal Audit 
Function  
Three 
Organisational 
Variables that 
Influence Internal 
Auditing Practices 
Role of Internal 
Audit in Risk 
Management 
Relationship 
between Internal 
Audit and the 
Audit Committee 
Relationship 
between Internal 
Audit and Senior 
Management 
Relationship 
between Control 
Environment and 
Size of the Internal 
Audit  Function 
Research Method Questionnaire + 
Annual Reports  
6 Case Studies: 
Cases 1 to 6  
10 Case Studies: 
Cases 7 to 16 
4 Case Studies: 
Cases 6, 14, 16, 17  
5 Case Studies: 
Cases 6, 14, 16, 
17, 18 
Questionnaire 
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Appendix 2: Overview of the 18 Cases 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
Year 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 – 2005 
Sector Services Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Banking and Insurance Manufacturing 
Employees 1 000 – 5 000 5 000 – 10 000 1 000 – 5 000 1 000 – 5 000 > 10 000 > 10 000 
Listing Euronext Paris 
Deutsche Börse 
Frankfurt 
Euronext Brussels 
Euronext Paris 
None Euronext Brussels Euronext Brussels Euronext Brussels 
Age of the internal 
audit function* 
2 years 12 years 13 years 1 year > 20 years > 20 years 
Number of internal 
auditors (FTE)* 
1 2 3 1 300 8 
Interviewee(s) Internal Auditor Internal Audit 
Manager 
Internal Audit Director Internal Auditor Internal Audit 
Manager 
Internal Audit 
Manager 
Audit Committee 
Chair 
Chief Financial Officer 
*: when the case study was conducted 
 
 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 
Year 2004 2004 2004 2004 – 2005  2004 2004 
Sector Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services Services 
Employees > 10 000 > 10 000 > 10 000 5 000 – 10 000 > 10 000 > 10 000 
Listing Euronext Brussels New York Stock 
Exchange 
Euronext Brussels Euronext Brussels New York Stock 
Exchange 
New York Stock 
Exchange 
Age of the internal 
audit function* 
10 years 25 years 10 years 7 years 10 years 30 years 
Number of internal 
auditors (FTE)* 
7 120 20 2 6 50 
Interviewee(s) Chief Audit Executive Internal Audit 
Manager 
Chief Audit Executive Internal Auditor 
 
Internal Audit 
Manager 
Internal Audit 
Manager 
*: when the case study was conducted 
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 Case 13 Case 14 Case 15 Case 16 Case 17 Case 18 
Year 2004 2004 - 2005 2004 2004 – 2005 2005 2005 
Sector Services Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Services Services 
Employees > 10 000 1 000 – 5 000 1 000 – 5 000 1 000 – 5 000 1 000 – 5 000 1 000 – 5 000 
Listing New York Stock 
Exchange 
Euronext Brussels Euronext Brussels Euronext Brussels None Euronext Brussels 
Age of the internal 
audit function* 
35 years 15 years 2 years > 15 years 1 year 13 years 
Number of internal 
auditors (FTE)* 
14 1 2 1 1 3 
Interviewee(s) Internal Audit 
Manager 
Internal Auditor 
Audit Committee 
Chair 
Chief Financial Officer 
Internal Audit 
Manager 
Internal Auditor 
Audit Committee 
Chair 
Chief Financial Officer 
Internal Auditor 
Audit Committee 
Chair 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Internal Audit 
Manager 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
*: when the case study was conducted 
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              Appendix 3: Overview of the Key Constructs  
 
 
          Agency Variables                       Internal Auditing 
          
* Diffusion of Ownership         * Size of the Internal Audit Department 
* Management Share Ownership      
* Leverage           * Assurance and Consulting Role in  
* Company Size             Risk Management, Internal Control and 
* Number of Reporting Levels           Governance  
* Geographical Dispersion of Activities 
 
          
 
                      
              
 
 
        Corporate Governance Context                New Organisational Variables 
 
* Growing Importance of Risk Management      * Expectations and Perceptions of Internal 
   and Internal Control             Audit Stakeholders 
                     - Audit Committee 
- Senior Management 
* Growing Monitoring Responsibilities for  
    the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee and     * Organisational Support for     
    Senior Management              Internal Auditing 
 
* Risk Management and Internal Control System 
             - Control Environment 
             - Internal Controls  
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Appendix 4: Overview of the Key Constructs linked with the Six Papers 
 
 
              Agency variables                       Internal auditing 
        paper 1  
* Diffusion of ownership         * Size of the internal audit department 
* Management share ownership      
* Leverage           * Assurance and consulting role in  
* Company size             risk management, internal control and 
* Number of reporting levels            governance  
* Geographical dispersion of activities 
 
          
 
     paper 1                 paper 3 - 5   paper 4 - 5   paper 2                 paper 6 
              
 
 
        Corporate governance context                New organisational variables 
 
* Growing importance of risk management        * Expectations and perceptions of internal 
   and internal control             audit stakeholders 
                paper 2 - 6    - Audit committee 
- Senior management 
* Growing monitoring responsibilities for  
    the board of directors, the audit committee and      * Organisational support for     paper 4 - 5 
    senior management              internal auditing 
 
* Risk management and internal control system 
             - Control environment 
             - Internal controls  
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